The Collapse of Communist Power in Poland by Hayden, Jacqueline
The collapse of communist power in Poland in 1989 was unforeseen and
unexpectedly sudden. Based on extensive original research, including interviews
with key participants, this book examines the process whereby the Communist
Party lost power. It sets out the sequence of events and examines the strategies of
various Communist Party players both before and during the Round Table
negotiations with Solidarity in the spring of 1989.
This volume argues that the specific negotiating strategies and institutional
arrangements agreed by the communist party representatives in the Round Table
discussions before the partially free elections in June were key factors in
communism’s collapse. In tracing the gap between what the PZPR (Communist
Party) expected in each bargaining scenario and the actual outcome, Hayden
assesses the evidence to determine whether the party members were far-sighted
strategists attempting to control and shape the process of democratic transition in
Poland, or whether they were caught up in a set of dynamic circumstances where
strategic mistakes produced unexpected political results.
This book shows that on many occasions, PZPR decision-makers ignored
expert advice, and many Round Table bargains went against the party’s best
interests. Using in-depth interviews with key party players, including General
Jaruzelski, General Kiszczak and Mieczys„aw Rakowski, as well as Solidarity
advisors such as Adam Michnik, The Collapse of Communist Power in Poland
provides a unique source of first-hand accounts by key players in Poland’s
revolutionary drama.
Jacqueline Hayden is a lecturer in politics at the Department of Political
Science, Trinity College, Dublin. She worked as a current affairs journalist and
radio producer for 15 years before completing her PhD in 2002. Her previous
books include Poles Apart: Solidarity and the New Poland (Dublin: Irish
Academic Press, 1994) and Lady G: A Biography of the Honourable Lady Valerie
Goulding LLD (Dublin: Townhouse Press, 1994).
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Why did the Polish communist party (PZPR) lose power over the summer of
1989? The starting point of this volume is the fact that, heretofore, there has been
no satisfactory answer to this question. It is an important question which goes
beyond the specific context of the collapse of communism in Poland to the
underlying causes of regime change as a phenomenon. Understanding what
caused the Polish communist party to collapse is not only challenging in the con-
text of theories of stability and change but it is also challenging because of the
effect of the Polish collapse on the process of change in the rest of Eastern and
Central Europe in 1989.
This volume is the product of a 25-year association with Poland which began
when I was lucky enough to be sent to Poland in July 1980 by an Irish newspaper,
The Irish Press, which wanted copy on the new Polish Pope and on the impact
of his pontificate on his native country. On my arrival in Warsaw, I made my way
to the homes of a list of dissident contacts and was lucky enough to be generously
welcomed by Jan Lity‘ski and Krystyna Lity‘ska. Jan was a prominent dissident,
editor of Robotnik (The Worker), an underground newspaper published by KOR
(Workers’ Defence Committee). Over the course of the next month, I travelled all
over Poland with Jan as strikes started in various factories, and was eventually
invited to a planning meeting of the Free Trade Unions of the Coast in the company
of Lech Wa„ˇsa and the rest of the committee on the eve of the start of the Gda‘sk
shipyard strike that was to launch the Solidarity trade union, Solidarnof-.
I stayed in touch with the Polish story and with my Polish friends throughout
the 1980s. In 1989, by then working for Irish radio, I covered the semi-free
elections in June and began gathering the in-depth interviews with key players
from both the PZPR and the Solidarnof^-led opposition that would form the basis
of this current volume. However, the primary source on which the analysis is
based derives from a series of interviews conducted with key communist party
actors. The interviews were mainly conducted in Poland during 1999 and 2000.
Several key figures were interviewed on more than one occasion. The analysis is
also based on an examination of Politburo records, contemporary documents as
well as the research of other scholars.
Given the fact that neither the PZPR nor the opposition Solidarity trade union,
Solidarnof-, anticipated the fall of communism at the outset of the Round Table




process in February 1989, the big question is what explains the collapse of the
party’s hegemony so shortly after its negotiators had concluded a deal with
Solidarnof- that they thought would enable the communist government to continue
business as usual and carry out its economic reform programme. It is an important
question because even a cursory examination of the deals agreed at the Round Table
indicates that PZPR negotiators appeared to have adopted positions and strategies
during the negotiating process that resulted in far from optimal institutional
arrangements and outcomes for the party. So, if it is assumed that the PZPR were
rational and strategic actors and did not deliberately decide to hand power over to
the Solidarnof--led opposition, the question is what explains the behaviour and
strategic choices that brought about the collapse of the party’s power?
This volume examines a range of Round Table bargaining scenarios in order to
track the gap between the communist party’s strategic intention and the actual
institutional outcome. Adam Przeworski1 and Josep Colomer2 have offered
conflicting accounts of the motivation of regime liberalizers during the periods of
political crisis. Przeworski emphasizes the role of strategic mistakes and chaos in
facilitating regime change, while Colomer argues that regime liberalizers may
behave non-myopically, in other words, may look forward to long-term political
and other goals, especially at the outset of the process of change. This volume
focuses on the Round Table process and adopts an analytic narrative3 approach
which allows for a tractable and explicit analysis of the intentions and strategic
behaviour of PZPR negotiators. Crucially, it separates intention from actual
behaviour and, by applying a rigorous standard of rationality, makes it possible to
identify where the outcome was not the one intended by actors.
The application of a theoretically driven analysis has shown conclusively that
Polish party reformers were rational and strategic in intent when they initiated the
consultation process with the Solidarnof--led opposition. The evidence shows
that negotiators did not perceive themselves to be relinquishing power. It is also
clear that this rational intent predisposed party reformers to prefer a ‘broadened
dictatorship’, as outlined by Przeworski, or an ‘intermediate regime’, as specified
by Colomer, but not an immediate transition to democracy. While it is evident that
some PZPR players anticipated that the process of democratic change might be
faster than the competitive elections planned for 1993, the dominant view was
that the deal represented a breathing space in which the party could prepare itself
for competitive politics in the future. Solidarnof-’s weakness in the period prior
to the Round Table was the communist party’s opportunity to reach an agreement
that would retain maximum incumbent power.
In the context of whether PZPR negotiators were non-myopic and far-sighted
in their strategic behaviour before and during the Round Table, though the analy-
sis confirms the fact they were rational in intent prior to the start of the process,
it has also conclusively been shown that party negotiators made mistakes in the
conduct of the bargaining over institutions. Their consistent failure to ensure that
they had reliable information about the institutional choices they were making
tends to confirm Przeworski’s contention that democratic transition follows from
the mistakes of regime liberalizers who seek ‘broadened dictatorship’.
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This process-driven account relies on a thin or minimal conception of rationality
to track the gap between ideal, formally rational behaviour and the historical reality
of the PZPR’s actual behaviour during the course of its Round Table negotiations.
It has proved a useful heuristic in the analysis of a complex set of events where elite
actors engaged in a round of bargaining over institutions such as the proposed elec-
toral system that created its own dynamic. The analysis has conclusively shown that
over a range of bargains and scenarios, the PZPR’s strategies produced unantici-
pated outcomes. These outcomes could have been anticipated had party negotiators
sought out up-to-date information in relation to a range of institutional choices and
had they listened to the advice of sympathetic advisers.
Not only is it the case that the PZPR’s misperceived strategies produced an
unanticipated outcome, but it is also arguable that the failure to update informa-
tion is the key to any explanation of the collapse of communist power in Poland
in 1989. It is plausible to conclude that rationally intentioned PZPR actors with
up-to-date information would not have negotiated the suboptimal institutional
bargains agreed at the Round Table and may not, as a consequence, have lost
power in the dramatic way they did following the June elections. Clearly, perfect
information had the potential to change the course of the history of both Poland
and the rest of Eastern Europe.
Notes
1 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991.
2 J. M. Colomer, Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization, Baltimore,
MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
3 R. H. Bates, A. Greif, M. Levi, J. L. Rosenthal and B. R. Weingast, Analytic Narratives,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
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This book would not have been possible without the advice and support of
Krystyna Lity‘ska and Jan Lity‘ski. In July 1980 they offered both hospitality
and the opportunity to meet their fellow dissidents, trade unionists and
future Solidarnof- leaders. Later on, with their help, I began to meet senior
communist leaders and subsequently the leaders of the post-communist SdRP
(now the SLD).
The most important influence on this book has been the seminal work of
Adam Przeworski and Josep Colomer who lead the field in the analysis of
regime change and transition. I am indebted to Michael Laver for pointing me in
a fruitful theoretical direction; his advice, in relation to both methodology and
theory building, has been most productive. I am also grateful to him for his
careful reading and comments on the first draft of this text. R. J. Hill has been a
constant source of knowledge and advice and has been generous with his
time. Kenneth Benoit read a number of early drafts and offered sound advice
on methodological matters. Michael Marsh read the first draft and gave useful
advice.
Jerzy Wiatr has been extremely generous with his time. Since 1989, he has
provided lengthy interviews on a number of occasions and read the first draft of
this volume. His comments and suggestions were all helpful. I am particularly
grateful to him for his encouragement over the years. Stanis„aw Gebethner, Piotr
Winczorek and Jacek Raciborski were enormously knowledgeable in relation to
the institutional bargaining at the Round Table.
The main source for this volume is a series of interviews with former members
of the PZPR. In particular, I would like to thank the following: General W.
Jaruzelski, General C. Kiszczak, Stanis„aw Ciosek, Mieczys„aw Rakowski,
Janusz Reykowski, Jan Bisztyga, Andrzej Werblan and S„awomir Wiatr. However,
while the focus here is on the PZPR, the analysis would not have been possible
without the insights of opposition dissidents, Solidarnof- activists and Polish
scholars. I would like to thank all of them for their time, insights and advice. In
particular, I would like to thank the following: Lech Wa„ˇsa, Adam Michnik,
Bronis„aw Geremek, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Lech Kaczy‘ski, Jaros„aw Kaczy‘ski,
Bogdan Borusewicz, Alina Pie‘kowska, Ludka Wujec and GraÁyna Staniszewska.




The late Fr Józef Tischner provided invaluable insights into the motivation of
players on both sides of the Round Table.
I would also like to sincerely thank Anna Gwiazda for her generous help with
translation and proofing. Jane O’Mahony has been a constant support. I would
also like to thank Frank, Ben and Charlotte Clarke for their wholehearted support
and patience while I pursued this research.
I would also like to thank Ms Nina Smolar of Aneks for permission to include
documents published in Tajne dokumentry Biura Politycznego.




KC Komitet Centralny (Central Committee)
KC PZPR Komitet Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii
Robotniczej (Polish United Workers’ Party
Central Committee)
KOR Komitet Obrony Robotników (Worker’s Defence
Committee)
NSZZ Solidarnof- NiezaleÁne Samorz‰dne Zwi‰zki Zawodowe Solidarnof-
(Independent Self-Governing Trades Union Solidarity)
OPZZ Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Zwi‰zków Zawodowych
(All Poland Trade Union Alliance)
PAN Polska Akademia Nauk (Polish Academy of Science)
PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
PRL Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (Polish People’s Republic)
PRON Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego (Patriotic
Movement for National Rebirth)
PZPR Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United
Workers’ Party)
SD Stronnictwo Demokratyczne (Democratic Party)
SLD Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left
Alliance)
ZSL Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (Peasant Party)
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Neither the communist party (PZPR) nor Solidarnof- foresaw the fall of
communism at the outset of the Round Table1 process in Poland in February
1989.2 Shrewd participants on both sides understood that the balance of power or
Poland’s political equilibrium was about to undergo some form of change.
However, neither communist party negotiators nor their Solidarnof- counterparts
expected that the PZPR would lose power in the dramatic way it did following the
Round Table process and the first semi-free elections on 4 June 1989.
The puzzle addressed here is how to explain the speed and timing of the
collapse of communism in Poland. If certain assumptions3 are made about the
rationality of the behaviour of communist party negotiators, the central question
is why rationally, self-interested individuals adopted positions and strategies during
the Round Table process that led to suboptimal outcomes for the communist party
on a range of vital issues and institutional choices. In simple terms, the question
to be addressed is why communist party actors adopted strategies and negotiated
institutional arrangements in the course of the Round Table process that precipitated
the collapse of the party’s hegemony in Poland.
This book explores the hypothesis that the speed and timing of the collapse of
communism in Poland can be explained by the strategic behaviour of PZPR leaders
and negotiators involved in the Round Table. In the context of this hypothesis, it
is postulated in game theoretic terms that dynamic change was precipitated
because both communist party and opposition actors were playing the political
game in conditions of uncertainty without full informational resources. The idea
is a simple one. It is underpinned by the notion that misperception and false
expectations by actors about their best choices or optimal strategies, at one point
in a game or round of negotiations, may compromise their ability to behave
optimally at the next round. It follows that such misperceptions about the outcomes
of strategies may have led to outcomes that were not expected by PZPR players
at the Round Table. Specifically, the PZPR’s strategic misperception precipitated
electoral defeat and the eventual dissolution of the communist party!
There has been no comprehensive, theoretically driven analysis of the PZPR’s
role in the process that led to its loss of power. The absence of a PZPR-centred
account of the process of change in Poland in 1989 is not just an unfortunate
lacuna in the literature; it is the underlying reason why there has been no
1 Introduction
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satisfactory explanation of why and how the PZPR’s political hegemony
collapsed so dramatically in the aftermath of the partially free June elections. By
analysing the PZPR’s strategic choices both before and during the Round Table
process, this study will redress the lacuna in the literature and explain how and
why communism collapsed so speedily in Poland in the summer of 1989. The
analysis of the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe is situated
in a range of academic discourse and approaches to the explanation of political
change, revolution and democratic transition that are, in turn, underpinned by
several theoretical perspectives. Leaving aside for now the question of whether
the events of 1989 should be described as a revolution or as some other conceptual
phenomenon, these events have been subjected to structural, agent- or elite-driven
explanations as well as being analysed in the context of a vast case study literature.4
Exclusively top-down or bottom-up explanations have not adequately explained
why communism collapsed when it did, nor have they brought much light to
bear on how it collapsed, that is, they have not provided an explanation of the
underlying process of change that occurred.
There have, however, been a number of accounts that have tracked the
background or structural conditions that precipitated the endgame of communism
in Eastern Europe. George Sanford5 notes Zbigniew Brzezi‘ski’s6 argument in
The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century
that communism entered into a ‘General Crisis’ in the late 1980s. Andrzej
Rychard, amongst other authors, has referred to ‘systemic exhaustion’.7 What is
generally meant by this terminology is that, by the mid-1980s, the time had
arrived when the system, in part or whole, was no longer susceptible to reform.8
There are several constituent parts in this set of background preconditions of
collapse.
A number of writers have noted the central role played by economic decline.9
In the post-1970 period, the command economy began to fail, to varying degrees
throughout the Soviet bloc. Economic growth slowed or stopped and plants and
enterprises were not efficient and there were massive consumer shortages.
People’s lives were hugely affected by arbitrary distribution of goods because of
queuing and shortages. Corruption, both small scale and large scale, was prevalent.
The Black Market was robust and inflation grew, as did the size of the hard
currency debts and borrowings.
This economic picture was briefly interrupted by attempted cyclical reforms.
While the reform efforts were often revolutionary, they were also often destabilizing.
Partial marketization created social divisions:
The Yugoslav and Hungarian experiences confirm that it was especially
dangerous in its introductory and transitional phases by causing elite division
and social discontent which often curtailed reform before it could get into
full swing and produce any benefits.10
In the Polish context, it was the various efforts towards economic reform – mainly in
the form of price rises – that led to the social explosions of 1970, 1976, 1980
and 1988. Virtually all of the Polish communist party leaders spoken to in the
2 Introduction
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course of research for this volume argue that the main motivation behind the
initiation of talks with Solidarnof- and the opposition in 1988 was the realization
that its attempts at economic reform had failed. The same was true of Hungary
and Yugoslavia, where various attempts and varieties of party reform ended in dif-
ferent degrees of failure. In the Polish case the ‘net effect of the regime’s alternate
toying with partial corporatist and pluralist solutions only built up the pressure for
full democratization’.11 Also, in the context of the perceived battle between
communism and Western capitalism, there were a number of areas in which cap-
italism appeared to be winning. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet
bloc’s economic problems became more obvious to its own citizens particularly
to those who had access to West European, mainly German, television. It was
becoming increasingly difficult for Eastern European party leaders to camouflage
the disparity between living conditions under communism and those in the West.
Another important contextual factor was the clash between the Leninist system
of monocentric political power and the pressures of a modern differentiated
society. Modernization, albeit spotty in the Soviet bloc, created demands that
could not be dealt with in the context of monocentric politics. Sanford remarks
that deStalinizing regimes paid a heavy price for being associated with the system
of terror, which, by the 1960s, they rejected.12 In fact, in the Polish case, the
repeated attempts at reform spearheaded by reformist elements within the party
further weakened its hold on society.
Adam Przeworski has noted the impact of the collapse of ideological belief in
the communist system amongst party cadre.13 This collapse was not, of course,
confined to the party alone. Society also became accustomed to a sort of double-
speak. There was a clash between official discourse, where the official line
was parroted, and reality or everyday family and social language.14 Apart from
the cognitive dissonance generated across society, the collapse of belief in
communist ideology had far-reaching consequences. As Adam Przeworski has
remarked:
By 1989, party bureaucrats did not believe in their speech. And to shoot, one
must believe in something. When those who hold the trigger have absolutely
nothing to say, they have no force to pull it.15
Another factor with mixed degrees of importance across the Soviet bloc was the
decomposition of communist elites. This was a particular problem in Poland
where factionalism had always been rife. However, after 1980, when General
Jaruzelski suppressed Solidarnof- with the introduction of martial law, the party
membership became highly differentiated over issues relating to ideological,
economic and political direction. Solidarnof-’s challenge and the party’s initial
response to it showed that even within the party there were those who accepted
pluralism.16 In simple terms, the conflict between hardliners and party reformers
became more open and public.
Communist regimes were also badly exposed after the signing of the Helsinki
Accords.17 After 1975, Eastern European regimes were increasingly vulnerable to
Western pressure in the context of explicit standards of human and civil rights
Introduction 3
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agreed in the Accords. Failures, abuses and nonconformity in this area provided
support for internal dissident groups such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and
KOR (Workers’ Defence Committee) in Poland who were able to exploit the fact
that the People’s Democracies were not adhering to their commitments.
The fatal blow to communism was undoubtedly Gorbachev’s abandonment of
the Brezhnev Doctrine. In retrospect, it is clear that Gorbachev’s announcement
that the Soviet Union would not invade or crush Eastern European governments
who initiated change or reform, fatally undermined the USSR’s hegemony in the
region. In The Rise and Fall of State Socialism, David Lane argues that the effects
of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies had a profound impact on political
stability in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev believed that perestroika, technically
meaning restructuring, would lead to reform within the parameters of Soviet
socialism.18 However, in Eastern Europe where communist governments were
less securely grounded and where there was opposition and dissidence,
Gorbachev’s reforms and policies had more profound consequences for the
integrity of the regimes.
Gorbachev had endorsed a critique of state socialism, perestroika, which
demanded reform not only in economics but also in politics. It was not possible
to simply start an efficiency drive, which is arguably what Gorbachev wanted
because the economy was so bound up with local government. As a result of the
linkage between the economy and local government, Lane argues that perestroika
also involved democratization of local government. As some of the governments
of Eastern Europe began to adopt Gorbachev’s other policy of glasnost, which
came to mean opening up or a freeing up of the constraints on expression in the
media and public arena more generally, this atmosphere of pluralism or acceptance
of democratization and pluralism spread. Lane argues that the effects of
Gorbachev’s policies were twofold: first, the political elites were confused, less
confident and began to split.19 Arguably, it was a time of almost palpable
disequilibrium. Many party leaders and apparatchiks pondered over what would
happen if Gorbachev were to be toppled and the status quo returned. While the
Gorbachev reforms may have suited the party reformers, many in the old guard
feared such changes. The second impact, identified by Lane, was the growth of a
public disquiet.20 Across Eastern Europe two processes were occurring: some
members of the political elites were withdrawing their support for the system and
initiating processes of change, and at the same time popular movements of change
were gaining support and social recognition.
Gorbachev’s revision of Soviet doctrine had a profound impact on foreign
policy decisions. The primacy under Marxist–Leninist theory of the class interest
was used by Soviet leaders to justify their defence of the unity and identity of the
whole bloc. In the past, attempts to weaken the links between Moscow and
Eastern European governments had been met with intervention and invasion by
the USSR. Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 are both examples of the
USSR not tolerating deviance. But the Soviets did not always adopt the military
option and invade. The Polish leadership crushed Solidarnof- in 1981 with the
mere threat of Soviet intervention. Earlier in Poland, in 1956 and in 1970, and
4 Introduction
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later in the mid-1970s, food riots or wage demands had been met with violent
repression; however, these were before Gorbachev’s abandonment of the
Brezhnev Doctrine which stipulated that communist governments were not only
responsible to their own people but also responsible for the maintenance of the
integrity of Marxism–Leninism in all socialist states. Gorbachev had this to say
about his view of the Soviet Union’s responsibilities to its satellite neighbours:
Immediately after the funeral of my predecessor, Chernenko, I called a
conference of political leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries and told them
clearly that now we were actually going to do what we had for a long time
been declaring: we would adhere strictly to the principle of equality and
independence, which also included the responsibility of each party for the
development of its own country . . . This meant that we would not commit acts
of intervention or interference in their internal affairs. My counterparts at
that conference, as I came to understand later, did not take what I said
seriously. But I did adhere to this principle and never departed from it.21
It is far from clear at what point Gorbachev’s counterparts in Eastern Europe did
begin to take seriously what he was saying. In fact, trying to pinpoint when the
realization of the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine had truly sunk into the
minds of the party leaders in Eastern Europe is a crucial question for scholars
trying to assess the impact of the new Sinatra Doctrine on the calculus of party
reformers. While the question of how much party leaders actually understood the
significance of Gorbachev’s commitment to non-intervention is problematical, it
is clear that for those who did understand, there was a massive change in the cost–
benefit ratio of initiating change. Simply put, Gorbachev’s abandonment of the
Brezhnev Doctrine lessened the potential costs to reformers or those wishing
to challenge communist orthodoxy. There was no longer a single ideology. It
was now possible for national, anti-communist or pro-reform groups of any shade
or colour to challenge the one-party command economy. The system was in
disequilibrium.
There was an international and externally controlled economic dimension to this
disequilibrium. Gorbachev wanted to disengage from the Cold War but Western
leaders throughout the 1980s raised the stakes of successful disengagement.
Germany, under Helmut Kohl, pressed the cause of East Germany. Kohl wanted a
united Germany as the price for USSR’s entry into what he called the ‘European
home’. As mentioned earlier, the command economies of Eastern Europe were
collapsing and so was the USSR’s ability to offer support to its client states. Once
Gorbachev made it clear that Eastern European states had to refloat their own
economies alone, they began to look to the West for economic development. The
West, in the form of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, made
the conditions of aid consequent on political and economic pluralism. Thatcher, for
her part, demanded competitive elections and a multi-party system in the USSR.22
In essence, Gorbachev had effectively put in motion a situation where the West
was able to make certain demands on behalf of the citizens of Eastern Europe
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which linked the satisfaction of a range of Gorbachev’s goals with the satisfaction
of the West’s demands for the liberalization of the personal rights and freedom of
the people of the region. David Lane successfully argues that it was this factor
that led to the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe:
Perestroika undermined state socialism economically, ideologically, and
politically: the organizing principles of the centrally managed and controlled
economy were cast in doubt; Marxism–Leninism was subverted; the party as
the dominant political institution was destroyed.23
In the USSR, this impulse came from top-down, from the elite around Gorbachev,
but in Eastern Europe, the thrust was both from below and ‘from already estab-
lished counter-elites vying for power’.24 The communist leaderships in Eastern
Europe were simply weakened and undermined by Gorbachev. Or, as was the case
with the Polish reformers, the Gorbachev initiative reduced the costs for those
who wanted to spearhead the opening up of a market economy. So whether
the political elites were encouraged or oppressed by Gorbachev’s reforms, the
overall effect was that the elites became differentiated.
The big question, of course, is whether Gorbachev realized the potential impact
of his policies for communism in Eastern Europe.25
Clearly, the genesis of the collapse of communism goes beyond the Gorbachev
era and the immediate events that precipitated the collapse. In fact, to understand
the genesis of the collapse in each case in Eastern Europe, one should look at the
manner in which communism arrived and survived in each case. We should not
only look at factors such as the impact of Gorbachev’s reforms and Western
demands for liberalization as a prerequisite for financial aid and development as
mentioned already, but we must also focus on the social, economic, political and
ethnic make-up of each of the countries of this so-called bloc. Communism
collapsed in Eastern Europe and later in the Soviet Union, but it collapsed in
different ways and to different degrees in each of these countries.
When academics and journalists talk of the domino effect, that is, the ripple
effect of the collapse of communism in Poland and Hungary being repeated
across Eastern Europe, it is important to remember that this was not just a case of
some inevitable and deterministic dynamic. Much deeper and state-specific
processes underpinned each episode of change. In order to understand these
specific circumstances, we must look into the history and experiences of each of
these countries, both before and after the establishment of the People’s
Democracies after the Second World War. We must understand the specific
experience of communism in each state if we are to understand how structural and
external factors, including the Gorbachev phenomenon, combined to precipitate
regime change across Eastern Europe in 1989.
This volume sets out to establish how communism collapsed in Poland.
The Polish case is crucial because of its demonstration effect across Eastern
Europe in 1989.26 It is also crucial because of the speed and timing of regime
change. Understanding the sequence of events and the dynamics of the process
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that led to the PZPR’s loss of power facilitates explication of the mindset,
motivation and calculus of communist elites in the region more generally. In
tracking the sequence of events both before and during the Polish Round Table,
this volume offers detailed insight into the decision and calculus of PZPR
negotiators. The approach applied here and insights gained from this exercise
would surely prove a useful heuristic in the context of the analysis of the collapse
of party power in other Eastern European regimes in 1989.
As was argued earlier, conflicting theoretical, case study and methodological
literature underpin the central question that this volume will address. In Chapter 2,
we will examine these explanatory approaches in order to assess their relevance
to the explanation of political change and democratic transition. In particular, we
will assess whether or not these various approaches provide the explanatory
leverage required to offer an account of why communism collapsed in Poland
when it did. In the first place, we will differentiate between structural and actor-
based explanations and address the question of the classification of the events of
1989. The problem here is the issue of whether it is appropriate to classify the
regime changes experienced in various countries across Eastern Europe as an
evolutionary or revolutionary phenomenon or indeed whether either category
provides a useful heuristic device.
This discussion is followed by an evaluation of previous explanations, which
leads on to an account of why the analysis of regime change in Poland in 1989 is
more usefully characterized as a collective-action problem. In this context, it is
posited that reform-oriented members of the PZPR including the first secretary,
General W. Jaruzelski, recognizing that the regime was facing economic collapse,
responded as political entrepreneurs to bring about a resolution of the collective-
action problem or regime crisis in the hope of securing the nation’s economic
fate and, thus, ensuring their own power in the new order.
At this point, however, it is important to reiterate that, while exclusively
top-down or bottom-up explanations alone have not provided a plausible account
of why communism collapsed in Poland in the summer of 1989, this volume will
start from the premise that structural conditions provided the necessary but not
the sufficient conditions for change at the end of the 1980s. In the context of
classifying regime change as a collective-action problem and in pursuing an
actor-based explanatory framework, this volume responds to the work of Adam
Przeworski27 and Josep Colomer28 who have offered conflicting accounts of the
genesis, nature and path of the fourth wave of change and transition in Eastern
Europe since 1989. Przeworski has concluded that rational, well-informed actors
could only work to maintain the authoritarian status quo or a ‘broadened
dictatorship’,29 and that an agreed transition to democracy could be the outcome
only of misinformed or miscalculating actors’ strategies. However, Colomer takes
the view that ‘Self-interested, rational actors can play the main part in the transition
from authoritarianism to a democratic regime.’30
In his analysis of transition interactions, Colomer assumes that actors are
playing non-cooperative and non-repeated games. Relying on the conceptual
framework proposed in Brams’s ‘theory of moves’,31 Colomer posits that actors
Introduction 7
Hayden-01.qxd  18/11/05  2:43 PM  Page 7 $ 
+ + 
$ 
can react and counter-react to their choices before the game ends and that they do
not make simultaneous or blind choices of strategies but make choices in the
expectation of other actors’ reaction. It is worth quoting from Colomer at some
length in order to clarify the parameters of the debate between these two scholars
and to indicate the broad outlines of the hypotheses that will be examined in the
course of this volume:
It is also assumed that actors do not merely look at their immediate interests
but can make future-oriented calculations anticipating other actors’ reactions
and counterreactions [sic]. Instead of future repetitions of the game (which
in our case are highly unlikely to exist), some foresight of the actors is
assumed.32
In essence, then, Przeworski regards democratic transition as the result of a
misperceived strategy on the part of regime actors who sought a broadened
dictatorship, while Colomer posits that actors’ foresight, or long-time horizons,
facilitates the emergence of what he calls ‘intermediate regimes’.33 According to
Colomer, ‘intermediate regimes’ provide a safety net for incumbents and a ‘way
to create a relatively stable situation away from the dictatorship but short of
democracy’.34
In the course of his discussion, Przeworski exhorts scholars to empirically test
his analytical framework and hypotheses.35 This volume responds to this
challenge and sets out to apply the underlying assumptions underpinning both
Przeworski’s and Colomer’s analysis in order to assess which approach comes
closest to providing an explanation of the collapse of communism in Poland. It
is most important to note that Colomer specifically points out that the Polish
case tends to support Przeworski’s ‘pessimistic interpretation of human rational
choices’36 in that the incumbents there ‘were badly defeated in their self-
confident expectations to retain power by electoral means’.37 Colomer attributes
this self-confidence to the fact that the Polish process of change was temporarily
ahead of the other processes of change in Eastern Europe. However, he also
points out that, in the midterm, the unanticipated democratic outcome proved
relatively favourable for Polish communists who transformed themselves
into Social Democrats and became the leading party in a coalition government
formed in 1993.
It is important to note that Colomer makes a distinction between the rulers’
decision to negotiate or not to negotiate a political compromise with the opposition
and decisions made during the process of the subsequent negotiations.38
According to Colomer, the key question is whether the behaviour of regime
leaders can be characterized as far-sighted at the point when the decision to
negotiate or not to negotiate is made. It is this pre-negotiation stage that Colomer
regards as the focus of both his and Przeworski’s analysis. In attempting to assess
whether or not regime actors conform to the hypothesis posited by Colomer, he
argues that it is essential to distinguish between rational behaviour, which is based
on actors’ available information, and perfect information, which is not a necessary
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condition for a rational decision. In this context, it is argued that unintended
outcomes can be produced even by the most rational and best-informed decisions.
A number of points follow from the foregoing analysis. First, any attempt at
estimating the rationality of PZPR actors prior to their decision to negotiate with
the Solidarnof^-led opposition must be explicit about the available information
upon which the decision was made. It follows that a crucial goal here is to discover
whether or not the PZPR’s decision-making was premised on the evaluation of all
of the information it had at its disposal or whether information that may have had
the potential to influence decision-making was ignored or not sought out. Second,
if it can be shown that regime actors made the decision to negotiate without fully
assessing the available information, then this would tend to cast doubt on
Colomer’s hypothesis. Third, while Colomer’s analysis concentrates on the initial
decision to negotiate or not to negotiate, it is plausible to argue that if actors are
far-sighted and rational in their hopes and goals at the point when the decision to
negotiate has been made, this behaviour will continue throughout the subsequent
negotiation process.
With this in mind, we will explore a range of bargaining and decision-making
scenarios, prior to, during and in the immediate aftermath of the Round Table
negotiations, in order to assess whether the evidence tends to support the idea that
PZPR actors operated on the basis of a far-sighted time horizon or whether they
made a series of strategic mistakes that led to the unanticipated collapse of their
power. In order to track the gap between actors’ strategic expectations and actual
outcomes, we will set out an informal set of observable implications for each of
the hypotheses in each scenario evaluated. Put simply, the PZPR’s Round Table
bargaining will be analysed to assess whether party actors were well informed
and far-sighted in their behaviour or whether their bargaining and decision-making
reflects Przeworski’s contention that democratic transition only results from the
misperceived strategies or simple errors of authoritarian incumbents.
While Przeworski and Colomer employ the formal tools of game theory to
construct and illustrate their analysis of political change, this study will follow the
form of an analytic narrative. Following Bates et al., the methodological approach
employed here seeks to ‘trace the sequences of actions, decisions and responses
that generate events and outcomes’.39 By analysing contemporary documents,
secondary sources and new interview material gathered by the present author over
time with a number of key Round Table players, this volume seeks to understand
PZPR negotiators’ preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives,
the information they possessed, the expectations they formed, the strategies they
adopted and the constraints that limited their actions. In doing so, it is hoped to
construct the story that accounts for the particular outcome. Put simply, this is a
process-driven account which seeks to expose the underlying mechanisms,
interactions, motivations and strategies that led to the collapse of communism in
Poland in the summer of 1989.
The analytic narrative form employs ‘thin’ reasoning and is theoretically
driven. Rather than simply telling the story of what happened in relation to each
of the bargaining scenarios examined, each event will be analysed in order to
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track the extent to which the empirical data supports the strategic, hypothesis of
far-sightedness posited by Colomer or supports Przeworski’s mistakes hypothesis.
The observable implications of both hypotheses will be informally stated at the
outset of each narrative. In other words, a simple statement of what might be
expected, given either the assumptions of Colomer or Przeworski, will be set out
prior to the analysis of each bargaining scenario. The advantage of this method is
that because it is ‘based on rigorous deductive reasoning as well as close attention
to empirical detail, analytic narratives are tightly constrained’.40 As Bates et al.
point out, both logic and the empirical record discipline analytic narratives.41
Later on, in Chapter 3, it will be argued that process-driven accounts that set out
to compare data with hypotheses and their observable implications provide a
transparent, replicable and deeper explanation of how and why change occurred
in the way it did.
Apart from a discussion of the methodology employed here, Chapter 3
provides biographical information concerning the Round Table actors and players
with whom interviews were conducted. While the present analysis is based on an
extensive series of interviews conducted between the summer of 1989 and spring
2000, this analysis is underpinned by interviews and research carried out in
Poland since July 1980 when the Gda‘sk shipyard strike spawned Solidarnof-.
Given the focus, the bulk of the interviews quoted are with PZPR leaders and
negotiators. Many of these interviews, including those with PZPR’s first secre-
tary, General W. Jaruzelski, Poland’s last communist prime minister, Mieczys„aw
Rakowski and party ideologue and negotiator, Professor Jerzy Wiatr, were
conducted over time. The fact that many of the interviews were not once off but
conducted at different time points enhances the reliability of the information and
interpretation offered by these interviewees. In many cases, the interviewees were
asked the same or similar questions about personal motivation and role in the
Round Table process in the course of a number of interviews conducted several
years apart and, as a result, it has been possible to cross-reference these answers
and compare them with contemporary documents. This undoubtedly obviates
any questions that might be raised concerning the reliability of the accounts of
interested actors.
It has already been made clear that this analysis is informed by actor-based
explanatory approaches and assumes that the structural preconditions necessary
for change created political disequilibrium in Poland and the rest of the Soviet-
dominated bloc during the late 1980s. Chapter 4 will examine the context,
structural preconditions and historical background to the PZPR’s decision to
initiate talks with the Solidarnof^-led opposition. Having provided a biographical
account of the backgrounds and motivations of the PZPR interviewees in Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 gives an account of the game these actors thought they were playing
when they initiated the Round Table process and sought direct talks with the
Solidarnof^-led opposition in the autumn of 1988. The analysis of these
interviews as well as contemporaneous documents is informed by the conflicting
assumptions of the Przeworski and Colomer hypotheses. At the end of this
chapter, an appraisal is offered of the relative merits of these two hypotheses in
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light of the empirical data. This chapter assesses a range of evidence in order to
confirm or negate the hypothesis that in deciding to initiate talks with Solidarnof-;
PZPR actors thought they were engaging in a process of incremental and
controlled political change. It will be argued that these actors did not expect that
the initiation of talks with the opposition would lead to immediate democratization
or the collapse of communist hegemony.
Chapter 5 evaluates PZPR negotiators’ motivations and strategies in relation to
three bargaining scenarios. First, the issue of the relegalization of Solidarnof- is
analysed. The fundamental question here is how PZPR players evaluated the
impact of relegalization. Was relegalization part of a far-sighted plan or did party
actors fail to assess the potential impact of this decision? Again, the discussion is
underpinned by the assumptions of the Przeworski and Colomer hypotheses. It
has been argued that the PZPR’s desire to get Solidarnof-’s agreement to a strong
presidency was part of its plan to retain political control and power.42 However, in
order to get Solidarnof-’s agreement to the new presidential office, PZPR nego-
tiators agreed to the establishment of a freely elected Senate. It is arguable that
the consequences of the party’s failure to win any of the 100 freely elected Senate
seats was an even greater psychological blow than the collapse of its vote in the
election to the Sejm (Lower House) where only two of its candidates were elected
from its 35-member national list.43 In this context, this chapter will provide an
evaluation of the motivation of PZPR negotiators in pursuing these three institutional
bargains and assess whether the evidence tends to support the far-sighted and
strategic or mistakes hypothesis.
It has been argued that the biggest mistake made by the PZPR at the Round
Table was its negotiators’ bargaining over the electoral law. With his counter-
factual analysis of the election result, Marek Kami‘ski has shown that almost any
other voting system would have produced a more favourable result than the
electoral collapse produced under the majoritarian rule adopted by the party for
the contractual election on 4 June.44 Chapter 6 offers an analysis of the process
that led to the choice of the electoral system and voting formula in order to assess
whether or not PZPR negotiators were far-sighted and strategic office-seekers. In
this context, the analysis will focus on three separate questions: first, whether or
not errors were made in relation to the choice of electoral system and voting
formula; second, whether or not PZPR negotiators made choices on the basis of
reliable information concerning their true support levels and third, whether PZPR
actors behaved judiciously in the conduct of their overall electoral strategy.
In his analysis of the PZPR’s election campaign, written just a few months after
the election, Paul Lewis notes that many commentators said that the party had
given up the ghost before the election campaign had even started.45 Chapter 7
analyses the key features of the PZPR’s election campaign in order to assess what
PZPR strategists thought they would achieve from a range of campaign decisions.
The fundamental question is what this campaign can tell us about the motivation
and conduct of the PZPR’s electoral strategy. Was the party behaving tactically in
allowing Solidarnof- leader Lech Wa„ˇsa to engage in a television debate with the
party’s trade union boss Alfred Miodowicz? What was the motivation behind
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the decision to run a ‘personality first’46 campaign blurring the distinction
between PZPR and Solidarnof- candidates? These and other issues will be
addressed in order to assess whether we can deduce far-sighted or erroneous
strategies at the heart of the party’s campaign plan.
Przeworski notes that one PZPR Round Table participant, Professor Jerzy
Wiatr, has somewhat provocatively described the Round Table agreement as
having been the outcome of a pact between the Catholic Church and the army.47
Given the importance of the role played by General W. Jaruzelski and General
C. Kiszczak in gaining communist party support for the initiation of the Round
Table process and the fact that both of these men developed extremely positive
relationships with senior members of the hierarchy,48 there is clearly more than a
hint of truth in Wiatr’s claim. Wiatr’s remarks highlight this most fascinating
aspect of the behind-the-scenes play that facilitated the Round Table accord, that
is, the warm relationship between senior members of the Catholic Church hierarchy
and the PZPR. Chapter 7 offers an evaluation of the impact of this relationship on
the strategic choices made by the PZPR in order to assess what this relationship
has to tell us about the Przeworski and Colomer hypotheses.
The final chapter offers a review of the extent to which the new interview mate-
rial, documentary evidence and the historical data tend to support the proposition
that the collapse of communism in Poland was the unintended consequence of the
strategic misperception of PZPR Round Table negotiators who had sought
controlled and incremental political change when they initiated the process.
The evidence in relation to each bargaining scenario is evaluated and explicit
conclusions are drawn about the impact on the Przeworski and Colomer hypothe-
ses. The central issue addressed in this volume is why the communist party
collapsed in Poland in the summer of 1989. It will be shown that this particular
ancien régime did not intentionally give up. Through a blow-by-blow analysis of
each of the party’s Round Table bargaining scenarios, it will be shown that in
some cases, most particularly the initial decision to enter into talks with
Solidarnof-, PZPR actors were far-sighted and strategic in intention but that a
series of subsequent mistaken strategies produced the unexpected collapse of
the party’s hegemony long before it planned to share power self-interestedly with
the opposition.
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Two basic approaches can be distinguished in the literature on regime change and
transitions to democracy. One approach emphasizes the structural prerequisites of
democratization while the other treats political regimes as the outcome of strategic
processes of change. As Colomer has noted, the structural approach was dominant
in the 1950s and 1960s when comparisons focused on the stable democracies
of Anglo-American countries and the failure of democratic experiments in
continental Europe between the two world wars.1 In this explanatory approach,
the emergence and survival of democracy was associated with socio-economic
development and political culture:
As a logical reaction to the deficient performance of the structural approach,
the role of political incentives and leadership decisions has been remarked
in order to explain the attainment of elites’ compromises leading to the
establishment of democratic regimes.2
Responding to this ‘deficient performance’,3 Adam Przeworski described 1989,
the ‘Autumn of the People’,4 as a dismal failure for political science. He argues
that ‘any retrospective explanation of the fall of communism must not only
account for the historical developments but also identify the theoretical assumptions
that prevented us from anticipating these developments’.5 In this context, there-
fore, it is important to distinguish between analytical frameworks and categories
that help us to understand and explain the process of change that occurred in
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and those conceptual tools that have been found
wanting. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that ‘not one of the structural
preconditions for democracy postulated in the sociological approach existed in
Communist Europe’,6 the events of 1989 posed other categorization problems for
scholars used to defining change as either revolutionary or evolutionary.
As has been argued, much of the literature that seeks to explain regime change
is underpinned by both the structure–agency debate and the problem of the applic-
ability of the revolutionary–evolutionary framework. It is, therefore, important to
examine the specific problem of regime change in 1989 and assess whether it is
possible to define the phenomenon as either revolutionary, evolutionary or per-
haps neither.7 We do this in order to be clear about the nature of the phenomenon
we seek to analyse. We will then move on to an analysis of previous approaches
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and review the extent to which the tools supplied in a purely structural or actor-based
account help us to explain the case at hand. In this context, it will be argued that
structural accounts alone provide little or no leverage in the explanation of the fall
of communism in Eastern Europe, and while some early actor-based accounts
focused on the interaction of regime players, the analysis was still embedded in
structuralist discourse.
Actors’ preferences were often assumed and were not specifically set out in
advance of the empirical analysis. Przeworski noted that the ‘result was an
intuitive micro approach often couched in macro language’.8 Having determined
the elements of the individualist or actor-based literature, which have been more
successful in explaining regime change, we will move on to argue that the problem
of regime change is best understood as a collective-action problem:
The collective action problem defines a central paradox generated by our
individualistic motivational assumptions. If a group of rational people
behave so as to maximize their individual welfare, then they produce a state
of affairs that is worse for each of them, individually, than if they had adopted
more co-operative behaviour.9
In the specific case of Poland at the end of the 1980s, the collective-action problem
can be understood in the context of the catastrophic deterioration of the economy
and the collapse of the PZPR’s confidence that it could resolve this problem alone
without Western support. It became apparent to a number of the PZPR’s most
senior players10 that regime reform of some type was the answer but the problem
was in whose interest was it to carry the cost of attempting to bring about the
changes that would allow for the gradual marketization of the economy and the
attraction of Western capital? Laver points out that a ‘solution to certain collective
problems may be provided by a political entrepreneur, who organizes various
forms of collective endeavour on behalf of the group’.11 In the case of Poland, it
will be argued that elements of the reformist wing of the PZPR, including General
W. Jaruzelski, should be understood as political entrepreneurs who, recognizing
the decreasing cost of initiating political change in the Gorbachev era, acted in the
hope of maintaining incumbency and power in the new order.
Before moving on to an overview of academic approaches to the explanation
of revolution, democratic transition and regime change, it is evident that, following
Dankwart A. Rustow, a distinction must be made between the causes and conditions
that maintain democracy and the conditions that initiate the democratization
process itself: ‘Explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and
genesis.’12 Rustow’s approach underscored the importance of choices made by
identifiable political actors in crafting democratic institutions. In describing
Rustow’s analysis, Lisa Anderson has written that he
never denied the significance of structural and cultural conditions to the
maintenance and stability of existing democratic regimes. However, he was
more interested in identifying the factors that brought such regimes into
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existence in the first place. These factors he found to be a more varied mix
of economic and cultural pre-dispositions with contingent developments and
individual choices.13
Defining regime change in 1989
It goes without saying that for a democratic transition to take place some form of
political and social change or revolution must occur in the first place. It, therefore,
follows that research aimed at explaining the nature of transition must a priori deal
with the causes of change itself. In her book States and Revolutions, Theda Skocpol
offers research students three basic analytical strategies.14 She argues that the state
and organizations are at the centre of explanations of social revolutions because rev-
olutions do not happen without the breakdown of the administration and coercive
power of the ancien régime. Her second point is that a focus on international and
world historical contexts is crucial to an explanation of the outbreak, conflicts and
outcomes of social revolution. Her fundamental argument is for a structural and non-
voluntarist or purposive approach to revolutions. She criticized theorists for imposing
what she calls a reified collective will on revolutionary origins and outcomes:
Wilful individuals and acting groups may well abound in revolutions, I main-
tained, but no single group, or organization, or individual creates a revolu-
tionary crisis, or shapes revolutionary outcomes, through purposive action. It
will not do, I asserted, to explain revolutions simply by propositions referring
to mass social psychologies, or by propositions referring to class interests
or actions, or by propositions referring to the ideological outlooks and
derivative actions of vanguard revolutionary leaderships.15
Skocpol champions a social–structural approach to the explanation of revolution.
She argues that most ‘recent attempts to explain either revolutions per se, or some
broader class of phenomena explicitly conceived as subsuming revolutions’16 can
be identified primarily with one or another of three major approaches. First, she
identifies aggregate-psychological theories, which attempt to explain revolutions
in terms of people’s motivations for engaging in political violence or joining
oppositional movements. The second group she describes is ‘system/value-
consensus theories’,17 which attempt to explain revolutions as violent responses
of ideological movements to severe disequilibrium in social systems. Her third
category is political conflict theories, which argue that conflict between govern-
ments and organized groups contending for political power should be the focus of
attention:
Thus I will be arguing that a major theoretical reorientation – away from
social psychological and universalist-deductive modes of explanation, and
toward a structural and comparative-historical approach – is required if
progress toward the adequate explanation of revolutions is to be made in the
social sciences.18
Agency–structure debate 15
Hayden-02.qxd  18/11/05  2:43 PM  Page 15 $ 
+ + 
$ 
Przeworski takes a different view. He highlights the fact that top-down and
bottom-up models often compete to explain liberalization but they are too crude.
He makes the case that ‘short of real revolution’19 decisions to liberalize combine
elements of top-down and bottom-up forces. Perhaps the key phrase here is ‘short
of real revolution’: it brings into focus the fact that even the simple characterization
of 1989 for research purposes is problematic:
For even in those cases where divisions in the authoritarian regime became
visible well before any popular mobilization, the question is why the regime
cracked at a particular moment. And part of the answer is always that
Liberalizers in the regime saw the possibility of an alliance with some forces
that up to then had remained unorganized, which implies that there was some
force in the civil society with which to ally. Conversely, in the cases in which
mass mobilization antedated visible splits in the regime, the question remains
why the regime decided not to repress it by force. Again, part of the answer
is that the regime was divided between Liberalizers and Hardliners.
Liberalization is a result of an interaction between splits in the authoritarian
regime and autonomous organization of the civil society. Popular mobilization
signals to the potential Liberalizers the possibility of an alliance that could
change the relations of forces within the power bloc to their advantage;
visible splits in the power bloc indicate to the civil society that political space
may have been opened for autonomous organization. Hence, popular
mobilization and splits in the regime feed on each other.20
Przeworski is not alone in arguing for a more holistic research agenda. J. A.
Goldstone argues that there is no conflict between micro and macro approaches
to the causes of revolution:
[P]rocess models of group recruitment, solidarity, and rational action suggest
that a wide range of collective action phenomena – including rebellions and
revolutions in traditional societies, social protest movements, and revolutions
in modern neo-patrimonial and communist states – are capable of being
brought together in a common framework involving group identity, popular
mobilization, elite divisions and disaffection, and changes in state strength
and effectiveness.21
Piotr Sztompka makes the point most effectively when he charges Skocpol with
forgetting that human beings ‘thinking and acting (however haphazardly) are the
mediating link between structural conditions and social outcomes’.22 He argues
that structural conditions do not dictate absolutely what humans do; they merely
place certain limits on human action or define a certain range of possibilities.
Sztompka says that what is needed is a synthetic, multidimensional approach.
He criticizes Skocpol for treating structural analysis and voluntarist analysis as
mutually exclusive opposites rather than as two necessary elements of a complete
sociological explanation.
It has been argued that one of the fundamental questions raised by the collapse
of communism is whether it took the form of a revolution or whether it was an
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evolutionary phenomenon. The answer is important from a number of perspectives.
One obvious question is whether the term ‘revolution’ is an appropriate analytical
concept in the case in point. Kazimierz Pozna‘ski is an evolutionist.23 He argues
that ‘the decay process of communism could be seen as a slow but systematic rejec-
tion of an artificial implant or foreign body, where a successful defence mechanism
prevents an unhealthy “population” from intruding and overtaking an existing sys-
tem.’24 Using a metaphor from natural science, Pozna‘ski sees communism as an
implant that was initially stabilized within the Eastern European system. Such
implanted bodies are then isolated and, finally, neutralized by the ‘healthy, normal
part of a given self-contained organism’.25 Essentially, Pozna‘ski rejects the ‘revo-
lutionary’ tag and argues that 1989 was the product of an evolutionary process.
In the context of whether the collapse was initiated by economic failure or
ideological breakdown, Pozna‘ski argues that the evolutionary weakening of the
official doctrine was not necessarily synchronized with economic misfortunes.
He points out that critical revisions of ideology often took place despite a
relatively good economic performance, though he concedes that the worsening of
the economy was ‘most likely stimulating the critical search for an adequate
ideological guidebook’.26
In the context of arguments about agency and structure, Pozna‘ski, perhaps
somewhat simplistically, argues that if it can be shown that particular social groups
were central to the process of change, then a ‘revolutionary’ approach is justifi-
able. However, if no single identifiable group can be found to have played a vital
role, then the ‘evolutionary’ theory receives support. But here, again, we find that
the arguments stack up on both sides because of categorization problems. Focusing
on the Polish case, Pozna‘ski asks whether it was the workers or the intellectuals
who led the ‘revolution’. Pozna‘ski quotes from M. Burawoy who argues that the
industrial workers were responsible for putting an end to communist rule. He calls
the struggle, launched in 1980 by the independent unions under Wa„ˇsa, the first –
in the Marxian sense – true revolution. Burawoy supports his claim by arguing
that Solidarnof- involved the massive participation of factory workers who were
self-led rather than directed by dissident, ‘vanguard’27 intellectuals.
V. Tismaneanu also talks about the revolutionary dismantling of the party by
society in Eastern Europe but sees the decisive force behind it as not the workers
but rather the opposition intellectuals.28 To him, what happened in Eastern Europe
(less so in Poland and more so in Czechoslovakia and Hungary) was the first
revolution in modern history by intellectuals, resulting in their capturing power
from the communist apparatchiks. On the other side of the coin, S. Meuschel
argues that East Germany was an example of society-centred collapse in that
revolution occurred without truly identifiable revolutionaries.29 ‘This was a most
strange example of a revolution executed by nobody or everybody, though,
similar to the French Revolution, ignited in the name of “liberty” ’.30
Pozna‘ski argues that to understand the forces that brought the system down,
one has to look to the communist party itself.31 In many cases, the apparatus
self-destructed. But what would have been the communist elite’s motives for such
a move? One answer is that it was unintended self-destruction by incompetent,
sterile cadres. Another answer might be that they gave way through the collapse
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of their belief in the party and the system. There was, in other words, a collapse
of their ideological belief system. Pozna‘ski posits an alternative view of why
party elites may have collaborated in the self-destruction of the party:
A more accurate picture is that by and large, and not only at the end of
communism, the members of the ‘nomenklatura’ were destroying the political
system as peculiar counter-revolutionaries, though not always damaging
themselves as discrete actors. This was not only rational behaviour but, impor-
tantly, was driven largely by concern for various types of personal gain.32
Pozna‘ski provides further support for the hypothesis that it was in the interest of
party elites to cause the system to self-destruct because they were already involved
in ‘nomenklatura’ capitalism. He cites both Hungary and Poland as examples:
The escalation of so-called nomenklatura capitalism during the last years of
communism – as in Hungary and Poland where the party passed the most
favourable regulations in 1987 – represented another step in the effort by the
party to expand its wealth. Large portions of public capital were handed over
during that period to the power elite at extremely discounted prices. By mid-
1989 in Poland, there were about 1800 so-acquired nomenklatura enterprises,
mostly small scale, but some rather large entities as well.33
Pozna‘ski argues that party or state actors did not act as an organized group but
rather as individuals sharing more or less similar concerns. Individual members
of the elite tried to maximize their personal gains at the expense of society but
they were competing among themselves as well:
In this game, the fittest were not only gaining the most by securing the
most valuable economic assets, they were also assuming the least vulnerable
political positions and thus were better prepared for growing anti-communist
attacks.34
Erzsebet Szalai’s analysis of the impact of Janos Kadar’s New Economic Mechanism
in Hungary supports Pozna‘ski’s argument.35 Szalai has shown that communist
party elites were the direct beneficiaries of economic liberalization in Hungary and
argues that what effectively appears to have happened in Hungary was an unspoken
deal between the large enterprise managers and the communist party giving them
ownership rights on the condition that they kept the economy afloat.
Pozna‘ski’s account of communist decay in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union is convincing. It offers the thesis that communism did not collapse through
a revolutionary act but rather through evolutionary forces. He argues that the
questioning of ideological principles undermined the regime more decisively than
its economic failures and that the party–state apparatus, together with society,
‘brought the institutions of communism down, as neither could live with the
constraints imposed on individual preferences and actions’.36
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Pozna‘ski leaves us with an account that highlights the motivations of both
elite and societal actors who respond to systemic problems, conscious of the con-
straints imposed on their individual preferences. These groups of individuals,
bound by their separate but coinciding needs, acted to abolish the constraints
imposed on their preferences and in so doing brought about the end of communism.
While Pozna‘ski’s justification of the evolutionary hypothesis is supported by the
historical evidence of the gradual disintegration of state socialism in Eastern
Europe, it does not help us with an explanation of why the communist party
collapsed in Poland in 1989. Jerzy Wiatr argues:
Revolution involves the rapid, mostly forceful, overthrow of the existing
power system. What happened in Poland was not a revolution in this sense.
Evolution involves a long process of gradual transformation. That also was
not what took place in Poland. There is a third category – political reform.
Such reform sometimes takes place in a short time (like a revolution) but is
done without the use of force and within the framework of the existing insti-
tutions (through their transformation). There are two pure types of reform:
negotiated reform and reform from above (Spanish v. Brazilian model).
Poland was the case of a negotiated reform.37
Wies„aw W„adyka has commented that the
attempt of the Communist Party and the opposition to create the common
Round Table was a means of looking for a synthesis between revolution and
evolution, and what is the most important – they succeeded.38
Solidarnof- leader, Lech Wa„ˇsa, later Poland’s first non-communist president,
had this to say when W„adyka asked him if the Round Table should be regarded
as a success or failure:
It depends on the conception. In the evolutionary understanding, in seizing
the opportunities the Round Table was a momentous event. However, in the
revolutionary understanding it was a poor affair. In fact, there is no straight-
forward answer to this question.39
It, thus, appears that regime change in Poland in 1989 was a case of neither
revolution nor evolution, but a hybrid case where changes in the structural conditions
played their part in the evolution of disequilibrium. This political disequilibrium
prompted dissatisfied regime actors to seek self-interested political change or
negotiated reform, as Wiatr describes it.
If categorizing the events of 1989 as a case of revolution or evolution has proven
problematical, other conceptual problems arise when explanatory frameworks,
formerly applied to authoritarian regimes, are used unquestioningly to explain the
collapse of communism. There is an assumption implicit in using such models
that the end result of transition from authoritarian and communist rule should or
Agency–structure debate 19
Hayden-02.qxd  18/11/05  2:43 PM  Page 19 $ 
+ + 
$ 
will be the same. A second problematic assumption is that ‘democracy’ and
the desire for it was the motivating factor for those who facilitated the process.
C. G. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki are particularly critical of the idea of
mixing the two areas of research.40 They argue that the collapse of communism is
different from the defeat or the collapse of fascism and authoritarianism in so far
as it involves not just political transition but also fundamental economic change.
In short, it is argued that there is neither a model nor a precedent for the transi-
tion from ‘real socialism’ to democracy and capitalism. They make the point that
the very language of transition assumes an outcome that in reality is far from
guaranteed. Bryant and Mokrzycki quote from Stark who says that seemingly
descriptive notions like ‘transition to capitalism’ and ‘transition to a market
economy’ hide ‘teleological constructs in which concepts are driven by hypothesized
end-states. Presentist history finds its counterpart here in futurist transitology.’41
Explanations of regime change and 
democratic transition
As was noted earlier in this chapter, academic explanations of democratic transition
have moved from structural to agent models. For Seymour Martin Lipset, the engine
of change was modernization.42 He identified certain social conditions for the
emergence and survival of democracy. It followed that the breakdown of democra-
cies was associated with undeveloped socio-economic environments. Samuel
Huntington, working in a similar vein, also associated democratization processes
with industrialization and economic development.43 Colomer has pointed out that
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba ‘added a cultural mediator between basic social
processes and the political level’.44 Almond and Verba emphasized political culture
as the driving force behind the stabilization of democracy.45 However, in his analy-
sis of the relevance of these approaches, Adam Przeworski has characterized the
macro-historical comparative sociological approach of Barrington Moore, Seymour
Martin Lipset and their academic descendants in the following terms:
The method characteristic of this approach is to associate inductively
outcomes, such as democracy or fascism, with initial conditions, such as agrar-
ian class structure. In this formulation the outcome is uniquely determined by
conditions, and history goes on without anyone ever doing anything.46
Przeworski has also noted that ‘the macro-historical approach was unappealing, even
to those scholar-activists who resisted the intellectual assumptions of the micro
perspective, because it condemned them to political impotence’.47 More recently,
Colomer has pointed out that the structural approach has come under attack both
theoretically and empirically.48 It has been argued that the notion of identifying
conditions with causes for the emergence of democracy was antiquated while the cor-
relation of socio-economic and political culture variables with processes of democ-
ratization underestimated the possibility that the relationship could also work the
other way round. The changes in Eastern Europe proved particularly problematic for
the structural framework, given the fact that in very few cases were there necessary
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or sufficient structural conditions to facilitate democratic transition. However,
despite the structuralists, regime change did occur in Eastern Europe in 1989.
In more recent times, analytical frameworks have moved towards theories
promoting actor models and ‘modes’ of transition, as is evidenced in the work of
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan,49 Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C.
Schmitter.50 In his analysis of the failure of democracy in Spain and Germany in
the 1930s, Linz highlighted the importance of leadership, institutions and belief
systems for a stable democracy. Structural conditions were deemed necessary but
not sufficient for democracy to survive. As this vein of analysis developed, the
impetus was moving away from deterministic approaches and towards analysis
that focused on the role of politics. It is fair to say that a striking feature of the
literature on this ‘third wave’ of democratization has been the prominence of
theories that mirror Rustow’s emphasis on strategic interaction and negotiation.
Terry Lynn Karl and Phillippe C. Schmitter identify four ideal types of regime
transition: pact, imposition, revolution and reform.51 They conclude that pacted
transition, the mode with the greatest odds of success, or transition through
imposition produce restricted democracy because the old elites retain power in
some shape or form. O’Donnell and Schmitter’s essay, ‘Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies’ in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, is another
important contribution in the same vein. In the same tradition as Rustow, Linz and
Stepan, they highlighted contingent choice:
the high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected
events (fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices,
confusion about motives and interests, plasticity and even indefinition of
political identities, as well as the talents of specific individuals (virtu) are
frequently decisive in determining outcomes.52
As Colomer has argued, uncertainty was regarded as an essential feature of polit-
ical change in the context of the work of O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead.
This new approach emphasized subjective factors ‘while structural conditions
were now considered to be not only insufficient but even unnecessary for attaining
political aims’.53
Przeworski was one of the first to point out the problems associated with the
early versions of the strategic approach. Essentially, he noted that, while the
language was that of strategic interaction, the analysis was embedded in structural
assumptions. Adopting arguments from public choice, Przeworski has used the
distinction between hardliners and softliners to develop a game-theoretic model
of authoritarian withdrawal. Staying in the realm of bargain making, Donald
Share and Scott Mainwaring have developed a ‘transactional approach’ to the
process of transitions,54 while Samuel Huntington has examined transition in the
context of the relative power of government and opposition.55 Not only bringing
people back in, but also putting them centre stage, Giuseppe DiPalma characterized
democratization as the ‘crafting’ of alliances in the transition process.56 In their
analysis, John Higley and Richard Gunther attributed democratic consolidation to
‘elite settlements’ and ‘elite convergence’.57 While offering a critique of what she
Agency–structure debate 21
Hayden-02.qxd  18/11/05  2:43 PM  Page 21 $ 
+ + 
$ 
claimed was the excessive voluntarism of such approaches, Terry Lynn Karl built
her scheme around a typology of transition paths that rested ultimately on the
possibilities of elite pact making.58 In ‘The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions’, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman argue that
the specifics of these approaches differ in important respects, yet they
converge on a number of points that can be traced directly to Rustow. First,
the key actors in the transition process are political elites, whether in the
government or opposition, not interest groups, mass organizations, social
movements, or classes. Second, actors are typically defined in terms of their
orientation toward regime change (hard-liners–soft-liners, moderates–
extremists) rather than by interests rooted in economic structures and condi-
tions or institutional roles. Third, actors behave strategically; their actions are
influenced by expectations concerning the behaviour of allies and rivals.
Finally, democratization is the outcome of explicit or implicit negotiation;
new institutions are ‘bargains among self-interested politicians’.59
It is, therefore, clear that current academic orthodoxy lies firmly within the
agency or elite model of transition. However, the usefulness of some streams of
this analysis remains problematic. In a 172-nation comparative study of the
preconditions of democratization, Tatu Vanhanen points out that the problem with
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead’s study in Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule is that it does not test any clearly stated hypothesis nor produce such
hypotheses.60 Oddly, O’Donnell and Schmitter seem quite proud of this:
We did not have at the beginning, nor do we have at the end of this lengthy
collective endeavour, a ‘theory’ to test or to apply to the case studies and
thematic essays in these volumes.61
As Vanhanen has observed, their study clarifies the final stages of the process
of democratization, but it does not provide any theoretical explanation for
democratization. As Przeworski points out, much of this exhaustive literature
bore no fruit. Although O’Donnell and Schmitter focused on strategic analysis and
looked at the problem from the perspective of actors, their work shied away from
adopting a formalistic, ahistorical approach inherent in the abstract theory of
games. Given that the macro-language of classes, their alliances, and ‘pacts
of domination’ was the dominant vocabulary of the time, the result was an
intuitive micro approach often couched in macro language.62
Empirically, it seems that there is strong evidence supporting actor-based and elite
settlement theories of the initial phase of democratization. In the context of the most
recent wave of transitions the cases of Poland and Hungary provide the most obvious
examples. The problem is that, unlike earlier theories, including Lipset’s moderniza-
tion approach, these new approaches lack predictive power and do not sufficiently
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allow for hypothesis testing. Unni Edvardsen agrees with this view.63 He argues that
the actors-and-process paradigm has failed to account for political actors’ choice of
strategy. He makes the point that Karl and Schmitter’s four ‘modes’ of transition are
assumed to be the prime determinants of whether democracy emerges.
Yet their model is not based on a decision rule. Being purely descriptive the model
lacks predictive value and fails to explain two issues. The first problem is why an
actor prefers one strategy to another in any context. Second, the model does not
explain why one mode is more likely to bring about democracy than another. In
particular, Edvardsen argues that there is no basis for Karl and Schmitter’s conclusion
that the pact mode has the greatest likelihood of success in a democratic transition.
In short, assumptions are made about the motivations and goals of actors and elites,
but if such approaches are to offer any leverage in the explanation of change such
models must be underpinned by theoretical assumptions and testable hypotheses.
As has already been noted, Przeworski has exhorted scholars to test the
hypotheses he has generated. In 1991, he pointed out that as the events in Eastern
Europe unfolded scholars were on the verge of having enough cases to test these
hypotheses systematically.64 By adopting individualistic or rational-choice
assumptions, Przeworski has moved the strategic approach forward from a point
where the preferences of actors were simply assumed to an analytical framework
that is underpinned by explicit a priori statements about the expected behaviour
of strategic players. The scholarship of Colomer and Geddes,65 amongst others,
follows in this vein. Because these authors have conducted their analysis of the
process of transition within the context of an explicitly laid-out set of theoretical
assumptions, and because they have used the tools and formal models of game
theory, it is possible to both replicate and build upon their scholarship.
We have so far concluded that it is not appropriate to examine the case of regime
change in Poland as either an evolutionary or a revolutionary phenomenon; we have
also found that structural scholarship failed to predict the possibility of change in
Eastern Europe more generally and that, while actor-based strategic approaches pro-
vide a more accurate account of what occurred in this last wave of democratization
and regime change, this approach has generally not been underpinned by explicit
theoretical assumptions. The work of Przeworski and Colomer is a response to this
lacuna. Unlike much of the previous strategic analysis, their work is underpinned by
the formal individualistic assumptions of rational choice and game theory.
At this point, we move on to a discussion of the analytical framework upon which
this study of regime change in Poland will be based. The starting point for this
discussion is the characterization of regime change as a collective-action problem.
Regime change: collective action as a framework of analysis
Michael Laver has defined the ‘collective-action problem’ in the following terms:
It arises when rational people desire collective consumption of goods from
which they cannot economically be excluded, and when each individual’s
contribution to the production of these yields a directly consequential benefit
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that is less than the cost involved. Rational individuals will then have strong
incentives to enjoy the benefits of the good without paying for it, and in this
sense to take ‘free rides’ on it.66
The ultimate collective-action problem is the abolition of the existing order or
regime and the supply of a new order and a new set of rules supplying more
beneficial outcomes. This was precisely the scenario that regime reformers and
opposition activists faced in Poland throughout the 1980s. Elinor Ostrom and
James Walker have used the public choice paradigm to analyse recent transitions67
and they have defined the problem in the following terms:
The problem of collective action is finding a way to avoid deficient 
outcomes and to move closer to optimal outcomes. Those who find a way to
co-ordinate strategies receive a ‘co-operation dividend’ equal to the difference
between the payoffs at a deficient outcome and the more efficient outcome.68
Ostrom and Walker argue that, in the context of Russia and Eastern and Central
Europe, it is important to explore how a wide diversity of institutions ‘that are neither
markets nor states’69 operate to enhance the joint benefits that individuals achieve in
collective-action situations. Ostrom and Walker point out that participants in a self-
governing or anarchic process constitute many of these institutions. They have not
been imposed by external authorities and are obviously not statist solutions. Ostrom
and Walker further argue that the very creation of these institutions is itself a collec-
tive-action problem and that understanding how individuals solve different types of
collective-action problems is of substantial analytical and normative importance:
To understand how institutions that are neither markets nor states evolve and
cope with collective action problems, we need to unpack larger and more
complex problems into a series of transformations that occur between the
provision of any good and its consumption. For each transformation process
we need to understand the kind of behaviour that individuals adopt.70
In Poland, as in other parts of Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, the collapse of
the command economy as well as the collapse of the socialist project more generally
created a collective-action problem. As Oberschall points out, communist discourse
had become empty rhetoric and the erosion of regime legitimacy had been facilitated
by the private acceptance by regime elites that the system had failed.71 The problem
was how to extricate both state and society from the game being played under the
clearly suboptimal rules of the command system. When we look at how individuals
and groups come together to achieve a goal, in this case, a change in the rules of the
game, we are in fact analysing the art of crafting institutions. Ostrom and Walker
argue that crafting such institutions can be viewed as one of creating co-ordinated
strategies for players in multilevel games:
Two types of co-ordinated strategies enable participants to extricate
themselves from collective action dilemmas: one exists when individuals
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agree upon a joint strategy within a set of pre-existing rules; another when an
effort is made to change the rules themselves by moving to a collective
choice or constitutional choice arena. The possibility of switching arenas is
frequently ignored in current analyses of collective action problems.72
Ostrom and Walker work on the assumption that rules are a public good and that
agreement on better rules ‘affects all individuals in the group whether they
participate in the reform effort or not’.73 Anticipating the ‘free rider’ problem,
they point out that the temptation to free ride in an effort to craft new rules may
be offset by the strong interest that most individuals have in ensuring that their
own interests are taken into account in any set of new rules:
Further, the group might be ‘privileged’ in the sense that one or a very small
group of individuals might expect such a high return from provision that they
pay the full cost themselves.74
This is the context, I argue, in which party reformers or softliners took on the role
of political entrepreneurs:
The entrepreneur supplies ‘political services’ for a fee. These services may
include enforcing agreements made by group members, imposing sanctions
on free riders, or getting more deeply involved in the co-ordination and
generation of collective action – for example by identifying strategies that
allow group members to generate collective action, or even producing goods
and services directly and using limited powers of coercion to ‘tax’ the group
with enforced payments for these. To save ink, let’s call the ‘political
entrepreneur’ a politician and the ‘group to which political services are
supplied’ the public. The portfolio of political services that are provided
might be thought of as a regime.75 (emphasis added)
It is being argued that General W. Jaruzelski and the communist party reformers who
initiated the Round Table process were political entrepreneurs. As political entrepre-
neurs, they were the agents of regime change. This group was prepared to absorb
the costs of creating the new rules of the game in anticipation of the rewards they
would accrue in the new game. In an article entitled ‘Economic Theories of the
State’, Russell Hardin observes that it may be in each individual’s interest to support
an extant order that is generally defective.76 Hence, it may be that, although citizens
would benefit from a change in regime, no individual would benefit enough to take
the costly action necessary to change it. He makes the point that in general the logic
of collective action can be devastating for any hope that we can collectively provide
ourselves with collective benefits:
An odd analogue of that logic applies just as forcefully to the burden of
switching from a defective to a more beneficial co-ordination. But if a
Gorbachev comes along to take the lead in moving us from a defective to an
alternative co-ordination, we may find it remarkably easy to switch.77
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The role of political entrepreneurs and their clients
Frederik Barth has written one of the earliest treatments of the role of the
entrepreneur in social change.78 He argues that there are several reasons why
anthropologists should investigate the entrepreneurial activity in the societies they
study. Barth points out that entrepreneurship is closely associated with general
leadership and the social structure of communities. Also, it very frequently
involves the relationship of persons and institutions in one society with those of
another economically more advanced one, and the entrepreneur becomes an
essential ‘broker’ in this situation of culture contact:
But in the most general sense, one might argue that in the activities of the
entrepreneur we may recognize processes which are fundamental to questions
of social stability and change, and that their analysis is therefore crucial to
anyone who wishes to pursue a dynamic study of society.79
Barth et al. set out to look at the entrepreneurial career as a process or as a
chain of transactions between the entrepreneur and his environment. In setting out
to describe the social aspects of that environment, Barth et al. argue that such
descriptions should emphasize the reciprocity of the transactions between the
entrepreneur and those around him:
In other words, we need to see the rest of the community as composed of
actors who also make choices and pursue strategies, and we must analyze
routinized, institutionalized community life in terms of the choices that are
available and the values that are ascribed – factors to which the entrepreneur,
through his relations with other people, is subject, but which he also by his
very activity may modify and change.80
From this perspective, all social activity may be analysed as the result of constrained
choices and, thereby, connected with the variables of ‘value’ and ‘purpose’. It hardly
needs to be said that the goods that are obtained through entrepreneurial activity are
clearly not restricted to purely monetary, or even material, forms but may take the
form of power, rank or experience and skills. If politics is viewed as an enterprise,
the problem the political entrepreneur faces is how to locate clients. He does this by
at first locating unsatisfied needs or by nurturing such needs in a population:
A political entrepreneur is a person who works to attain desirable power posi-
tions. He can only achieve these, within this political structure, by obtaining
the stewardship of votes from clients; and clients render him votes on the
understanding that he acquires for them – by means of his expertise –
specific, culturally defined goods.81
Political entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe
The two most obvious groups of individuals that may be described as political
entrepreneurs come from the reform wings of the various Eastern and Central
26 Agency–structure debate
Hayden-02.qxd  18/11/05  2:43 PM  Page 26 $ 
+ + 
$ 
European communist parties and from the moderate ends of the opposition elite or
counter-elite. In the Polish case, Catholic Church activists are also strong candidates
for the role of political entrepreneurs. Another obvious group is enterprise managers,
as are individuals who were active in Kadar’s second economy in Hungary. This
coincides with the views of regional specialists such as Elemer Hankiss who have
argued for a Grand Coalition theory of regime change in Hungary.82 In 1990, he
argued that a new ruling class, a grand bourgeoisie, had entered the political arena.
He saw the emergence of an alliance of four social groups:
the most dynamic members of the younger generations of the Kadarist
oligarchy; second, the same type of people coming from the upper and upper-
middle layers of state bureaucracy; third, from the managerial class, i.e. the
managers of great state companies and agricultural co-operatives (called the
‘red’ and the ‘green barons’); fourth, the most successful members and
families of the emerging entrepreneurial class.83
Hankiss was not alone amongst area specialists in predicting such a coalition of
interests. Another Hungarian writer, Szelenyi, detected a coalition of the ‘reform-
minded cadre elite, the technocracy, and the new petty bourgeoisie’.84 Hankiss
argues that the ruling elite gave up its coercive and bureaucratic power without
too much resistance and took the risk of a radical transformation of the political
system because it realized that it had a good chance of converting the power it had
possessed in the old system into a new kind of power which would be relevant and
workable in the new system.85
Defining payoff and utility
So what is the payoff or the utility for the political entrepreneur? Specifically, what
did the reformist group around General Jaruzelski hope to achieve with its
attempt to change the rules of the game? Clearly, the hope of future incumbency
under new rules is one form of payoff. However, in the case of many ‘party
reformers’ there were two kinds of potential payoff. Arguably, particularly in the
Hungarian case, some hoped to be able to exchange political power for economic
power after the communist parties lost exclusive power. Second, many reformers
recognized the inevitability of change and sought to exert as much influence as they
could on the transformation process and thus secure a stake in the new order.86
In the fin de siècle situation of Eastern Europe, the actors involved did not have
perfect information; all kinds of mistakes were made and actors did not always
know the moves that others were making. However, given that the game was about
shaping or indeed controlling the future, it follows that an actor’s utility could
only be realized in the future. Following Michael Laver, I assume that
the less an individual discounts future utility, the more likely that he or she is
to find it rational to stick to a conditionally co-operative strategy, and the
greater the consequent prospect of resolving the collective action problem
concerned.87
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Political entrepreneurs expect potential rewards and, thus, are prepared to
underwrite the costs of overthrowing the ancien régime. For the opposition
activist, the rewards include becoming part of the new ruling elite, shaping the
rules of the new game to suit individual interest, approval and reputation benefits.
For the party reformer, enterprise manager, technocrat or financial entrepreneur,
there is the twin chance of economic power through privatization as well as the
hope of retaining political influence.
Defining costs and benefits
In analysing stability and institutional change, Douglass C. North has described
the agent of change as the ‘individual entrepreneur responding to the incentives
embodied in the institutional framework. The sources of change are the changing
relative prices or preferences’.88 North allows for the grey, fuzzy bits where
people’s preferences and perceptions come in:
we are at something of a loss to define, in very precise terms, the interplay
between changes in relative prices, the ideas and ideologies that form people’s
perceptions, and the roles that the two play in inducing changes in institutions.89
From the perspective of regime change, the big question is when do relative price
changes lead to institutional change and when are they simply a source of recon-
tracting within the framework of the existing rules? North argues that the easiest
way to think of these issues is in an equilibrium context:
Institutional equilibrium would be a situation where given the bargaining
strength of the players and the set of contractual bargains that made up total
economic exchange, none of the players would find it advantageous to devote
resources into restructuring the agreements. Note that such a situation does
not imply that everyone is happy with the existing rules and contracts, but
only that the relative costs and benefits of altering the game among the
contracting parties does not make it worthwhile to do so. The existing
institutional constraints defined and created the equilibrium.90
Clearly, the relative costs of opposition and bargain seeking changed because of
internal and external political developments in Eastern and Central Europe and
the Soviet Union. In the context of the collective-action problem, that is, the over-
throw of the communist regime, the international political environment in which
Eastern Europeans existed was provided with an external political opportunity in
the form of Mikhail Gorbachev. In the domestic context, a political opportunity
was created by the gradual delegitimizing of communist power. There are two key
factors here. First, there is the gradual collapse of the command economy and the
private acceptance by regime elites that the system had failed. Regime opponents
were also provided with political opportunity by the failure of attempted reforms
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and by the subsequent division within the regime elites occasioned by the
economic failure and the erosion of legitimacy.
As we noted earlier, Anthony Oberschall has remarked, in the context of the col-
lapse of communist party legitimacy in Eastern Europe, that communist discourse
and frame had become empty rhetoric: ‘When a regime lacks or loses legitimacy,
the challenger’s discourse and frame prevail.’91 Przeworski has identified two fac-
tors that led to the destabilization of the communist monolith and the destruction
of the party’s legitimacy. The first was the embourgeoizement of the party elite,
which diminished the elite’s ability to crush dissent. His second point is that
implicit in the concept of ‘goulash communism’ was the admission that the model
was flawed. Once Khrushchev and later party chiefs publicly identified Western
living standards as something to be aimed at, the cat was out of the bag. In the
context of the relative costs of opposition, the balance sheet was steadily slipping
in favour of those capable of arbitrating change. As Przeworski has argued:
By 1989, party bureaucrats did not believe in their speech. And to shoot, one
must believe in something. When those who hold the trigger have absolutely
nothing to say, they have no force to pull it.92
Following Olson, Gordon Tullock has offered his by-product theory of revolution.93
Essentially, a critique of the public goods approach, Tullock argues that revolutions
should be analysed in the context of the private rewards for those who participate
in them:
The largest profits from revolution are apt to come to those people who are
(a) most likely to end up at the head of the government, and (b) most likely
to be successful in overthrow of the existing government. They have the
highest present discounted gain from the revolution and lowest present
discounted cost. Thus from the private goods theory of revolution, we would
anticipate senior officials who have a particularly good chance of success in
overthrowing the government and a fair certainty of being at high rank in the
new government, if they are successful, to be the most common type of
revolutionaries.94
Tullock points out that superficial examination of history would seem to indicate
that the private goods theory is upheld by the empirical data. Another obvious area
for empirical investigation concerns the expectations of revolutionaries. Bearing in
mind the problem of categorizing 1989 as a ‘revolution’, it is worth noting
Tullock’s point that research is required to establish whether his impression that
revolutionaries generally expect to have a good position in the new state is correct:
Further, my impression is that the leaders of revolutions continuously
encourage their followers in such views. In other words, they hold out private
gains to them.95
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Morris Silver’s argument provides support for those who might want to test the
hypothesis that revolutionaries have made a calculated choice.96 He argues that in
the private interest framework, the revolutionary is viewed as having made an
occupational choice to become a ‘ruler’ and to this end devotes a portion of his
time to politics of a certain type:
Revolutionary activity itself is a form of ‘investment’ in human resources:
(1) it creates a position or, one might say, an annuity for the revolutionary;
(2) it provides the revolutionary with some of the organizational, communi-
cations, and military skills needed to earn the ‘wage’ paid by society to
its rulers for producing ‘order’.97
Hankiss provides convincing support for those who would argue for a private
reward theory of revolution or regime change in the context of Eastern Europe in
1989. He makes the point (in relation to Hungary) that it was not only the threat
of economic collapse and loss of power that prompted the members of the ruling
elite to implement radical reforms. An important factor, according to Hankiss,
was the knowledge that they had a fairly good chance of transferring their power
into a new and more efficient socio-economic system:
This would be the consummation of a historical process: the new ruling elite of
1948, which began to rule in the 1950s as a small, despotic vanguard and became
a parasitic oligarchy in the 1960s and 1970s, has found in the late 1980s the
ways and means to establish itself, for the first time since it came to power, as
part of a strong and legitimate ruling elite or ruling class, forming a ‘grand
coalition’ with the managerial and the emerging entrepreneurial class. I have
warned that – depending on how far the country will be able to develop the
institutions of a constitutional democracy and those of welfare state – their rise
to power may limit as well as increase the freedom of society.98
Rational choice, game theory and 1989
It is an implicit assumption in many of the explanatory approaches reviewed above
that 1989 can be categorized as a revolution. While this notion is highly contested,99
the idea of regime or rule change as a collective-action problem is a useful heuris-
tic device in the conduct of academic analysis of the phenomenon. Furthermore,
approaches such as Tullock’s by-product theory of revolution and North’s cost–
benefit analysis of institutional equilibrium and change open up the possibility of
researchers tracking the relationship between the initiation of political or regime
change and alterations in the cost–benefit structure of actors’ preferences.
Many scholars question the application of game theory to non-institutionalized
settings or indeed moments of crisis.100 It is argued that periods of regime change
are implicitly inappropriate canvasses for the application of game-theoretic
models where it is presumed that actors are rational and in possession of perfect
information. Given the nature of the complex range of external, internal and
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economic factors that affected the choices made by political actors in Eastern and
Central Europe following the initiation of Gorbachev’s reforms, it can be taken
for granted that national regime leaders made such choices without perfect
information. G. Tsebelis argues that
As the actor’s goals become fuzzy, or as the rules of the interaction become
more fluid and imprecise, rational choice explanations will become less
applicable.101
However, Tsebelis concedes that the validity of the rational-choice approach
increases where elites are involved, and in addition he argues that the results (of
applying rational-choice models) are more likely to be fruitful in iterated situa-
tions in which people learn or are naturally selected than in non-iterated games.
Tsebelis continues that behaviour will more closely mirror rational-choice
prescriptions when the issues are important and that the degree of approximation
will vary with the level of information. With these provisos in mind, it seems clear
that the repeated elite interaction between communist regime actors and the
Solidarity opposition in Poland throughout the 1980s satisfies Tsebelis’s condi-
tions; the game was iterated and the issues were unquestionably important. That
said, the problem of the lack of perfect information remains.
More recently, Josep Colomer has argued that both rational choice and game
theory are appropriate analytical platforms for the study of processes of political
change:
Transition from a nondemocratic regime by agreement between different
political actors is a rational game. If rulers are unable to maintain their
unchallenged domination and the opposition is not powerful enough to
impose its preferred regime alternative, two possible outcomes can result.
The first is a civil war . . . the second possible outcome is a compromise of
rational actors with different preferences on an intermediate formula between
dictatorship and democracy.102
Colomer specifically posits that his reasoning differs from other analyses in holding
that an agreed transition to democracy could be the outcome only of misinformed
or miscalculating actors’ strategies. He disputes Przeworski’s analysis that rational
well-informed actors could not promote a process leading to democracy but could
only work to maintain the authoritarian status quo or a ‘broadened dictatorship’.103
The central issue that arises in the context of the Colomer and Przeworski
debate is the question of whether actors will operate on the basis of a ‘farsighted
criterion of choice’104 during periods of regime crisis given the long-term conse-
quences for the rules of the game:
The assumption that rational actors can have some degree of foresight is
postulated for situations of regime crisis which involve decisions with long-
term consequences – the choice of the rules of the game – and do not usually
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appear very often in individuals’ lives (perhaps once in a generation). Actors
participating in a transition process can have strong incentives to make
calculations anticipating the foreseeable consequences of their choices if
they believe that they are not likely to have the opportunity to repeat the
game soon thereafter.105
Colomer’s argument in relation to far-sighted time horizons is a central plank of
his analysis of the process of democratic transition in Poland and is also central to
his refutation of the Przeworski hypothesis that Eastern and Central European
regime actors sought only ‘broadened dictatorship’ and not full democratization.106
Colomer also rejects the view that political equilibrium and perfect information
are necessary conditions for the appropriate application of game theory models:
Usually, transition actors have noncoincident expectations regarding their
relative strength in the future . . . These different expectations are compatible
because the transition process is characterized by a relatively high degree
of uncertainty in comparison with more stable political regimes . . . The
uncertainty of such an open situation induces actors to make some concessions
in pre-electoral bargains.107
While it is hard not to agree wholeheartedly with Colomer’s attack on structuralist
scholarship which failed to predict the collapse of communism and the transition
process in Eastern Europe, his rejection of Przeworski’s contention that democratic
transition only results from the miscalculated strategies of party elites is more
problematic. Colomer posits that in certain situations actors operate on the basis
of a ‘farsighted criterion of choice’, which, he says, induces non-myopic equilib-
rium instead of short-term-looking myopic equilibrium. Colomer further argues
that rational actors can anticipate other actors’ reactions and counter-reactions to
their decisions in order to avoid undesirable and inefficient results and that this
condition ‘can be associated with a process of regime change in which actors can
remember a previous failed experience of civil conflict or believe (themselves) to
be playing a game that is very unlikely to be repeated soon’.108
While it is plausible to argue, as Colomer does, that past memories of failed
bargaining induce non-myopic strategic behaviour, it is arguable that his view that
actors will perfectly anticipate each others’ moves and, thus, avoid inefficient
outcomes is more problematic. First, there is the issue of actors’ access to infor-
mation and, second, there is the matter of disequilibrium and uncertainty at times
of regime crisis. Third, Colomer’s contention that this non-myopic behaviour only
applies to the decision to negotiate or not to negotiate and not to any subsequent
round of bargaining leaves us with only a partial explanation of actual outcomes.
If it is deemed that regime actors may be far-sighted at the outset, how do we
characterize their behaviour during subsequent rounds of the game? In the
specific context of the Polish Round Table, Colomer argues that the agreement
was ‘viable because it gave the actors reasonable expectations of satisfying their
priority interests: freedom of association for Solidarnof- and maintenance of the
32 Agency–structure debate
Hayden-02.qxd  18/11/05  2:43 PM  Page 32 $ 
+ + 
$ 
Communist’s dominant role, respectively’.109 However, because the Polish
reformers were ahead of the rest of the Eastern European transitions, ‘mistaken
expectations’110 about the party’s prospects in competitive elections led to
unexpected defeat. Colomer concludes that because of a ‘stroke of bad luck’111
the results of the June election produced a ‘political upheaval’.112
But contrary to Colomer’s analysis, it will be shown here that the outcome had
nothing to do with bad luck, but a lot more to do with the fact that PZPR strategists
did not make informed evaluations in relation to a range of Round Table institu-
tional bargains and, in particular, the party’s expected performance in the election.
It will be shown that party actors did not behave rationally in that they did not
assess the available information at their disposal. The question that arises is a
simple one: what would have been the effect of perfect information on the PZPR’s
decision to enter into talks with Solidarnof- or, indeed, on the institutional
bargains negotiated by the party at the Round Table; consequently, what are the
implications of the answer to this question for Colomer’s theory of strategic tran-
sition and Przeworski’s contention that democratic transition only results from the
miscalculated strategies of party elites?
This volume will provide a process-driven analysis of a range of institutional
bargains negotiated at the Round Table in order to assess whether the strategic
misperception of PZPR negotiators produced the almost immediate collapse of
communist power and not the broadened dictatorship that had been expected.
With this aim in mind, it is argued that regime change in Poland in the late 1980s
is best understood as a collective-action problem and that political entrepreneurs
such as General W. Jaruzelski and the reform wing of the PZPR initiated the
Round Table process as a way of resolving that problem with the provision of new
rules of the game. It is argued that these reform-oriented entrepreneurs, or appa-
ratchiks, initiated this process in the hope of securing future incumbency and
political gains in the new order.
In subsequent chapters, we will examine each of the key Round Table bargain-
ing scenarios in order to assess whether PZPR negotiators were strategically
far-sighted, as Colomer posits, or merely seeking the broadened dictatorship
posited by Przeworski. While Colomer’s expectation of non-myopic behaviour
applies only to the initial decision of regime actors to negotiate, it is hoped that by
applying these two hypotheses to the various Round Table bargaining scenarios, it
will be possible to demonstrate the gap between actors’ strategic expectations and
actual outcomes. Examining subsequent rounds of bargaining in the light of these
two hypotheses provides a heuristic with which to gauge the empirical record and,
thus, explore in a systematic fashion the behaviour of PZPR negotiators.
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There is an implicit assumption in much of the case study analysis of the collapse
of communism in Poland that the PZPR made a number of strategic mistakes that
precipitated the party’s demise. Such accounts have given the notion that PZPR
participants blundered in their negotiations at the Round Table. Osiaty‘ski quotes
President Aleksander Kwafniewski who told him that the PZPR had mistakenly
believed it was strong enough to retain power and to enforce any compromise that
might be reached at the Round Table:
This illusion saved us from the Romanian experience. If the Party leadership
realized how weak it was, there would never have been the roundtable talks
and peaceful change.1
Kami‘ski has shown that the communists made two critical mistakes at the
Round Table talks by agreeing to certain details of the future electoral law. The
first one was the error of estimation. The communists estimated their level of
political support from non-adjusted polls. ‘Such polls were doomed to paint an
overly optimistic picture’2 of the likely electoral outcome. As Kami‘ski argues,
the second mistake was an error of omission. The PZPR proposed single-member
district majority run-off (in short, MR) as the electoral law. This gave them worse
outcomes than Single Transferable Vote (STV) or Proportional Representation
(PR) Party List systems would have produced.
The results of the June 1989 election unleashed political chaos.3 Solidarnof-
negotiators had agreed to a 65:35 division of seats for the ‘contractual’ Sejm at
the Round Table. This arrangement, amongst other institutional agreements
reached during the talks was designed to ensure the party’s control of the legisla-
tive process. This division reserved 65 per cent of Sejm seats for the communist
party and its allies while Solidarnof- and opposition candidates could contest
the remaining 35 per cent. Only 2 of the 35 communist party candidates on the
national list election to the contractual Sejm reached the 50 per cent requirement
and were elected on the first round.
While the PZPR’s allies, the Peasant Party, managed to get three candidates
elected to the Sejm on the first round, the result was that only 5 of the 299 seats
reserved for the ruling coalition were secured on 4 June. This performance
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contrasts with that of Solidarnof- whose candidates secured 160 of the 161 seats
reserved for the opposition in the first round. In the election to the Senate, which
was fully contested, Solidarnof- took 99 of the 100 seats, with the communist
party failing to secure a single seat (the other seat was won by an independent
millionaire). The party’s electoral collapse precipitated a crisis and made the
implementation of the Round Table accord problematic. Although both
Solidarnof- and PZPR negotiators moved quickly to patch up the crumbling
agreement, ‘the planned chronology was rapidly overtaken by the new pace of
events’.4
Much of the analysis of the PZPR’s collapse has concentrated on the PZPR’s
fatal choice of a majoritarian electoral system. So, while these contributions
explain how the outcome might have been different had alternative choices been
made, they do not explain why or how these choices came to be made. This analysis
will show that this error over the choice of electoral system was part of a bigger
pattern of PZPR strategic errors in their negotiations over a range of institutions
during the Round Table process. Tracing the genesis of the Round Table process
and examining a whole range of PZPR strategic choices will expose the matrix of
decisions and institutional outcomes that led to the party’s collapse. Previous
accounts have assumed that the PZPR contained softliners and hardliners and that
these internal divisions played a major role in the party’s lack of a coherent game
plan or strategy.5 However, it will be shown here that a very small group within
the party elite propelled the Round Table process and that younger party players
were able to hijack the negotiations when this elite lost control of the bargaining
process in the context of the dynamic of change they had initiated.6
This analysis is premised on the assumption that while structural and external
factors created the necessary conditions for regime change in 1989, there were
not sufficient conditions to precipitate the collapse of communism in Poland.
However, external factors, including Gorbachev’s reforms and his abandonment
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, created institutional disequilibrium within Poland and
elsewhere in Eastern Europe towards the end of the 1980s. The most significant
impact of this disequilibrium was a change in the relative costs and benefits of the
preferences and available political alternatives of communist regime players. A
number of additional theoretical assumptions underpin this framework of analysis.
First, it is assumed that PZPR Round Table negotiators were rational, goal seeking
and utility maximizing. The validity of the rational choice assumption is
increased given the tight nature of the elite group that negotiated on behalf of the
communist party. Second, it follows that rational behaviour can be modelled and
that rational PZPR actors would not have knowingly made suboptimal choices
that would lead to the collapse of communist power. In the context of the theory
of games, it is, therefore, argued that false expectations and miscalculation on the
part of PZPR negotiators precipitated the fall of communism.
In their seminal work on the Polish transition, Josep Colomer and Margot
Pascual argued that the misinformation of actors made the Round Table pact
possible and that this put Poland ahead on the path towards change.7 Colomer and
Pascual take the view that had the players had true information about the Polish
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voters’ preferences and had Solidarnof- understood its own strength, then neither
side would have agreed to the Round Table compromise. The more likely scenario
would have been sharp conflict followed by repression.
Marek Kami‘ski’s counter-factual analysis of the outcome of the June 1989
contractual election also assumes that PZPR players made ill-informed strategic
choices at the Round Table.8 As we have already remarked, Kami‘ski has shown
that the PZPR’s consent to the elections was founded on an overly optimistic
estimate of its popular support. An alternative electoral law, the STV, would have
been mutually acceptable to Solidarnof- and the coalition government and would
have been critically better for the communists. Kami‘ski’s argues that
the configuration of social, economic, and geo-political factors in Poland in
1989 were not sufficient for the fall of communism. I argue that the collapse
of the communist regime in Poland could quite likely have been prevented if
the communist rulers hadn’t committed a series of mistakes.9
Kami‘ski argues that both STV and PR would have been acceptable to
Solidarnof-:
This mistake, the choice of a weakly dominated proposal, was probably due
to the complexity of the decision-making environment, the lack of technical
knowledge about electoral rules and their properties, and finally, the fact that
under communist estimates about the distribution of voter preferences,
alternative laws produced similar outcomes.10
While Kami‘ski’s seminal work is, perhaps, the most important explanation to
date of why the Polish communist party lost power when it did, it is, nonetheless,
limited to the analysis of the PZPR’s bargaining over the electoral rules. Kami‘ski
has stated that his goal was not to reconstruct the political history of the fall of
communism. His interest lies in the Round Table bargaining process that
produced the voting procedures and the subsequent political games. However,
given the relevance of Kami‘ski’s analysis and conclusions to the debate between
those who argue the case that democratic transition may be the strategic, far-sighted
goal of regime actors and those who take the view that such transitions are the
outcome of the strategic mistakes of regime liberalizes, it seems more than worth-
while to expand upon Kami‘ski’s framework of analysis and examine a range of
Round Table bargaining scenarios to see what they can tell us about these two
conflicting perspectives.
This volume builds on the works of Przeworski,11 Colomer and Pascual,12
Kami‘ski13 and Colomer14 and posits that dynamic change was precipitated in
Poland in 1989 because both the PZPR and Solidarnof- opposition actors were
playing the political game in conditions of uncertainty without full informational
resources. Przeworski and Colomer propose two conflicting individualist
explanations of the collapse of communism and subsequent transition in Poland.
Our main task here is to assess which of these explanations provides the most
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explanatory leverage. Following King, Keohane and Verba, a desirable property
of any theory is that it should generate as many observable implications as possible.15
In other words, readers should be told in advance what behaviour or consequences
they should expect to see given theory A or theory B.
It also follows that in order to track the extent to which a hypothesis stands up,
it is necessary to outline the observable implications prior to the actual analysis.
In each case of institutional choice discussed in the course of this volume, the
observable implications will be informally stated at the outset so that an assessment
can be made of how the facts of what happened conform to either the predictions
of Przeworski or Colomer. With these two conflicting explanations in mind, we
will first examine the PZPR’s decision to initiate talks with Solidarnof- in order
to assess whether the party was far-sighted and strategic or not. This will be
followed by an analysis of the party’s expectations in relation to the relegalization
of Solidarnof-. Did PZPR negotiators methodically evaluate the consequences of
relegalizing the union?
We then move on to investigate the PZPR’s expectations from the establishment
of a strong presidency followed by an analysis of the party’s agreement to the
introduction of a freely elected Senate. It has been argued earlier that the choice
of a majoritarian electoral system proved fatal to the PZPR’s electoral prospects;
we will now elaborate on Kami‘ski’s analysis of the bargaining over this institu-
tion in order to assess what it tells us about the party’s motivation and behaviour.
We also look at the PZPR’s conduct of the electoral campaign and its expectations
in relation to the role of the Catholic Church in that campaign.
Colomer argues that the Round Table should be understood in the context of an
‘agreed project [that] was a redefinition of the rules of the political game according
to the estimated bargaining power of the players’.16 If this was the case and both
Solidarnof- and the PZPR coincided in their strategies and sought an ‘intermediate
formula’,17 then it follows that a number of observable implications can be
elaborated. First, we would expect that each institutional bargain should reflect
the relative strengths of the regime and opposition, as perceived by PZPR and
Solidarnof- negotiators at the time. We would also expect that party negotiators
would plot each move or strategic choice on the basis of the most up-to-date
information at their disposal. We also expect, as Colomer posits, that the PZPR
would ‘react and counter-react to their choices before the game ends’.18 In other
words, if PZPR negotiators make mistakes in a bargaining arena then we expect
them to try and rectify that error or mistake. We also expect to see PZPR actors
making future-oriented calculations when making strategic choices or agreeing
bargains. In simple terms, we do not expect to see PZPR negotiators make
calculations on the basis of immediate short-term interest alone.
Przeworski posits that ‘misperceptions lead liberalization to transition’19 and
that regime liberalizers want ‘democracy that will keep them in power’.20 A number
of observable implications flow from Przeworski’s hypothesis. First, we would
expect to see PZPR actors evaluating each strategic move on the basis of its
capacity to preserve incumbency. If, as Przeworski posits, liberalizers only seek
‘broadened dictatorship’,21 then the PZPR should only agree to the creation of
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institutions that it can realistically hope to do well from. Unlike Colomer, he does
not expect actors to be far-sighted in their calculus. If as Przeworski posits,
misperception leads to liberalization, then we expect to see the PZPR making
flawed evaluations and strategic errors arising out of a failure to update information
in the bargaining arena.
Having outlined the observable implications and expected behaviour that flow
from the hypotheses of both Przeworski and Colomer, we now move on to a
description of how we will go about evaluating these conflicting explanations. It
has been argued earlier that game-theoretic forms of rational choice have been
most effective in the study of highly institutionalized settings in the developed
world.22 Moments of transition are, by their very nature, unstable because the
institutional settings are also unstable and the rules are undefined. Such situations
are, as Przeworski has argued, moments of maximal uncertainty.23 In moments of
transition, people may not know where their interests lie and so it is arguable that
political transition seems to defy rational forms of analysis. In their analysis of
the cases of Zambia and Yugoslavia, Bates et al. argue that spatial models proved
too limited and sought to use ‘games of incomplete information’24 where the
limitations of rational choice became evident.
Bates et al. argue that the ‘cultural’ knowledge required to complete a rational
choice explanation reveals the complementarity of interpretivist and rational
choice approaches. In criticizing the game-theory method, they argued that game
theorists often fail to acknowledge that the approach requires a complete political
anthropology. They argued that if game theory is to provide explanatory leverage,
a detailed knowledge of the values of individuals and of the expectations that
individuals have of each other’s actions and reactions is required. Furthermore,
they argued for a detailed and fine-grained knowledge of the precise features of
the political and social environment within which individuals make choices and
devise political strategies:
To construct a coherent and valid rational choice account, then, one must
‘soak and poke’ and acquire much the same depth of understanding as that
achieved by those who offer ‘thick’ descriptions.25
According to Bates et al., the phrase ‘analytic narrative’ captures their conviction
that theory linked to data is more powerful than either data or theory alone.26
While the narrative form has been the dominant form for explaining human
behaviour, it is recognized that they often mobilize the mythology and hagiography
of their times. This led many social scientists to reject the method and instead
adopt quantitative methodologies. Bates et al. argue that in seeking a logically
rigorous approach they have returned to the rich, qualitative and descriptive mate-
rials that narratives offer. In exploring a concrete historical case, such as the
Round Table process and the collapse of communism in Poland, we are examining
the choices of individuals embedded in specific settings. In examining such
choices, we need to unpack and trace the sequence of actions, decisions and
responses that generate events and outcomes. Following Bates et al., the analytic
38 Collapse of communism in Poland
Hayden-03.qxd  18/11/05  2:44 PM  Page 38 $ 
+ + 
$ 
narrative approach seeks to account for outcomes by identifying the mechanisms
that generate them. However, rather than representing a return to ‘thick’ description,
the analytic narrative method employs rational choice theory and, thus, ‘thin’
reasoning to produce tightly constrained accounts based on rigorous deductive
reasoning grounded on close attention to empirical detail. As we noted earlier,
both logic and the empirical record thus discipline analytic narratives.
In the particular case we examine here, we will explore a range of the Round
Table bargaining scenarios in the context of the specific observable implications
of the conflicting Przeworski and Colomer hypotheses. In explicitly laying out the
expected behaviour, given each hypothesis in each bargaining scenario, it will be
possible to evaluate each explanation in order to see if the interview data, historical
records and other sources support the logic and implications of either account.
Following Bates et al., this analysis will locate and explore the particular mecha-
nisms that have shaped the interplay between strategic actors involved in the
Round Table. In so doing, it will be possible to model the process that generated
the collapse of communism in Poland and will capture the essence of the story of
that collapse.
The present analysis and conclusions are based on an extensive series of
interviews conducted with key party players, opposition negotiators and
observers carried out between 1989 and 2000. However, this analysis builds on
research conducted in Poland prior to, during and in the year after the Gda‘sk
shipyard strikes in August 1980. During 1980 and 1981, interviews were
conducted with Solidarnof- leader, Lech Wa„ˇsa, the founding members of the
Free Trades Union of the Coast, the Solidarnof- presidium, Catholic Church hier-
archy, priests and activists as well as a wide range of dissidents.27 The conclusions
have also been drawn from a close examination of Politburo records, Round Table
documents and the work of other academics. Previous accounts have not high-
lighted the fact that PZPR negotiators were warned of the dangers of choosing a
majoritarian electoral system for the election to the Senate. It will be shown that
two electoral experts28 advised the party, in writing, against opting for a majori-
tarian electoral system but that this advice was ignored. By tracking the series of
events and decisions and showing that this electoral error was part of a wider
pattern of strategic misperception which produced the institutional arrangements
agreed at the Round Table, it will be possible to offer a more comprehensive
explanation of the collapse of communism in Poland.
Given the emphasis on actors and actor-based explanation, it is important to
establish the credentials and credibility of the interview data gathered for this
analysis. Many scholars eschew interviews with actor stakeholders on the basis
that such persons will seek to tell the story that serves their best interests or fits
the legacy they wish to leave. Several factors obviate that perception in this case.
First, many of the key PZPR players were interviewed over time. For example, the
PZPR first secretary, General W. Jaruzelski and the last communist prime minister,
Mieczys„aw Rakowski, were interviewed by the author on two separate occasions,29
while Professor Jerzy Wiatr was interviewed on five occasions during the
1990s.30 Lengthy and detailed interviews (not all quoted from in this volume)
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were conducted with PZPR spokesman, Jan Bisztyga, immediately after the
election in June 1989 and on two subsequent occasions in 1990 and 1992.31
Interviews with less well-known players have also been conducted over time.
In the case of opposition dissidents and Solidarnof- activists (subsequently post-
Solidarnof- elected representatives), including Lech Wa„ˇsa, interviews have
been conducted on several occasions between 1980 and 2000.32 The fact that
the interviews have been conducted over time has allowed the author to check the
consistency of actors’ stories. It has been possible to compare the analysis and
information of PZPR interviewees to ascertain whether their stories conflict with
each other. Conducting the interviews over several time periods has also made it
possible to ask interviewees to respond to the accounts of other actors where
differences have occurred.
As Bates et al. point out, a narrative ‘possesses a background or setting, a
beginning, a sequence of scenes and an ending’.33 For the purposes of this
analytic narrative, we, therefore, need to know the background and setting of the
actors or interviewees from whom we have sought information so that we can
evaluate their motivations in the context of the version of events they relate. In
order to help the reader to follow those motivations, we now move on to provide
brief biographical details of the actors interviewed in the course of the research
for this book. Before doing so, it is important to note that the prime source of
information for this analysis is a series of interviews conducted in May 1999. At
that time, a range of PZPR and ex-Solidarnof- actors were asked the same set of
questions concerning the Round Table process. These questions are related to the
conditions that facilitated the initiation of the contacts between Solidarnof- and
the PZPR; what the PZPR expected to achieve from the initiation of talks with the
opposition; what the PZPR expected to achieve with the relegalization of the
union; what party actors expected from the institutional agreements they reached
with Solidarnof- as well as a range of questions that sought information on
the PZPR’s disastrous choice of electoral rules. Questions were also posed




Born in 1939, Stanis„aw Ciosek was a member of the Polish United Workers’
Party (PZPR) from 1959 to 1990. He held a variety of administrative posts within
the party. He was awarded a degree in oceanic studies from the College of
Economics in Sopot in 1961 and served for the next 14 years in the administra-
tion of the Union of Polish Students. Ciosek was a deputy to the Sejm from 1972
until 1985, and from 1975 to 1980, he was a regional first secretary in the PZPR.
He served on the Central Committee (Komitet Centralny, KC) from 1980 to 1981
and from 1986 to 1990. He was also a member of the Council of Ministers
between 1980 and 1985. In the years leading up to the Round Table negotiations
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(1986–8), he was the general secretary of the KC PZPR and general secretary of
the National Council of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON).
Ciosek served as Poland’s ambassador to Moscow between 1990 and 1996. In
1996, Ciosek became President Kwafniewski’s adviser on international affairs.
Ciosek was centrally involved in the ongoing talks between the Catholic hierarchy
and the PZPR during the 1980s. He was one of a small group of key party figures
who drove the process that led to the Round Table.
Professor Stanis„aw Gebethner
Stanis„aw Gebethner is a professor of Political Science at the University of
Warsaw. He represented the government coalition at the subtable on Political
Reform at the Round Table. Regarded as a non-party intellectual who was close
to but not a member of the PZPR, Professor Gebethner also had links with the
PZPR’s coalition partner, the Democratic Party. Professor Gebethner is a consti-
tutional and electoral expert. Subsequent to his role at the Round Table, Professor
Gebethner has advised various parliamentary committees on the relative merits of
various electoral formulae and constitutional issues. Apart from his teaching
and advisory work, Professor Gebethner writes extensively on Polish politics, in
particular on constitutional and electoral matters.
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR
Mr Jaruzelski is a dramatic person in Polish history. In his personal biography
one can see the dramatic destiny of many Polish people and elites. Jaruzelski,
a representative of the gentry and intelligentsia, becomes a communist
because he thinks that it was the great hope for the world. Having served the
interests of communism and the Soviet Union, he then sees it collapse in the
eighties. And what is left? His national feelings and patriotic sentiments!
Now I believe that Mr Jaruzelski is a different person – and this different
person I have learned to respect.35
Bronis„aw Geremek’s assessment of Jaruzelski encapsulates the key points in
his biography. Jaruzelski’s father was a volunteer in the war against the
Bolsheviks in 1920. Later, he was deported to Siberia along with his father who
died there. As a young man, he attended a training school for Soviet officers and
joined the Soviet-inspired Polish First Army and took part in the liberation of
Poland as well as the suppression of anti-communist resistance. He joined the
Polish Workers’ Party in 1947. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of
the KC PZPR, chairperson of the Council of State of the PRL, was appointed
prime minister in February 1981. One of the central issues surrounding Jaruzelski
is whether he should be regarded as a Polish patriot or traitor arising out of
his role in the introduction of martial law in December 1981.36 Jaruzelski was
the key figure behind the PZPR’s decision to enter into talks with Solidarnof-
in the late 1980s.
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Jaruzelski claims that it was the realization that it was impossible to reform the
economy without social support that precipitated the initiation of the Round Table
process.37 Jaruzelski was elected as the first president of post-communist Poland
in August 1989 but retired from public life after his presidency came to an end in
December 1990. In 1992, he published his book Stan wojenny dlaczego . . .
(Martial law why). Jaruzelski has been a prolific defender of his role in both
martial law and the Round Table process. His most recent work is To Differ
Wisely. How Did Marshal Law Come About?38 On 16 October 2001, General
Jaruzelski went before Warsaw district court, accused of being the chief perpe-
trator behind the bloody suppression of demonstrations in Gda‘sk and Szczecin
in December 1970.
Lech Kaczyński
Lech Kaczy‘ski was a Round Table participant on behalf of Solidarnof-. He was
born in 1949 (one of identical twin brothers) and graduated from the University
of Warsaw’s Faculty of Law in 1971. He was later awarded a doctorate from the
University of Gda‘sk. During the 1980s, Kaczy‘ski was the director of the
dissident-led Bureau for Intervention of the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR)
and advised striking workers in the Lenin shipyards in Gda‘sk in 1980. He was a
member of the Helsinki Committee in Poland between 1982 and 1989 and played
a prominent role in the opposition throughout the 1980s. He was an adviser to
Lech Wa„ˇsa both before and after the collapse of communism and was a member
of the Citizen’s Committee between 1988 and 1991. He became a Senator repre-
senting the post-Solidarnof- Civic Parliamentary Club in 1989. He was later
elected to the Sejm for the Centre Alliance and served as a presidential adviser on
issues of national security. He was the Minister of Justice from June 2000 until
July 2001. He has held prominent positions in Prawo i Sprawiedliwof- (PiS) and
is currently the mayor of Warsaw. He is also professor of Law at the Catholic
Theological Academy in Warsaw.
General Czes„aw Kiszczak
General Kiszczak likes to style himself as the ‘Father of the Round Table’. While
Mieczys„aw Rakowski was the last communist prime minister of Poland to actually
head a government, General Kiszczak was the last PZPR prime minister of the
People’s Republic of Poland. He was in office from 2 to 15 August 1989 but was
unable to form a government. In the first non-communist government of Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Kiszczak served as vice-prime minister until July1990. Kiszczak is
best remembered for his role as Minister of the Interior, a position he held for
most of the 1980s. He was extremely loyal to General Jaruzelski and, in January
1989, threatened to resign with his first secretary when the Tenth Plenum of
the KC PZPR resisted their Round Table initiative. Kiszczak is bitter about the
outcome of the Round Table and feels that the Solidarnof- opposition hijacked
the project. He maintains that his role in the Round Table is not fully appreciated.
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Since 1993, General Kiszczak has been facing a series of charges in relation to
the killing of miners at the Wujek mine in Katowice. In 1994, Kiszczak’s trial
began in Warsaw’s Provincial Court. He was accused of breaking the constitution
of the Polish People’s Republic. In 1996, he was acquitted. In 1997, the Court of
Appeals rejected General Kiszczak’s acquittal and the court case started in the
court of first instance. The trial started again in May 2001. In March 2004,
Kiszczak was given a two-year suspended sentence.
Aleksander Kwafniewski
President of Poland (serving two terms – 1995–2000 and 2000–2005), Aleksander
Kwafniewski was born in 1954 and helped to initiate the Round Table negotia-
tions. He was co-chair of the subtable on Union Pluralism at the Round Table.
Kwafniewski studied international business at the University of Gda‘sk and was
a member of the PZPR from 1977 until 1990. He was active in the youth wing of
the party and was leader of the Union of Polish Students and editor of the student
weekly Itd. He was the Minister for Youth Affairs between 1985 and 1987 and
chair of the Committee for Youth and Physical Fitness from 1987 to 1990.
Kwafniewski played a significant role at the Round Table and was responsible
for proposing that the election for the Senate would be competitive. He played
a central role in the creation of the post-communist SdRP and was leader of the
SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) until he became president in 1995.
Adam Michnik
Adam Michnik has been a lifelong human rights activist and Polish dissident. He
was adviser to the Solidarnof- movement and negotiator for the opposition at the
Round Table. He is a renowned intellectual, historian, author and is editor-in-chief
of Gazeta Wyborcza since it was launched in the spring of 1989 (then a pro-
Solidarnof- election gazette). Michnik was imprisoned between 1968 and 1969
following his expulsion from the University of Warsaw after the protest marches
in March 1968. He was a founding member of the KOR in 1977 and a lecturer in
the ‘Flying University’ which brought workers and intellectuals together in
unofficial seminars. Michnik was imprisoned again between 1981 and 1984 and
from 1985 to 1986. After the Round Table, he served as a Sejm deputy for the
post-Solidarnof- Civic Parliamentary Club until 1991.
Bishop Alojzy Orszulik
Father Alojzy Orszulik was made bishop of Œowicz in 1982 and played a key role
in the process that led to the Round Table. Bishop Orszulik lectured in canon law
until 1989 and held several positions in the Polish Episcopate including director
of the Press Department between 1963 and 1993. In 1980, he began serving as a
member and secretary of the Joint Commission of the Government and
Episcopate of Poland. Bishop Orszulik’s Round Table memoir is an important
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source of information concerning the relationship between the PZPR and the
Catholic Church in Poland.
Mieczys„aw Rakowski
Mieczys„aw Rakowski was prime minister in the months leading up to the Round
Table. Born in 1926, he was an officer of the Polish People’s Army from 1945
until 1949. Rakowski received a doctorate in history from Warsaw’s Institute for
Social Sciences in 1956. He became a member of the Polish Workers’ Party in
1946 and, from 1948 until its dissolution, was a member of the PZPR. He served
on the KC from 1975 to 1990.
Rakowski was editor-in-chief of the weekly magazine Polityka from 1958
until 1982. In 1990, Rakowski became editor-in-chief of Dzif, a political
magazine. He was a member of the PZPR’s Politburo from 1987 to 1990 and the
last first secretary of the party. Rakowski has always insisted that he was on the
reformist wing of the party although this opinion was not universally accepted.
He was not a central figure in the contacts between the party and the opposition
in the run-up to the Round Table as he was prime minister during the period.
However, he argues that he was the first to invite the opposition to join the
coalition government in the autumn of 1988 in the hope that the move might
help to resolve Poland’s economic crisis. Rakowski is the author of numerous
publications on Polish politics.
Professor Janusz Reykowski
Janusz Reykowski was born in 1929 and is a professor of psychology at the
University of Warsaw since 1972. Since 1980, he has directed various psycho-
logical institutions including the Institute of Psychology at the Polish Academy of
Sciences. He also founded the private Higher School of Social Psychology in
Warsaw in 1996. He was one of the two co-chairs of the subtable on Political
Reform at the Round Table and negotiated on behalf of the government. He was
a member of the PZPR from 1949 until 1990 and served on its KC and Politburo
between 1988 and 1990. Reykowski became editor-in-chief of the journal Studia
Psychologiczne in 1972 and is a member of several international psychological
associations. Reykowski describes himself as being surprised by the PZPR’s
request that he negotiate on the party’s behalf at the Round Table39 as he does
not regard himself as having been a party insider. The timing of Reykowski’s
appointment to the KC and Politburo is worth noting.
Professor Andrzej Werblan
Born in 1924, Andrzej Werblan was professor of Political Science at the Silesian
University in Katowice. He was a member of the Polish Socialist Party and joined
the PZPR at its foundation in 1948. He became a member of the PZPR KC in the
1950s and served as head of the Science and Education Department of the KC. In
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the 1970s, he became one of the secretaries of the KC as well as deputy speaker
of the Sejm in 1971. He was a member of the Politburo for a few months in 1980,
but resigned in December. He lost his Sejm seat in 1985 and was no longer
involved in leadership positions from that time. During his active role in the party,
he was on the reformist side in 1956, then drifted to the mainstream but was later
identified as a reformist leader in 1980–1. In 1968, he became associated with the
nationalistic faction of General Moczar, for which he was often criticized in
liberal circles. He was not active in the PZPR at the time of the Round Table
negotiations but was in regular contact with party activists. In particular, he was
in contact with Professor Reykowski and telephoned him in relation to the
proposed electoral rules. He also contacted Prime Minister Rakowski who notes,
in a published collection of his letters, that Werblan’s advice against the use of the
majoritarian system for the June 1989 election was ignored because he had not
actively participated in the creation of the government or the PZPR’s policy-making
in the late 1980s.
Professor Jerzy Wiatr
Born in 1931, Jerzy Wiatr is professor of Sociology at the University of Warsaw.
He has held various academic positions in Poland and abroad, including the
presidency of the Polish Political Science Association and vice-presidency of the
International Political Science Association. From 1981 to 1984, Wiatr was director
of the Institute of Marxism–Leninism of the PZPR KC. He was a deputy to the
Sejm and a negotiator for the party at the subtable on Political Reforms at
the Round Table. He was a founding member of the Social democracy of the
Republic of Poland following the dissolution of the PZPR in 1990 and a member
of the SdRP’s National Council between 1991 and 2000. He was chairman of the
party’s Warsaw Council between 1991 and 1996. Wiatr was an MP from 1991
until 2001 and Minister for Education between 1996 and 1997 in the government
of W„odzimierz Cimoszewicz.
S„awomir Wiatr
S„awomir Wiatr has played a prominent role in post-communist government in
Poland including a position as campaign chief in the country’s negotiations with
the European Union prior to membership. He was awarded a PhD degree in
Journalism and Political Science at the University of Warsaw in 1980. From 1979
until 1983, Wiatr worked at the Warsaw University Methodology Centre for
Political Sciences, followed by a job at the Polish Academy of Science (PAN)
Centre of Management Sciences (1983–9). In the academic years 1981–2 and
1986–7, he lectured at the Institute of Political Science of Vienna University.
In 1984, he completed an internship at the Institute of Political Science of
the University of Heidelberg. In 1989, Wiatr was appointed as the head of
the youth department of the PZPR KC and from July 1989 he was appointed as
a secretary of KC.
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S„awomir Wiatr was head of the PZPR KC on youth in 1989 and founder member
of the post-communist SdRP along with his friend, Aleksander Kwafniewski.
He participated in the Round Table talks and was a deputy in the tenth Sejm –
the last before the fall of communism. In 1991, he became involved in business,
introducing the Austrian Billa supermarket chain to Poland. Other companies
with which he was linked were active in social research, marketing, promotion
and construction. From 1980 to 1989, he was an activist of the Polish Society of
Political Science, acting as chairman of its Warsaw branch and a member of the
Central Board. From 1990, he chaired the Kazimierz Kelles–Krauz Foundation.
S„awomir Wiatr is the son of former Education Minister Jerzy Wiatr.40 He is a
friend of his contemporary, former President Aleksander Kwafniewski.
In this chapter, it has been argued that the analytic narrative ‘offers a method
for moving from the context rich world of events and cases to explanations that
are logically rigorous, illuminating and insightful’.41 It has also been shown that
by explicitly laying out the observable implications of hypotheses, in this case of
conflicting theories of Adam Przeworski and Josep Colomer, it is possible to
empirically assess which of these theories provide the most explanatory leverage.
It has also been argued that the interview material gathered for this volume is
unlikely to yield false information given the fact that many key actors were
interviewed over time and because it has been possible to check the veracity of
stated positions with other contemporary documents. Finally, in providing a brief
biographical note, it is hoped that readers will be able to follow the motivation
and logic behind interviewees’ statements more easily.
We now move on to the analytical narratives themselves. In Chapter 4, we
examine the context of the initiation of the Round Table process and try to
determine the strategic goals and expectations of PZPR negotiators at the start of
the process.
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The compromise was built on the weakness of Solidarnof- and the party. The
party was too weak to liquidate us and we were too weak to gain power.1
The structural context
Any credible analysis of the context of the collapse of communism in Poland
must take into account the overall structural background conditions in Eastern
and Central Europe in the 1980s. Zbigniew Brzezi‘ski’s argument that commu-
nism entered into a general crisis in the late 1980s was noted in the introductory
chapter.2 Other authors have referred to systemic exhaustion.3 In simple terms,
the command economy system was no longer capable of being reformed by
ad hoc interventions. In retrospect, it can be seen that several factors, including
economic decline and the destabilizing impact of cyclical attempts at economic
reform and partial marketization contributed to this systemic exhaustion.
Virtually all of the Polish communist party leaders spoken to in the course of this
research have confirmed that the main motivation behind the initiation of talks
with Solidarnof- and the opposition in 1988 was the realization that the PZPR’s
economic reform effort had failed.4
Another important contextual factor was modernization. Although spotty in the
Soviet bloc, modernization created demands that could not be dealt with in the con-
text of monocentric politics. In Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia, various attempts
and varieties of party reform ended in different degrees of failure. But perhaps the
key factor which created the mindset for change in Poland and the rest of the Soviet
bloc was the collapse of the ideological belief and commitment to communism.
Adam Przeworski has observed that, by 1989, party bureaucrats did not believe in
their own propaganda. And not believing in their own speech, lessened their author-
ity as well as their ability to enforce that authority.5 The decomposition of commu-
nist elites was another factor of varying importance in the destabilization of
communism across the Soviet bloc. This was a particular problem in Poland where
factionalism had always been rife. However, after 1980 when General Jaruzelski
suppressed Solidarnof- with the introduction of martial law, the differences
between the hardliners and party reformers became more acute.
The fatal blow, as has been noted earlier, was, of course, Gorbachev’s
abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It is arguable that the communist system
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of governance in Eastern Europe would have struggled on had party reformers not
been given the green light to initiate economic and social change. The removal of
the threat of Warsaw Pact intervention cannot be overestimated as a factor in the
collapse of communism in 1989.
In the Polish case destabilization was not confined to the party–state arena alone.
A separate but equally important change in the balance of power was occurring
within NSZZ Solidarnof-, in the late 1980s. Voytek Zubek has shown that, by 1988,
the Solidarnof- leadership under Lech Wa„ˇsa was on the run from the younger and
more militant elements with its ranks.6 Initially, some PZPR-oriented commentators
and party leaders took pleasure in the Wa„ˇsa leadership’s discomfiture. Soon,
however, most of the PZPR’s leaders began to realize that the dangers stemming
from the inception of the new, more radical, movement within Solidarnof- were
incomparably greater than the possible benefits that the party could gain from a
weakening of the ‘old’ Solidarnof- leadership. There was a growing fear that if left
unchecked, the new movement would inevitably continue to develop its new
leadership and would find followers among radical intellectuals.
The effect of this realization combined with the impact of Gorbachev’s reforms
‘even further isolated Poland’s besieged communist elite’7 and encouraged the
internal reform of both Solidarnof- and the PZPR. The overall impact of the
radicalization of younger Solidarnof- members and the various pressures being
experienced by the PZPR led both the party and Solidarnof- to engage in exer-
cises designed to rid themselves of their more radical elements. As the
Solidarnof- theorist Adam Michnik notes earlier, the perceived mutual weakness
of both the government and opposition created a context where compromise was
the rational and self-interested strategy for both players.8 It is this context that
underpins our analysis of the expectations of PZPR actors responsible for the
initiation of the talks process with Solidarnof-.
Wiktor Osiaty‘ski has argued that the PZPR’s main purpose in opening up
negotiations was to seek a compromise that, while giving the opposition some say,
would secure for the party overall control over developments in Poland.9 In this sce-
nario, the ideal situation was a distinction between economic and political reforms:
The Party elite would have preferred to solve economic problems first, and
only then move on to political reforms, having thus secured a better starting
position for such negotiations. According to Aleksander Kwafniewski,10 this
turned out to be impossible, ‘for economic change requires many years,
while political reforms are faster and easier to implement’.11
As Osiaty‘ski remarks, the party’s bottom line was that it had to retain control of
the reforms and negotiations. Even for the party reformers, the idea of democracy
was limited to democracy in which the PZPR could not lose.
The initiation of the Round Table process
Was this a far-sighted strategic move aimed at preserving the long-term interests
of PZPR actors or a short-sighted strategy designed to retain incumbency?
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In order to evaluate the relative merits of the respective hypotheses of
Przeworski and Colomer, we must return to the observable implications or
expected behaviour and strategies that flow from these conflicting theories. It fol-
lows that, in the light of Colomer’s strategic transition theory, we would expect to
see PZPR actors evaluate their strategic options in the context of their assessment
of the relative strengths of the party and the opposition. We would also expect to
see PZPR negotiators attempting to perfect and update the information at their
disposal as they plot each strategic move. Furthermore, we would expect regime
players to react and counter-react to the moves of opposition negotiators. In
general terms, we would expect to see actors focusing on long-term interests. In
the light of Przeworski’s hypothesis, we expect that the preservation of short-term
incumbency will be the focal point of PZPR strategies. If broadened dictatorship
was the goal of these actors, then we would also expect to see them only agree-
ing to the creation of new institutions they can hope to dominate and do well
from. If, as Przeworski posits, transition results from the misperceived strategies
of regime liberalizers, then we expect to see actors making flawed evaluations that
are not in the PZPR’s best interests as a result of a failure to update and improve
the information at their disposal.
Author interviews with PZPR Round Table negotiators
Professor Janusz Reykowski
The psychologist, Professor Reykowski, argues that there was a growing awareness
of the ineffectiveness of the command economy among the political elite towards
the end of the 1980s and that this was a prime factor in the move to initiate talks
with the opposition:
In my conversations with people in the leadership at the time I learned that they
thought there would either be fundamental economic reform or the economic
system was likely to collapse or at least not be able to meet the basic needs of
society. So the problem was how to reform the system and there was some plans
and programmes. And towards the end of the eighties the authorities learned that
they themselves do not have the social approval for deep reform. So there was
an intensive search to get this approval. One attempt was a kind of referendum
in 1987.12 It failed and there was no clear idea as to what to do next. The prob-
lem was how to get the public’s approval. So during the eighties there was a
crossroads. Either the system is going to be more and more repressive and
sooner or later face a major confrontation with part of society or some com-
pletely new solution would have to be attained. And this new solution was an
attempt at reaching an agreement with the opposition. The idea was that if the
opposition became part of the political system then it would give an opportunity
to make reform because the attitude of society in general would be different.13
Professor Reykowski provides an interesting insight into the private motiva-
tion of the elite to which he belonged. He points out that the situation
Hayden-04.qxd  18/11/05  2:44 PM  Page 49 $ 
+ + 
$ 
of the nomenklatura played a part in the elite’s decision to seek an accommodation
with the opposition:
The living conditions of the nomenklatura, the people at the highest level
here, was approximately that of a lower middle class person in the west. Of
course there were many privileges in comparison with ordinary people. But
this privilege from today’s perspective was a joke. For example as a
Politburo member, as I was in 1989, I had no problem buying shoes. I had
two or three pairs of shoes to choose from and the ordinary person had no
choice – only one pair. Ordinary people had to stay in line to buy a TV, but
I could buy one in one week. So there was a privilege – there were stores
behind the yellow curtains for the governmental elite. But these stores were
very low quality in comparison with an ordinary provincial store in Poland
at present. What I am saying first is that this ruling class was very econom-
ically frustrated – especially those people who had contact with the west.
They knew that people in a similar position in politics in the west lived
completely differently.14
Apart from the personal economic frustration of the elite, Professor Reykowski
remembers a pervasive feeling of the ineffectiveness of the system of governance
in Poland:
They [members of the elite] were not able to pursue any rational plan. Even
people at the top level felt helpless. They perceived the system as irrational.
Both these aspects – the economic situation and the inability of self-realization
in professional life meant that people were ready to search for deep change.
There was of course a large group of party activists – the party leadership in
the large factories and the large voivodships [districts] who were trying to
protect the status quo. They didn’t want to have any radical change except the
change of leadership. . . . In the second part of the seventies – the elite was
transformed. New people had joined the party. Most of them were university
educated – most of them in the best Polish universities. A high proportion
had contact with the west. So what I am saying is that there were social
processes within the system that made the system more inclined to change.
At the same time there were also highly conservative factions who would
interfere with any change. An important factor was that after martial law, in
the second half of the eighties, Jaruzelski eliminated the more conservative
elements from the leadership.15
Professor Reykowski points out that the goal of those seeking talks with
Solidarnof- at the end of 1988 was not very clear or defined:
The idea was that the opposition should become part of the political system.
But what does it mean to become part of the political system? It means, at
least, to be in the parliament. The idea to recruit the opposition had come
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earlier. Prime Minister Rakowski wanted to have ministers from the opposition
in his government. But the opposition argued that if they were recruited into
government they would be of no value because their supporters would
perceive them as traitors and not as independent political actors. They would
be seen as part of the system. I think that for quite a long time in the Polish
leadership there was not a clear awareness of this situation. But in early ‘89
it was possible to agree that Solidarnof- was [of ] no use if it was perceived
as being in the same position as PSL [Peasant Party] or other so-called satellite
parties. It was then understood that the opposition must be independent and
be an independent political agent. And for that to be the case, it cannot be a
part of centralized and a mono-party system . . . . There must be a new form
of political game. It was hoped that parliament would be a new area – a new
institution where this new political game can be played. But nobody was very
clear how this new game could be played. There was a vague premonition
that the next step would be more fundamental change in the political system.
Nobody was thinking very far ahead . . . . But the main idea . . . was to trans-
form political conflict from the streets into the parliament and into the polit-
ical arena . . . . It was hoped that if Solidarnof- was in parliament that the
conflict will be rationalized in this form and not by demonstration. Of course
the aim was not clear or highly articulated!16
MP Professor Jerzy Wiatr
MP Professor Jerzy Wiatr identifies three conditions that facilitated the convening
of the Round Table:
First Gorbachev and the new Soviet policy! Second the elimination of the
hardliners from the PZPR, which took place gradually and was completed at
the tenth Party Congress. And then, the third factor was Solidarnof-. Two
things happened within Solidarnof- in 1988 that were important for future
compromise. One was that the leaders of Solidarnof- – the people around
Wa„ˇsa realized that they were strong enough to negotiate from the position
of strength but not strong enough to win if they rejected negotiation. This
kind of feeling was probably consolidated by the strikes in the summer of
1988. And then the second thing was that for the first time, the Solidarnof-
leadership realized that they had been challenged by a younger and more
radical generation. So for them it was now or never! By the way, it explains
to some extent why among the radical and younger militants of Solidarnof-
there is now so much criticism of the Round Table. In a sense the Round
Table was stealing the chance from these younger more radical people. It was
probably the last moment for the old leadership. Had Wa„ˇsa and the people
around him made a mistake and rejected the offer of compromise then prob-
ably they would have been replaced by the younger, more radical generation
of Solidarnof-. The results would probably have been worse for the party but
also worse for the then leadership of Solidarnof-.17
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So, what were the PZPR’s perceived alternatives to opening negotiations with
the opposition? Wiatr argues that other alternatives were being considered:
I would call it the Brazilian alternative rather than the Spanish model. Amongst
those of us who were in power in the late eighties on the national level, nobody
could be described as conservative anti-reform. But there were distinctively
different approaches. Everybody knows what is meant by the Spanish way. So
what is Brazilian – it is reform from above without consultation about chang-
ing the system. Change is imposed, but the essence of what abertura meant in
Brazil was keeping power. It meant marginalizing the opposition but at the
same time democratizing the system to the point where Brazil became a
democracy. So it was a different channel. I think that Rakowski18 was actually
the strongest and most serious exponent of the Brazilian strategy even if he
would not have called it by that name. You cannot describe Rakowski as a con-
servative anti-reformer. He was for democratic change long before many peo-
ple were in favour of this option! But at the same time he was very emotionally
anti-Solidarnof- and rather sceptical about the prospects of negotiation and
hoping that he would be able to reform the system from above. He could not
achieve this aim for many reasons; one of them being that he was given the
chance too late. But there are also other factors in the Brazilian case – the fact
that the opposition was destroyed much more radically in the coup of 1964 than
was the case in Poland after martial law. Also the Brazilian economy was doing
very well as compared to the dismal state of the Polish economy. I think it
explains why the Brazilian road was closed for Poland. That’s my view. The
only road that was open if Poland was to avoid a confrontation was a negoti-
ated transition and that was what Jaruzelski opted for. I think that at a certain
point Rakowski joined the team, but that was a different story.19
Wiatr argues that there was a sense of there being no turning back from the
process of change among the reform-oriented elite who played the central role in
initiating the Round Table:
At the time, the aim as I saw it was a form of contractual democracy, which
was another way of saying negotiated power sharing with the objective of
democratizing the system later on. When we discussed this question of what
would come later I remember asking [Professor Janusz] Reykowski and
[Mieczys„aw] Rakowski whether the PZPR would be in power or opposition
when the system becomes fully democratized? In fact history has shown that
we would be both in opposition and in power. So both sides were proved to be
right. But one thing was obvious that the power sharing was not an arrange-
ment for another half-century. Sharing power would allow Poland to transit
through the very difficult period of reforms. The idea was, and we were prob-
ably over optimistic, to try and reach a socially acceptable situation in a few
years and then compete in a fully democratic election – not from the position
of extreme political weakness but from a position of sharing the credit with
Solidarnof- for the improvement in society. We didn’t want a situation where
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one side was only to be blamed for the failures and the other side could
be seen as the only hope. That was certainly my view. People had various
expectations but the realization that there was no return was fairly common.20
General Wojciech Jaruzelski
General Wojciech Jaruzelski argues that a turning point in his analysis of the
options open to the PZPR was the government’s failure to win the 1987 referendum
on the party’s economic reform package:
It was the best example of how the rulers of Poland were so naïve. It was
decided to count the votes on the basis of the people eligible to vote rather
than on the basis of the actual turnout or vote. In any country there is no such
formula – it was more than democracy. It was stupid. If you count the votes
of those who came – then over 70 per cent voted. Looked at this way the
referendum was won by the government – but if you calculate on the basis of
100 per cent total electorate then we lost with just over 40 per cent supporting
the reforms. This state considered to be totalitarian in 1987 honoured the
result. But it was a signal that the necessary reforms would be painful and
that we needed to enlarge the basis of social support. We were looking to
widen the base of support and we were using the church. Publications were
emerging, a pro-reform coalition was being suggested and anti-crisis pacts
were being mooted in the press. The whole conception, before the strikes,21
was to introduce the opposition to the system of power, but doing it smartly
on a restricted basis . . . we did not want to formalize the opposition as
Solidarnof-. But we were looking for ways to exploit, to invite the opposition
to help us reform the economy. . . . It is worth noting that some important
steps were made under Rakowski22 and they were very close to those continued
by Mr Mazowiecki23 . . . but Mr Mazowiecki was enjoying a state of national
euphoria and so people were ready to take risks. But we did not have that
luxury – even our own trade unions24 started to strike. But the big change
came both from the political and psychological point of view.25
General Jaruzelski took the view that he was under no immediate pressure to
initiate talks with the opposition groups. However, he did feel that the moment
was optimal from a strategic point of view. The Solidarnof--led strikes in the
spring and late summer of 1988 had not been universally supported across
the country and there were elements within Solidarnof- who were questioning the
capabilities of Lech Wa„ˇsa and the group around him:
The strikes were finished very quickly. And there was a lot of opposition from
within the party and reservations about me personally and about the fact that
I was starting talks with the opposition. The situation was not pressing . . . but
I believed it was an optimal moment to make the move. Because when there
is a winner and loser it is hard to say that negotiation or a compromise is going
on – because there is someone who lost and someone who won. But in 1988
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during and after the strikes one cannot say there were winners and losers.
Solidarnof- was weak and the strikes were waning. Even the first move
toward the government was from Solidarnof-. Professor Andrzej
Stelmachowski, who had the blessing of the church, approached the govern-
ment about the possibility of talks. But it is true to say that the government
was weak. We knew the result of the referendum (1987) and we were unable
to carry out the reforms without broad support. So it was a very good moment
to start talking about negotiations. It took more than half a year to set it up and
the church played a major role. But the main barrier was the question of
Solidarnof-’s legalization. The party members were thinking about giving the
opposition part of the power, some part of the Sejm. Rakowski was offering to
share ministries with Solidarnof- – but the party was afraid. There were bad
memories of 1981 and fears that we would have strong trade unions making
demands. We were afraid of aggression that would hurt the economy.26
General Jaruzelski makes the point that he was not afraid of Solidarnof- as a
political force, but he was afraid that the union would create chaos if it was
relegalized and allowed to organize in the factories. Jaruzelski’s notion of the
political role Solidarnof- would play was coloured by the PZPR’s perception of
the strength of its own organization:
I was more thinking of [Solidarnof- as] an additional party – like a Christian
Democratic party. We were not afraid of political competition. We had strong
political structures of our own. We had our own knowledge that the support
for Solidarnof- was not so strong. But we were afraid that if we relegalized
Solidarnof-, they would create chaos when they entered the factories. It is
hard to imagine Solidarnof- re-entering the factories and saying ‘work
harder and eat less’. . . . The state-controlled unions were afraid of the com-
petition from Solidarnof-, and so before relegalization, they had started
being more aggressive. They were going to make demands because they were
afraid that Solidarnof- would snatch away their members. So we were
expecting a wave of demands after relegalizing.27
General Czes„aw Kiszczak
Interior Minister General Czes„aw Kiszczak likes to be described as the ‘father
of the Round Table’. Almost fanatically loyal to General Jaruzelski, on
11 September 1986 Kiszczak announced an amnesty for political prisoners. He
regards this as the masterstroke and first move in the effort to initiate talks with
the opposition: ‘The basis of the communist system was terror . . . so our move had
great significance and much influence.’28 Kiszczak says that he wanted to create
the environment for political talks with the opposition so that we could
discuss the possibility of improvement of the country. It is important to
remember that no serious member of Solidarnof- would talk to the party
while his friends were in prison.29
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As with all interviews with political actors, it is necessary to exercise great
caution in the assessment of General Kiszczak’s testimony given his desire to be
remembered as having played a key role in the Round Table process:
The party was very weak. There was a pretence that the party exists – as in the
rules and the constitution. But three people ruled Poland – Jaruzelski, Siwicki30
and Kiszczak. We wanted to legalize Solidarnof- at the tenth Plenum (of the
Central Committee of the Party) on 17 January 1989. We wanted agreement
from the party. We wanted to spread the responsibility for legalizing the union.
A paper was presented and there was a great debate – but we anticipated the
problem. We three – Jaruzelski, Siwicki and myself – arranged a trick.
Jaruzelski threatened to resign. Rakowski got to hear of it and he joined in. We
all [the three] withdrew in a dramatic fashion. There was a discussion. Henryk
Jab„o‘ski led the discussion – the party was afraid of discussion.31
Having secured the approval of the Tenth Plenum to enter into talks with the
opposition, a meeting was arranged between Solidarnof- leader Lech Wa„ˇsa and
General Kiszczak for 25 January. Kiszczak argues that the timing was right for
the opening of talks because both sides were weak:
It was a chess game. Nobody could make a move to win. Solidarnof- tried
their 1980 strategy – they tried strikes to demonstrate their power one more
time. The April–May [1988] strikes failed for Solidarnof-. They only got the
partial support of the workers. In August – they tried again in Gda‘sk.
Geremek32 and Wa„ˇsa went up to try and get support. Only 30033 workers
out of thousands joined the strike. The same in Kraków – Nowa Huta! There
only 300 or so joined in. Overall only a thousand or so went on strike in the
whole country. The people were tired – they’d had enough. Solidarnof- was
weak. They were having an internal crisis. But in the party, people were not
happy either. We couldn’t manage the economy. People’s expectations were
not satisfied. The socialist system, the economic model was not reformable.
The military men had thought that the army way, discipline, would reform
the economy but we didn’t succeed. The country needed systemic change. No
government with communists and the peasants could introduce reforms.
The changes needed required belt-tightening, and for that, public support was
required. We were not going to get that. We needed the support of society.
But we would not get co-responsibility for the economy and the changes
without co-opting the opposition.34
Kiszczak argues that the PZPR could have adopted other strategies:
We could have started the talks differently. We could have made problems for
the opposition. We could have talked to the non-Solidarnof- opposition or
with certain wings of Solidarnof-, for instance the ‘August 80’35 opposition.
Also we could have talked to the AK36 army people. But all of that had the
potential to create chaos within the opposition. But we didn’t want to do this.
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The public had greater respect for Wa„ˇsa than the rest of the opposition.
That’s why I chose Wa„ˇsa. We didn’t mean to harm the opposition.37
Kiszczak emphasizes that the goal, the reason for initiating the Round Table talks
process was to generate the social support necessary to reform the economy. Limited
political change was the means to an end – not an end in itself: ‘We thought about
reform, market economy à la Balcerowicz – we wanted to loosen the straightjacket.
We thought about press freedom. But we didn’t aim to give power to the opposition.’38
Stanis„aw Ciosek
The political scene in 1988 was the following: Solidarnof- was weakening –
they’d moved from 10 millions down to 2 millions. It was not possible to
count exactly but it was weaker and the spirit of Solidarnof- was getting
weaker. That can be checked. One of the mysteries is why the party was going
to agree for a free election! And the answer – maybe because Solidarnof-
was getting weaker – so we hoped for a better result. The idea of competition
for political elections in 1980 would have been to give up – political suicide.
But the party felt in 1988–9 the chances were more or less equal – that is the
party against Solidarnof-. The economy was down the drain despite
the attempts at reform with no significant results. Brezhnev was gone . . . so
the climate was different.39
Ciosek rejects the notion that the PZPR had no alternative but to negotiate with
Solidarnof-:
Of course there was an alternative. Keep the old way. It would have been
stagnation – helpless. We would keep our posts. We could rule for a number
of years with the old ways. It was not a tactical move to allow the free election –
this whole Round Table compromise. It was not a tactical move – it was a
strategic move and change. It was a clear and conscious drive to change the
whole situation and system in Poland. It was a deliberate attempt to change
the system. It was not to give power to Solidarnof- – but it was a power-sharing
idea. The idea was to try and rule together. But the situation changed.40
Ciosek is emphatic that the initiation of the Round Table talks process did not
result from some immediate sense of pressure:
The direct goal – the basic goal – the reason was intellectual. There was no
physical pressure. The strikes were weak. It was a deliberate intellectual
decision! It was not a result of pressure. We were seeking the solution to the
current situation and problems. The other countries around Poland were
growing at a greater rate. So we could rule in stagnation as it was in 1988.
Most probably if we had started to change the face of socialism but leaving
the leading role of the party, there would be other solutions. But we decided
to allow the opposition to share power. Maybe it was a naïve approach to
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invite the opposition to power share. . . . Of course, my instincts were telling
me that it was the end of an era – the end of absolute rule! In my opinion
everyone was realizing that the relegalizing of Solidarnof- is the effective
end of the leading role and sole ruling of the party.41
Unlike Kiszczak who, as we saw, argued that the main aim of the Round Table
was to initiate a process of economic reform, Ciosek claims that the aim was to
start the process of democratization in Poland. He does not accept that the PZPR
made any strategic mistakes at the Round Table:
It was clear gamble! We were devising the change of a system – so it was a
conscious gamble concerning this. The real aim of the changes was not about
the economy or socialism to capitalism. It was about a democratization
process – a fuzzy democracy. . . . In the Round Table there is no sign of a free
market concerning the economy. The Mazowiecki government made the true
choices relating to the political and economic system in Poland.42
Mieczys„aw Rakowski
Mieczys„aw Rakowski supports the idea that the Round Table process arose
not just out of systemic exhaustion but also from the personal exhaustion of the
elite players:
We realized in the second half of the 1980s that the economic crisis [and] the
political crisis had not been resolved. We used preventive measures against
underground Solidarnof- and especially in the second half of the 1980s – the
underground was still very active. They were publishing a lot of papers, etc.
We could see that the system was tired but the main reason and the most
important was that since September 1986 there were no political prisoners.
All prisoners were released on the 11 September. This meant that the activists
were operating in public. Solidarnof- was openly organizing in many facto-
ries. There were two trade unions, the old one, the OPZZ43 and Solidarnof-.
In 1988 there were strikes in Kraków. The August strikes showed that
Solidarnof- was also weak. Solidarnof- knew it. Bugaj44 said that they were
like officers without an army. Both sides were tired. Each side was looking
for something new and so – the Round Table.45
Rakowski says that there was no alternative to negotiation, but he did not
expect that the opening up of the Round Table talks process would result in the
PZPR losing power:
We aimed to include the opposition into the existing system of power in the
country. I suggested when I was forming my last government that we offer
four ministries to Solidarnof- but they rejected the idea. That was September
1988! To repeat – the general idea was to include the opposition into the
system of ruling!46




In 1989, S„awomir Wiatr was an active member of the PZPR. He completely
rejects the idea that the collapse of communist power resulted from a mistaken
strategy at the Round Table. He admits that many people in the PZPR had a
different attitude to the prospect of political change than the generation he repre-
sents. He argues that young party reformers like himself and Aleksander
Kwafniewski actively sought deep change in order to position themselves for the
creation of a new post-communist social democratic party:
We were in a sort of situation where we looked at this process, maybe not
without emotion, but with an awareness that we had to change our PZPR suit.
People with the experience of Rakowski saw it as the end of the world. It was
difficult for them to imagine what would happen the day after. That’s why the
younger generation took an active role in 1989. That’s not to decrease the role
of Jaruzelski and the group around him because without him nothing would
have happened. I have read Rakowski’s notes from this period and it displays
that he was sceptical about the idea of the creation of a new system in Poland.
We were in a totally different condition, intellectually and politically because
we believed that we would be weak for a while, but we were also sure that we
would achieve important positions in the new system for many reasons.
Some reasons were internal. We thought we were more politically talented
and that we understood the country and the mechanisms better.47
S„awomir Wiatr concedes that the potential outcome was far from clear at the
beginning of 1989:
We wanted the best results. Some people even thought it was possible that we
could win the elections. . . . It was clear that after the elections that there would
be a change in the system of power and it was also clear that Solidarnof- would
join this system. . . .We thought and the Solidarnof- people thought that the
structures from the old system would exist in the new system for some time.
Even after the election and the agreement between Wa„ˇsa and the ZSL and
SD48 which gave Solidarnof- a majority, it was still clear that some posts in the
ministries would go to people from the PZPR. The idea of that was more to do
with geo-politics than with internal affairs. When you look at it now – and there
were a lot of emotions at the time of the 4 June elections – for the more aware
and astute end of the PZPR, it was clear that it was the end of the system and
the end of the party. From the beginning of 1989, we were intellectually
prepared for the organization of a new left-wing party. It was to be a party that
would meet the standards of European social democracy. It was also clear that
it would be a revolution of the generations. It was clear that this party would be
created by the 35-year-old generation. There were two kinds of thinking. One
way was from people in the parliamentary structures or people with party roles.
So these people were inside this new system created by the Round Table. And
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the other approach was that we were preparing for the creation of the SdRP,
which happened in January 1990. . . .At the beginning of 1989 – it wasn’t like
today – there were going to be great changes between 1989 and whatever hap-
pened next. People would have different skins. We knew we would be in a new
formation. We didn’t know how many left wing parties there would be or how
many Solidarnof- parties there would be, but we knew it would be different.49
Wiatr points out that this desire for less radical change was not just a preference
of the older generation of the PZPR:
I remember unofficial talks, which were important for the consensus about the
election. Bronis„aw Geremek and Adam Michnik50 argued that in the future
the political scene would not be conducted through parties, but through social
movements. They hoped for something that we knew could not happen except
in a quasi-totalitarian system. They wanted to keep the organizational integrity
of Solidarnof-. And we knew that the sooner we finished the PZPR, the
sooner the decomposition would occur on the other side.51
Adam Michnik
Adam Michnik played a central role in the contacts and later on in the negotiations
between the union and the government:
HAYDEN: To what extent do you agree that the party negotiated itself out of power
politically in order to reinvent itself in the new order?
ADAM MICHNIK: Fairytales! You should read the documents. Till the end, they did
not believe that they would lose power and have to give power to Solidarnof-.
They were totally astonished – surprised.52
The conditions of change
The evidence from PZPR documents, memoranda, pre-Round Table exchanges and
the contemporaneous notes of Catholic Church negotiator, Bishop Alojzy Orszulik.
General W. Jaruzelski has consistently argued that the economic imperative
played a major role in the decision to make contact with the ‘constructive opposi-
tion’ in the late 1980s. One of the key aims of the initiation of contacts with
Solidarnof- was the desire to create an environment where Western governments
would end the economic sanctions imposed on Poland after the introduction of
martial law in 1981. Given the fact that economic aid from within the Soviet bloc
did not compensate for the loss of Western aid and capital, the need to appease
Western demands for the inclusion of the Polish opposition became more acute as
economic conditions deteriorated in the Soviet Union. General Jaruzelski visited
Prague in February 1989 for a meeting with the general secretary of the
Czechoslovak communist party, Milosz Jakesz, and President Gustav Husak. He
used the opportunity of the visit to explain the raison d’être behind the PZPR
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decision to enter into a talks process with Solidarnof-. The memorandum provided
to the Polish Politburo following the trip is the equivalent of a cost–benefit analysis
of the determinants of PZPR strategy in the late 1980s.53 Jaruzelski began his
meeting with Jakesz by justifying the introduction of martial law in December 1981:
The introduction of martial law was a necessity (there was a threat of a
catastrophe), in military terms it was a victory but politically it was a defeat.
Conclusions had to be drawn from that, the position of socialism had to
be rebuilt in people’s heads and hearts – something that was not fully
successful.54
Jaruzelski then explained the reasoning behind the ‘round table’ and the
opening of discussions on political and union pluralism in Poland:
It is necessary to take such steps as a result of a difficult economic situation
that requires unconventional methods and difficult decisions aimed at
overcoming inflation and improving the market. This, in turn, would not be
possible without the understanding and backing (or at least neutrality) of all
significant social forces. The objective, therefore, is to neutralize
‘Solidarnof-’ in order to pass successfully through a difficult period of 1–2
years when all these problems will become particularly striking.55
Jaruzelski told Jakesz that the PZPR needed
to create a reality that would allow breaking of the West’s economic discrim-
ination. Out of this necessity came the idea of seeking solutions that would
lead to the weakening of the opposition’s hostility. It is a lesser evil than
eventual confrontational solutions and at the same time provides a chance of
creating a wide front of national agreement and holding parliamentary
elections on a joint platform and with a high attendance of electorate. The
accepted course of action therefore provides a chance of reaching a situation
that would be safe for socialism and would include the opposition in joint
responsibility. Also important in this matter is the position of the Church:
currently that means objective support for our efforts.56
Jaruzelski said that he was aware that the opposition had its long-term objectives.
He said that the aim was to keep the process under the party’s control and force
the opposition not to incite strikes but to counteract them. Jaruzelski spoke of the
conditional opportunity to initiate change:
It is assumed that insofar as the anticipated process will develop successfully
and ‘Solidarnof-’ will be able to operate legally, it will be a different
‘Solidarnof-’ than the one in 1981. Then it was an anti-Soviet movement,
today it declares itself in favour of perestroika; then its extremist wing could
not be isolated, today there is a very apparent split within it, something that
gives us an additional chance.57
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Jaruzelski also described changes in the attitude of the Catholic Church which
created opportunities for the PZPR:
The relationship between the Catholic Church and the USSR has changed.
The Church, to large extent, as a result of the Vatican’s eastern policies,
is interested in peace in Poland and does not want the emergence of
anti-Soviet feelings. It has a moderating impact on the stance of the
opposition.58
In weighing up the cost and benefits of the PZPR’s new strategy, Jaruzelski also
provided Jakesz with an assessment of the international situation:
The other significant element is the international situation. The non-
confrontational tendencies weaken the US and Western pressure for destruc-
tive actions in Poland. Whereas in 1981 the West was attempting to cause a
break out of conflict, now it has adopted a longer term policy of gradually
winning different social forces for strengthening pro-western tendencies.
This is however a process that can be appropriately won over.
Poland’s foreign debt is a serious problem since it impedes the acceleration
of the economic development. We are aware that without changes in our
domestic policies there is no chance of the West changing its attitude towards
our country. Introduced changes create an opportunity to improve our economic
relations with the West and also give us a chance to improve economic
situation of our country which would, in turn, strengthen the party’s position
and provide wider opportunities for its policies.
It is possible to adopt such a direction in our solutions because: in the
current situation we don’t do it under pressure but on our own initiative; there
appears to be a positive opinion of the government’s work; part of the
opposition (Wa„ˇsa, etc.) changes its rhetoric and working methods (from
aggression to agreements, strike prevention, compromise). Being fully aware
of the dangers, we believe that the above circumstances allow us to take a step
that, with due caution, should be, on balance, beneficial to us.59
Jaruzelski warned that the success of the ‘round table’ ‘is not a foregone
conclusion. The responsibility for its failure should not fall on us’.60 He told
Jakesz that a central part of the deal would be Solidarnof-’s agreement to abstain
from strikes for two years:
This year is an important one. Being fully aware of dangers and differences
in political make-up of the opposition the issue at stake for our system is to
try to absorb the opposition and to make it participate in shaping of the
system. It is a great historical experiment, which, if successful, may have
implications reaching beyond Polish borders.61
General Jaruzelski’s exposition of the reasoning behind the decision to initiate
the talks was clearly intended to highlight the fact that the PZPR was starting
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a process it intended to control. While the Prague memorandum deals with the
generalities of the aims of the talks process, other PZPR documents provide more
detailed accounts of the specific institutional changes envisaged. A confidential
report prepared by a PZPR ‘Interdepartmental Team’ in September 1988 following
the Eighth Plenum of the KC PZPR clearly shows that the party intended to
design institutions it expected to dominate.62 According to this document, the
establishment of an upper chamber and the office of the president could be
introduced through amendments to the existing Constitution. Acknowledging
the fact that a ‘deep process of social and political changes’63 was taking place,
the interdepartmental team explained that a new constitution should be the end,
rather than the beginning of the process.
In a later chapter, I will provide a detailed analysis of the PZPR’s bargaining
over institutions, including the presidency and Senate at the Round Table. At this
juncture, however, a number of points should be made. First, the characterization
of the functioning of the new Senate, as outlined in the departmental team report,
clearly shows that the PZPR envisaged it as a vehicle for incorporating the
opposition onto a body that would ultimately be controlled by the PZPR itself.
The selection mechanism for the Senate would give the president control over
one-third of the seats while nominally independent organizations would nominate
the other two-thirds. However, given the fact that these organizations would be
nominated by the PZPR-controlled Sejm, and the fact that the president would
always come from within the ranks of the party, it is clear that the party elite saw
its future being secured in the context of the creation of a strong presidential
system of government.
The fact that a number of members of the PZPR’s senior elite were actively
thinking about ways of including the opposition in the state’s institutions towards
the end of the 1980s is not contested. However, as late as June 1988, two years
after Kiszczak’s amnesty for political prisoners and a mere year before the con-
tractual election of June 1989, Polish Catholic Church authorities were surprised
to hear that the PZPR was considering the possibility of including the opposition
in the formation of a coalition government. Bishop (then Father) Alojzy Orszulik
played a key role as a go-between for the PZPR and the opposition during the
1980s. He kept a contemporaneous account of his meetings with both government
and opposition representatives.64 Father Orszulik met with Stanis„aw Ciosek on a
regular basis during the course of 1988 and early 1989:
Ciosek said that a proposal of creating the Senate or an upper house of the
Parliament is being considered. In the Sejm, the governing coalition would
secure 60–65 per cent of seats. But, in the Senate, it would be the other way
round. The Senate would have the right to put forward a motion ordering
controversial decisions of the Sejm to be voted again, but they should then
be supported by two-thirds of votes. Ciosek stated that political pluralism
was needed in Poland adding, however, that he did not support trade union
pluralism. He returned to the concept of merging Solidarnof- with existing
trade unions, but, according to him, they would not have to be of a party
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type. Ciosek added that neither the Americans nor Germans had trade-union
pluralism.65
The limits of the PZPR’s ideas of political pluralism are clear in a note from
Father Orszulik’s talks with Stanis„aw Ciosek in November 1988.66 Father
Orszulik reports Ciosek’s annoyance at remarks made by Solidarnof- spokesman,
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, concerning free elections:
Ciosek complained about Onyszkiewicz who had demanded free elections in
the interview for ‘Confrontations’. The party is not prepared for that. For the
present, it is being proposed that the party would keep 60 per cent of seats in the
Parliament. Ciosek said that their intention was to change the state’s structures
significantly in the future: We should move gradually towards free elections.67
On 4 January 1989, Father Orszulik asked Prime Minister Rakowski if he could
envisage free elections in four years’ time and whether it was possible for the
PZPR to be in opposition.68 Prime Minister Rakowski acknowledged that free
elections might be possible in 4–8 years. He commented that the PZPR was weak
and cautioned that the notion of elections in April (1989) was an idea ‘discussed
in a small circle, not a proposal’:69
Personally, I am not afraid of confrontational elections. We have at our
disposal Security Forces, the party machine and the mass media, but it will
be another split which will solve nothing. External conditions make it possible
that the conflict in Poland can be resolved. This will lead to social and
political order at the end of this millennium.70
This chapter begins with a quote from historian and dissident Adam Michnik
who played a central role in the Round Table process. As a historian, Michnik has
been particularly concerned by the tendency to alter the historical record so as to fit
today’s political needs. At a conference in Michigan to mark the tenth anniversary
of the Round Table, he vehemently rejected the claim that the PZPR had
voluntarily handed power to the opposition:
There are two myths that accompany the debate about the Round Table. The
first myth, popularized by politicians and columnists associated with the
former communist party, talks about the benevolence of the party leaders,
who simply turned the power over to the opposition as soon as it became
possible. The second stereotype talks about the conspiracy of ‘the reds with
the pinks.’ However, there was neither benevolence nor conspiracy. The
strategic goal of the communist party was to gain a new legitimacy for the
communist rule in Poland and abroad, and allowing some form of legalized
opposition was to be the price for that. The strategic goal of the Solidarnof-
opposition, on the other hand, was legalization of Solidarnof- and launching
the process of democratic transformation.71
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Conclusion: a ‘fuzzy democracy’
This chapter set out to discover whether PZPR actors were far-sighted, as posited
by Colomer, or motivated by more short-term interests, as posited by Przeworski,
when they initiated the process of contacts with Solidarnof-. In general, we were
seeking to assess whether PZPR actors sought incremental and controlled
political change that would facilitate a broadened dictatorship in the short term or
whether they looked to their strategic long-term interest and a process of deeper
change. We now return to the observable implications or expected behaviour
that flows from the hypotheses of Przeworski and Colomer to evaluate what
the material, discussed in preceding pages, tells us about these conflicting
propositions.
It is clear from the preceding analysis of both interviews with party actors and
PZPR documents that the initiation of the Round Table process was enabled by
political disequilibrium in the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s. Senior PZPR
actors, led by General Jaruzelski, understood that the cost–benefit calculus of
initiating systemic reform had changed as a result of the abandonment of the
Brezhnev Doctrine. Interviews with General Jaruzelski, General Kiszczak,
Mieczys„aw Rakowski, Stanis„aw Ciosek, Janusz Reykowski and Jerzy Wiatr
have clearly identified that the key motivating factor in the decision to initiate
talks with the opposition was a fear of economic collapse.
In the context of the Przeworski hypothesis, PZPR actors were motivated by
short-term interest and retaining power and so we expect them to try and domi-
nate any institutions agreed in the opening round of contact with the opposition.
We also expect to see mistakes arising out of flawed strategic evaluation and
incomplete information. We have found evidence to support Przeworski’s hypothe-
sis in the contribution of Professor Janusz Reykowski who points out that the goal
at the outset of the talks ‘was that the opposition should become part of the polit-
ical system’.72 Reykowski also states that ‘nobody was very clear how this new
game could be played’73 and ‘nobody was thinking very far ahead’.74 General
Jaruzelski also supports this perspective. He noted that
the whole conception, before the strikes, was to introduce the opposition to
the system of power, but doing it smartly on a restricted basis. . . . We were
looking for ways to exploit, to invite the opposition to help us reform the
economy.75
It is clear that General Kiszczak thought of the project in limited terms: ‘We
didn’t aim to give power to the opposition.’76 Prime Minister Rakowski echoes
this view: ‘we aimed to include the opposition into the existing system of power
in the country’.77 The Prague document could not be more explicit on the short-
term interest that was to be served by the initiation of talks between the PZPR and
Solidarnof-.78
Jaruzelski told his Czechoslovak colleagues that the ‘objective is to neutralize
Solidarnof- . . . the accepted course of action therefore provides a chance of reaching
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a situation that would be safe for socialism and would include the opposition in
joint responsibility’. The PZPR’s Interdepartmental Team report clearly shows
that, in September 1988, party strategists only envisaged the creation of institu-
tions it could expect to control.79 The Presidential office was to act as the party’s
guarantee of continued power. Finally, Bishop Orszulik’s memoirs confirm the
fact that as late as November 1988, Stanis„aw Ciosek was angered by and rejected
Solidarnof- spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz’s demand for free elections.80
In the context of the Colomer hypothesis, PZPR actors should be strategic and
far-sighted; they would be expected to carefully evaluate their options in relation
to the relative strengths of the party and Solidarnof-. We would also expect PZPR
actors to react and counter-react to the moves of other players and to have sought
to update their contextual knowledge before making choices. A number of state-
ments support Colomer’s analysis. First, Jerzy Wiatr argues that the aim was ‘a
form of contractual democracy, which was another way of saying a negotiated
power sharing with the objective of democratizing the system later on’.81 This
conception supports Colomer’s contention that liberalizers will seek to create an
‘intermediate regime’ as they extricate themselves from authoritarianism. Wiatr’s
son, S„awomir, who would later play a leading role in the formation of the post-
communist SdRP, is clearly far-sighted when he talks about the group around him
believing that they would ‘achieve important positions in the new system’.82 This
group looked to the future and the creation of a new ‘left-wing party’.
Stanis„aw Ciosek, who emphasized that the PZPR perceived Solidarnof- to be
weakening in the latter part of 1988, provides clear support for the expectation
that actors will evaluate their options in relation to the relative strength of the
opposition.83 Ciosek says that, in the context of an election, it was thought that the
chances of the PZPR and Solidarnof- ‘were more or less equal’.84 Ciosek
confirms the fact that Solidarnof-’s weakened position was seen as the PZPR’s
opportunity to drive a hard bargain for the union’s support for the government’s
economic reform package. Ciosek, who as we shall see in later chapters, has
always claimed that he was involved in a ‘deliberate attempt to change the
system’,85 describes the initiative as a ‘clear . . . conscious gamble’.86 However,
Ciosek’s remarks highlight the limits of the PZPR’s plans at the start of the Round
Table: ‘It was a democratization process – a fuzzy democracy’87 or perhaps an
‘intermediate regime’ as Colomer posits.
In the light of the mixed evidence, it is difficult to conclude that PZPR actors
were exclusively far-sighted or short-sighted when they initiated the talks process
with Solidarnof- in late 1988. Actors had differing conceptions of the end goal
and often displayed elements of both short- and far-sighted behaviour during the
period. However, it does seem fair to conclude that PZPR negotiators, albeit
gambling negotiators, expected to be able to control the process they had
unleashed and engage in incremental and controllable change. They were to learn
very quickly that this was a flawed evaluation of their prospects.
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The relegalization of the union was Solidarnof-’s main goal at the start of the
Round Table. Olson argues that this objective was easily and quickly met.1
However, he points out that the political conditions surrounding that main goal
were much more difficult to define and took much more time to resolve.
Ultimately, the PZPR was prepared to relegalize the union in order to achieve its
main goal, that is, Solidarnof-’s agreement to participate in contractual elections
so as to legitimize the party’s economic reform effort. However, the institutional
bargaining between the two sides created a dynamic in which new institutions
emerged as a result of offer, counter-offer and compromise. So, while it can be
seen that both sides had clearly defined objectives at the start of the Round Table,
the potential impact of many of the institutional bargains, which emerged out of
the dynamic process, had not been comprehensively evaluated. As Olson has
argued, the creation of the new Senate was not only haphazard but was also one
of the most fateful decisions made at the Round Table. Solidarnof- wanted free
elections as the price it would pay for conceding the strong presidency and, while
the PZPR was not prepared to abandon its reserved seats in the Sejm, its negotiators,
much to the surprise of many involved, offered the opposition a freely elected
Senate: ‘A government negotiator, apparently without advance consultation on his
side, offered the Senate with elections.’2
Once the negotiations began, both sides were drawn into a contingent and
evolving dynamic. Round Table co-chairman Bronis„aw Geremek has said that
the opposition’s acceptance of the principle of non-confrontational parliamentary
elections was linked to three bargaining scenarios.3 The first of the scenarios was
the negotiations over the restricted Sejm elections, the second was the free elections
to the Senate and the third was the creation of the office of president.
This chapter will focus on three Round Table bargaining scenarios: the
relegalization of Solidarnof-; the PZPR’s preference for the introduction of a
strong president and its bargaining over the introduction of the Senate. The
bargaining over the electoral system and voting formula for both the Sejm and the
Senate will be discussed in Chapter 6.
While the PZPR’s negotiators were drawn from the reform-oriented wing of the
party, it would be incorrect to regard them as behaving as a single actor at all
times. As we have seen, many scholars talk about the PZPR’s goals and objectives
5 Strategies and outcomes
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at the start of the Round Table. While acknowledging the splits between hawks
and doves, many of these scholars fail to register the range of opinions that per-
meated the small clique who conducted the negotiations. So, while there is wide
knowledge of the hurdles that Jaruzelski et al. had to cross on occasions, such as
the Tenth Plenum, when only the threat of resignation forced the party to back his
decision to open talks with the opposition, there is less analysis of the differing
expectations of the PZPR elite who negotiated on the party’s behalf. As a conse-
quence, there is even lesser analysis of how these differing conceptions of the
outcome of the talks affected individual bargaining scenarios. It is being argued
here that differing conceptions of the purpose and expected outcome of the talks
had a major impact on institutional bargaining and outcomes at the Round Table.
We now move on to an evaluation of the hypotheses of Przeworski and Colomer
in the context of the relegalization of Solidarnof-, the PZPR’s preference for a
strong presidency and the concession of a new and freely elected Senate. In the
context of the Przeworski hypothesis, we expect that the PZPR’s decision to rele-
galize Solidarnof- will be part of a short-sighted strategy to co-opt the opposition
and create a ‘broadened dictatorship’. We also expect that they will only agree to
the creation of new institutions that they can realistically hope to do well from.
Finally, we also expect PZPR negotiators to make flawed evaluations in relation
to institutional choice due to a lack of contextual information. However, in the
context of Colomer’s analysis, we would expect that the PZPR’s decision to
relegalize Solidarnof- was part of a far-sighted plan aimed at opening up the
political space to opposition actors. We would expect to find that, having evaluated
the relative strengths of the party and the union, the PZPR sought the creation of
institutions that reflected that strength. We also expect that, in the course of the
negotiations over new institutions, PZPR negotiators would react and counter-react
to moves and offers on the basis of updated information.
The relegalization of Solidarnof-
Professor Janusz Reykowski emphasizes the fluidity and strategic incoherence
that was prevalent in the PZPR at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989.4 He
points out that there were different ideas within the party about the purpose and
significance of the offer to relegalize Solidarnof-:
At the initial stage of the negotiation – it was a trade-off. Solidarnof- agrees to
participate in a not fully democratic parliament and for that get legalization. I
am not sure to what extent this idea was accepted in the party leadership at the
end of ‘88 or the beginning of 1989. What I remember is that part of us opposed
this kind of approach. I think Ciosek, Kwafniewski5 and others were thinking
that legalization of Solidarnof- was part of a broader process of the change
of the political system and not the price paid for Solidarnof-’s participation in
the system of government. In this concept, legalization was a necessary step
towards the transformation of the system. But I cannot say when awareness of
this point of view became common enough to become part of the policy!6
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An examination of internal party documents indicates that, as late as September
1988, within days of the first historic meeting between Lech Wa„ˇsa and General
Kiszczak, senior PZPR members were still being reassured as to the impossibility
of any restoration of Solidarnof-. In a document entitled ‘Solidarnof- – Why
Not’ distributed on the instructions of General Jaruzelski to members of the
Politburo and party deputy secretaries, the writer engages in a Jesuitical distinction
between the evil inclination of Solidarnof- as an organization, an acknowledge-
ment of the ‘just protest’7 of 1980 that led Poles to support the union, and
the acceptance that ‘many leading (Solidarnof-) activists . . . have changed over
the years’8 and have now developed into ‘realists’:9
Poland is open today to far-reaching changes of relations and structures,
development of liberties, democracy and diversity. However, there are limits
to the changes and they are unsurpassable at the present stage in history. In
the interests of Poland’s existence a line must be drawn that cannot be
crossed. This, among other things, is the reason why the restoration of
‘Solidarnof-’ is not possible.10
In the course of the rest of this document, Solidarnof- is accused of extremism, of
breaking agreements, of making ‘immoderate . . . pay claims’,11 of jeopardizing
Polish statehood by engaging in anti-Soviet actions, as well as a range of other
crimes, including being paid indirectly or directly out of the American state budget:
The name ‘Solidarnof-’ was intrinsically associated with actions that cannot
be reconciled with the aspirations to strengthen, purge, and transform socialism
that dominate today in the USSR, Poland and some other countries in our
camp and that are historical process of reforms called the second revolution.
So, even if we assumed today theoretically that a new, hypothetical
‘Solidarnof-’ becomes a real trade union organization for working people,
cut off from its roots and traditions, taking the platform of revival, reconcil-
iation and reform, severing links with Western centres of control and dollar
payments – even then the name itself would be a burden for all those positive
aspirations and would undermine their credibility.
Besides, at present, the introduction into a workplace of two or more
competing trade unions would encourage competitive bidding in social and
pay demands making rational management of the economy difficult and
overturning reforms.
The ‘Solidarnof-’ chapter must be, therefore, finally closed since the current
activities of illegal structures of the organization show that they continue all
harmful tendencies from the period of legal activities and from the times of
full conspiracy.12
The same document later goes on to talk of the ‘positive achievements of
Solidarnof-, its constructive ideas and human potential hav[ing] their lasting
place in the life of Poland’.13 While the message is clearly designed to reassure
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the more hardline elements within the PZPR, it also highlights the fluid nature of
the political scene towards the end of 1988:
Nobody wants people from ‘Solidarnof-’ to feel defeated or rejected. Simply
we must look into the future and not into the past, we must put common good
above old and present antagonisms. The situation is changing, people are
changing, socialism is changing and new relations require new structural
forms. And this also applies to former ‘Solidarnof-.’14
Two things appear clear from an analysis of this document: first, General
Jaruzelski was preparing the way for a broadening of the dialogue between the
government and the public approved at the Eighth Plenum of the PZPR KC on
27–28 August, and second, it was not envisaged that Solidarnof- would reemerge
in its old form as a result of these contacts.
As mentioned earlier, the ‘Solidarnof- – Why Not’ document was distributed
three weeks after the historic first meeting between Lech Wa„ˇsa and Interior
Minister, General Kiszczak. In a Radio Free Europe situation report, J. B. de
Weydenthal noted that while the meeting was a ‘political milestone’, the ‘uncer-
tainties surrounding the meeting are not surprising’.15 De Weydenthal points out
that the recent plenum of the party’s Central Committee reiterated its long-standing
opposition to the reinstatement of Solidarnof- and there were no grounds for
assuming that this policy will be quickly reversed. He further notes that
Solidarnof- has repeatedly said that any talks between the union and the party
would have to deal with the issues of pluralism and the relegalization of
Solidarnof- and that it was unlikely that the union would abandon its position in
the near future.16
Radio Free Europe’s situation report also notes remarks made by Politburo
member, W„adys„aw Baka on 31 August, the same day as the Wa„ˇsa–Kiszczak
meeting. In an informal meeting with Western journalists, Baka is reported to
have said that Solidarnof- activists ‘might be allowed’ to take over certain chapters
of official unions in particular factories but that the ‘restoration of the
Solidarnof- organization seems unlikely’.17
Solidarnof-’s insistence on the primacy of the relegalization issue was one of
the factors that delayed the opening of the Round Table talks which had initially
been envisaged for the autumn. Millard notes that, following the first meeting
between Kiszczak and Wa„ˇsa, both sides came under considerable pressure from
within their own ranks.18 Wa„ˇsa was criticized by elements within Solidarnof-
who perceived any negotiation with the government as a sell-out19 and by radical
groups such as ‘Fighting Solidarnof-’ and ‘Solidarnof- 80’. Meanwhile,
Jaruzelski and other reformers faced the continuing opposition of the party’s
hardliners as well as the strident antagonism of the PZPR’s trade union ally, the
OPZZ, who rejected the idea of trade union pluralism outright. A sense of confusion
and conflicting signals was the key feature of the end of 1988 and the beginning
of 1989. Millard notes that when the two sides met for the preparatory meetings
on 15–16 September in Warsaw, both Jaruzelski and Kiszczak were ‘clearly
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prepared not only to talk to Solidarnof- but to concede its legalization’.20 The
problem was that at this stage of the game neither the party as a whole nor a
majority of the Politburo were prepared to go as far as the reformers were to
appease Solidarnof- in order to get the union to share responsibility for the much-
needed economic reform.
The period between September and the end of January was both intense and
divisive for the PZPR. On 19 September, the Messner government resigned after a
televised parliamentary debate which was highly critical of its performance.
Mieczys„aw Rakowski became prime minister and immediately offered the oppo-
sition a number of places in his cabinet. Solidarnof- rejected his offer not least
because the union did not want to be co-opted in the way other segments of the
opposition in Poland had been, but because Solidarnof- did not wish to be in any
way encumbered in its negotiations at the Round Table. Meanwhile, Jaruzelski and
the close circle around him pursued their Round Table strategy by making key
changes to the Politburo so as to rid themselves of the hardline elements opposed
to the talks. As was noted in the ‘Solidarnof- – Why Not’ memorandum quoted
earlier, the ‘situation is changing, people are changing, socialism is changing and
new relations require new structural forms’.21 However, despite Jaruzelski’s
manoeuvres, there was still opposition to the idea of the Round Table at the start
of the second leg of the Tenth Plenum of the PZPR KC in January 1989. General
Kiszczak explained how they finally got the Central Committee’s approval for the
leadership’s position on the question of political and trade union pluralism:
At the Tenth Plenum on 17 January 1989 we wanted to legalize Solidarnof-. We
wanted agreement from the party. We wanted to spread the responsibility for
legalizing the union. A paper was presented – there was a great debate – but we
anticipated the problem. We three – Jaruzelski, Siwicki22 and myself – arranged
a trick. Jaruzelski threatened to resign. Rakowski got to hear of it and he joined
in. We all withdrew in a dramatic fashion. There was a discussion. Henryk
Jab„o‘ski led the discussion – the party was afraid of discussion.23
Colomer and Pascual argue that Jaruzelski and Kiszczak’s tactics at the Tenth
Plenum ‘implied new priorities on the part of the communist leaders which can
be precisely defined as new preference orders’.24 While this new preference order
underpins the tactics and strategy of Jaruzelski’s immediate entourage, and
possibly most of the small group entrusted with the task of negotiating with the
opposition, the vote did not change the fact that a large segment of the party was
opposed to the very idea of the Round Table and had only voted under threat of
the leadership’s resignation. The daily, Trybuna Ludu, noted after the plenum that
statements by KC members provided the party leadership with a clear signal
that the course of action it had proposed raised numerous doubts, questions,
and serious fears . . . . There were also accusations that party policy was
incomprehensible, flawed, and at times contradictory to the expectations and
views of party members.25
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Perhaps a more important qualification is the fact that even those party actors
committed to the idea of the Round Table were not ad idem on the concessions
they were prepared to make once the negotiations began. Jaruzelski et al. wanted
the opposition to share responsibility for the economic reforms and for this they
were prepared to relegalize Solidarnof-. However, the precise consequences of
this concession and subsequent concessions had not been fully formulated. In the
week before the Round Table was due to commence its first formal session, both
sides were still at loggerheads over the relegalization issue.
On 27 January 1989, a team of opposition representatives, including
Solidarnof- leader Lech Wa„ˇsa, met a PZPR team led by General Czes„aw
Kiszczak at Magdalenka near Warsaw. The meeting, which took place from
11.30 a.m. to 10.15 p.m., was highly charged and centred on the relegalization
issue. General Kiszczak opened the meeting by telling those assembled that the
PZPR regarded the meeting as the final one before the first plenary session of
the Round Table. He set out his side’s preference that the question of elections to
the Sejm, changes in the political system and the possibility of the creation of trade
union pluralism ‘including Solidarnof-’26 should be discussed. Senior Solidarnof-
negotiator, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, intervened immediately to say that the relegaliza-
tion issue should be dealt with first. While Kiszczak agreed that the relegalization
issue should top the agenda, a row immediately ensued about the question of how
the union would be relegalized. Solidarnof- wanted one single reregistration and
not a branch-by-branch registration so as to avoid the chaos that surrounded
Solidarnof-’s registration in 1980. Stanis„aw Ciosek got to the heart of the prob-
lem straight away when he told the Solidarnof- side that the OPZZ objected to
the top-down relegalization process. The OPZZ wanted Solidarnof- to ‘follow
the same route as the OPZZ, to rebuild its structures from the bottom up’.27 The
exchanges that followed provide a fascinating insight into the hardball being
played on both sides of the table:
L. KACZYŃSKI (SOLIDARNOF_): If the version of legalizing ‘Solidarnof-’ in one
single step cannot be implemented, then the government is not going to have a
partner for a very long time . . .
A. GDULA (PZPR): There are many things, which tie our hands. There is a split
reaction amongst our grass roots, which blames us for selling out the inter-
ests of socialism. We have great problems with OPZZ. Their position yester-
day and the absence today of their representatives at this table is not a game
of pretence. This is political fact that we have to take into consideration. Also,
the existing legal arrangements cannot be disregarded.
In my opinion, we must show wide-ranging moderation. The objective of
our discussion is consensus on non-confrontational elections, which shall be
followed by the process of the legalization of ‘Solidarnof-’.
L. WAŒĘSA (SOLIDARNOF_): We must see and understand the barriers, but we must
not erect or build new ones.
T. MAZOWIECKI (SOLIDARNOF_): We understand fully iunctim between the
legalization of ‘Solidarnof-’ and the elections. However, we cannot enter into
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agreement earlier, before we obtain guarantees of ‘Solidarnof-’s’ right
to exist. We are discussing the framework and how to ‘tie-up’ the ‘round
table’. Its results will ensure the implementation of changes in the Cabinet’s
resolution and the legalization of ‘Solidarnof-’. We decisively want this to
happen on the basis of one legal act. As to the OPZZ’s argumentation, it is
historically outdated. If we are to build a new chapter, then let us put the past
aside, and not give ourselves a conflict card. You’ve got problems with
the OPZZ, but this is your worry. The party was backing OPZZ cells then
the party should convince them about the concept of a dialogue. We want a
single-step act also in your interests. If this is going to be a ‘bottom-up’
and slow process, then at the bottom we have to take into account the resis-
tance of the party apparatus. This is an exceptionally conflict generating
situation.
B. GEREMEK (SOLIDARNOF_): I wish to say it openly: ‘Solidarnof-’ is interested in
dragging the issue. For us, the slow pace of the process is not dangerous, does
not create conflicts at the grass roots, as it gives the new trade union person-
nel time to develop and to mature. However, let us not think separately about
the interests of each side. Let us find ways to reconcile those interests. I assure
you, that the creation of trade union structures from ‘bottom-up’ does not lie
in the interests of our country.
S. CIOSEK (PZPR): Thank you for your sincerity. We see the global interest of our
country differently. The process of the creation of ‘Solidarnof-’ should be
something that would finalize the social conflict, and not open it into a new
phase. The bases for everything, which we are discussing here, are material
issues and the possibility of an economy-based conflict; one must enter into
a social agreement, in which we [ought to] determine intentions as to the
economic reforms and the position of the trade union movement. As a
‘finale’ of the ‘round table’, we see the arrangement being achieved on the
social compromise, the renunciation of strikes and the commencement of the
process of creating ‘Solidarnof-’.
If we were to manage stopping the vindication strikes, then we would
have a card to tackle trade union-related matters. But we see the order
[of these matters] as follows: a formal act to rebuild ‘Solidarnof-’ that
follows the arrangements on the issue of social order. You must understand
us; we have already crossed the Rubicon. We do not intend to go back, but
the rebuilding of the legislation on trade unions requires a longer period of
time.
L. WAŒĘSA (SOLIDARNOF_): We cannot provide declarations of strike guaran-
tees, if we don’t have an organization that would be able to hold back the
vindication. We don’t want to blackmail with strikes, but we are more
responsible than our colleagues from the OPZZ and cannot provide such
guarantees.
J. REYKOWSKI (PZPR): How one should move forward from the declaration that
‘Solidarnof-’ will ensure the stabilization of the atmosphere in factories to
its implementation? What mechanism would guarantee the safety of the
partners?
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L. WAŒĘSA (SOLIDARNOF_): We can work and reason towards that but we cannot give
you any guarantees. We could write [something to that effect], but that would
achieve nothing. Such guarantees might be given by various institutional bodies,
but also not in 100 per cent.
B. GEREMEK (SOLIDARNOF_): I propose that the social order declaration be treated
as an undertaking to renounce actions that disrupt order.
W. FRASYNIUK (SOLIDARNOF_): Prompt creation of ‘Solidarnof-’ is a guarantee of
ensuring peace and order. The lack of any movement in this matter increases
the tension and fuels speculations. We want a ‘top-down’, single-step regis-
tration, and temporary regulations should be created that would make it
possible. You, Gentlemen, are afraid of your grass roots. We also are afraid
of grass roots, especially the inexperienced activists; those, who became
activists at five past twelve. They don’t know anything about martial law;
they did not stick their necks out, but now proclaim radicalism . . .
T. MAZOWIECKI (SOLIDARNOF_): Let’s find common ground on the issues of social
safety. We don’t want to run away from it today, but we see this as a very
difficult problem. Maybe it should be worked out at a ‘small’ table? Only the
programme for social order that is based on concrete solutions could bring us
closer to [our] objective. Today we won’t be able to resolve it, we can only
make a declaration.
CZ. KISZCZAK (PZPR): I propose to close the discussion on this subject as follows:
‘Having agreed a formula for the social agreement, we shall submit to the
Cabinet a request to change the Trade Unions legislation and we shall
determine at the ‘round table’ the date for the commencement of the creation
of ‘Solidarnof-’.
T. MAZOWIECKI (SOLIDARNOF_): Who is going to be party to the social agreement?
CZ. KISZCZAK (PZPR): The signatories of the ‘round table’!28
It is abundantly clear from the exchanges quoted earlier that it was not only the
PZPR side that had to deal with its hardline faction. Lech Kaczy‘ski bluntly told
his interlocutors that the failure to concede a single-step registration process would
lead Solidarnof- to withdraw from the negotiations, while Bronis„aw Geremek
was effectively saying that time was on the union’s side and that they were
prepared to sit the economic crisis out. Gdula’s plea that the party’s hands were tied
and that the OPZZ posed many problems for the PZPR is met with the blunt riposte
from Mazowiecki that the OPZZ is the party’s worry. Ciosek’s argument that ‘the
commencement of the process of creating Solidarnof-’29 should follow an agree-
ment on social compromise and the renunciation of strikes clearly indicates that,
for him at least, the idea was that Solidarnof- would be rewarded after it delivered
the conditions in which the party would be able to introduce economic reform.
Perhaps one of the most revealing of all of the contributions is from W„adys„aw
Frasyniuk who points out that the manoeuvrability of the PZPR and Solidarnof- is
constrained by threats from the grass roots in both organizations. Frasyniuk was
effectively saying that if the party did not concede single-step and top-down
registration it might well find itself left to negotiate with inexperienced union
radicals whose demands would not be constrained by the memory of martial law.
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An internal party memorandum entitled ‘Information Concerning the
Magdalenka Talks on 27 January 1989’ notes that
[T]he most difficult negotiations were concerned with the issue of the
timetable for the legalization of ‘Solidarnof-’. The ‘Solidarnof-’ side
remained categorically on the position that the commencement of the process
of creating ‘Solidarnof-’ must precede their agreement for the conclusion of
an election pact. In a very difficult and heated discussion we finally worked
out a conditional formula for the setting up of ‘Solidarnof-’ . . . [and by]
March we shall request the Cabinet to change the resolution, which is blocking
trade union pluralism. At the same time we shall put forward a legislative
initiative to amend the Trade Union legislation in a way that would enable the
creation of a professional union from the top, enabling also joint trade union
representation in the work place. This formula has a condition that it will be
valid only when we obtain necessary authorization in this matter. Otherwise,
we can withdraw from it. The ‘Solidarnof-’ side made the reservation that it
would like to hear this declaration in the opening speech of the ‘round table’
negotiations. If this does not happen, then they shall consider the idea of
the ‘round table’ invalid.30
In another PZPR memorandum dated 30 January, it is noted that in accordance
with arrangements made during the preparatory meeting on 27 January that
the work of the Round Table will be divided into three working groups: a group
on the economy and social policy, a group on political reforms and a group
on union pluralism. A team under the leadership of comrade W. Baka will lead
the PZPR side of the negotiations as the table on union pluralism. It is further
noted that
[I]t is proposed to hold this week the meetings between the proposed
comrades and the persons responsible for each particular group. The aim of
these meetings should be to agree the tactic and the preparation of working
material necessary for the future work of groups.31
The question arises, given the short amount of time between the party’s agreement
to open the negotiations on trade union pluralism and the commencement of the
first plenary session of the Round Table on 6 February, as to the quality and
thoroughness of the negotiating tactics and strategies of Comrade Baka’s team.
A key question in the evaluation of PZPR strategy at the Round Table is
whether the party anticipated the impact on the institution of one-party rule of
legalizing Solidarnof-. Janusz Reykowski’s account of the PZPR’s reaction to the
first meeting of the Political Table at the Round Table provides an interesting
insight into the mixed and confused feelings of participants:
People don’t think clearly! At the one side – it is true what you have said that
nobody anticipated [the impact of relegalizing Solidarnof-], but on the other
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hand there were many situations where people considered the possibility that
the whole system would collapse and Solidarnof- would get power. I repeat
often a story from the first meeting of the political table – at the beginning
of February – when one member of the table (PZPR) wrote to me saying that
this was not a real negotiation about the sharing of power but about giving up
the power to Solidarnof-. So I gave the letter to Ciosek, and he gave it to
Jaruzelski, and he sent me a message saying that our side should discuss what
our view of this was. So I organized a meeting and I invited, besides the
members of the negotiation group, also people from the top leadership. The
discussion was hot and the general agreement was that the author of the letter
was likely to be right and that we should seriously consider that it is an
outcome. But in order to understand our position we have to consider what
are the alternatives. What – if not negotiation? And there was quite a common
agreement that if we did not negotiate that after the next few years – two [or]
three years – there would be a physical confrontation in Poland with the
younger generation, the post-martial law generation – who were not demor-
alized and who were quite radical. So we either seek a negotiated solution or
we accept the possibility that there will be a sharp confrontation in the near
future. I remember one speech – where he ended by saying – ‘after all they
[Solidarnof-] are Poles.’ It wasn’t giving away the basic values of the nation
to some foreign power, but to other Poles. In other words, in some part of the
minds of those involved in decision making there was consideration that
things may go in this direction [Solidarnof- would eventually take power].
But the dominant thinking was not like that. Of course there will be four
years of cohabitation and during this time the party would become much
more effective. This bureaucratic organization [the PZPR] would become
more able to act politically. In fact it did happen – after four years – between
1989–93, it [the party] became able for the political game in the democratic
system. It was not expected that in the meantime our power would be taken
away by Solidarnof- . . . . Expectations were vague – there were some
dominant trends in thinking but the same people could think conflicting
things at the same time.32
Professor Jerzy Wiatr thought that the party’s purpose in offering relegalization
was very clear:
The aim was to give it [Solidarnof-] a share of power. Not just legal existence
of the union, but a share of power! On that I have no doubt.33
While Wiatr maintains that the party’s goal was clear, he argues that the PZPR had
not worked out the potential consequences of relegalizing Solidarnof-:
That was probably the weakest elaborated part of the strategy. Obviously the
party had to change but most of us did not realize before the election how
fundamentally the party was unprepared for the new situation. I can speak of
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myself. I was astonished by the degree to which the party was unable to operate
in the relatively open political context of the election of 1989. It was totally
unprepared. It had unrealistic image of the situation.34
Wiatr goes further and claims that the PZPR negotiators had ‘no plan and no
strategy’35 going into the Round Table process:
On our side it was one big improvisation. Reykowski was often alarmed by
the degree to which our side was unprepared. Many things were just impro-
visations. Elements of the new proposals had been elaborated in a small team
that we had formed half a year before the Round Table. We – meaning Janusz
Reykowski, Miko„aj Kozakiewicz, myself and Stanis„aw Gebethner – we
weren’t all in the party. Kozakiewicz was in the Peasant Party and Gebethner
was a non-party academic. We did it under the umbrella of PRON.36 It was a
kind of convenient way to do it. There were some ideas elaborated. I was the
author of the proposal to have a presidential system, a strong president – as
a way to stabilize and democratize the system. Not through strengthening the
party – it was beyond repair. We all knew, in this circle, that it was beyond
repair and that we had to find a different way . . . . Generally speaking
we came to the Round Table without any clear strategy . . . . Solidarnof- came
with a very clear strategy. They knew what they wanted – they were by far
better prepared than we were.37
Stanis„aw Ciosek argues that PZPR negotiators understood what the impact of
relegalizing Solidarnof- would be and rejects the notion that communism
collapsed in Poland because of the party’s misperceived strategies at the Round
Table:
Everyone in my opinion was realizing that the relegalizing of Solidarnof- is
the effective end of the leading role and sole ruling of the party. That’s why
there was discussion and opposition in the party to making the trade union
legal because it was such an important step . . . there were great political
battles on this topic. Remember the famous Tenth Plenum where Jaruzelski
threatened to resign. So this was a conscious decision – large sections were
against the issue of legalizing the union.38
Grażyna Staniszewska who was a Solidarnof- representative at the subtable on
the economy is sceptical about Ciosek’s view that ‘everyone’ understood the
significance of the decision to relegalize Solidarnof-:
Now Ciosek says that the decision about the relegalization of Solidarnof-
was taken by the party before the Round Table. I was very distrustful of this –
I was sure it was a trap. It was a trap to get us to the Round Table. So I was
surprised that the party had agreed to relegalize the union and it was done
very quickly at the early part of the Round Table, nearly immediately.39
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Mieczys„aw Rakowski was a party reformer and the last PZPR prime minister of
Poland. He admits that he did not anticipate the effect of relegalization. He
expected that Solidarnof- ‘would function as a trade union. Nothing more! Of
course now we can say that we lacked imagination or anticipation! But talking
sincerely, Solidarnof- also didn’t anticipate!’40
In a Polish Situation Report written for Radio Free Europe published on the
day the Round Table talks commenced, Louisa Vinton discussed how the aims of
Solidarnof- and the PZPR ‘are ultimately at odds’:41
Solidarnof-’s chief goal, as Lech Wa„ˇsa has put it, is to ‘break the [party’s]
monopoly’ over politics, the economy, and public organizations. The party,
on the other hand, is determined to maintain its primacy in public life; its
willingness to contemplate the legalization of Solidarnof- seems to stem
from the realization that a failure to make changes now may pose a greater
threat than the risks entailed in negotiating with Solidarnof-. As Politburo
member Marian Orzechowski has said, ‘the PZPR will not surrender its
leading role, but it does not wish to and can not implement this role as it has
in the past’.42
The office of president and an upper house
The issue of the creation of the office of the president was the central plank of the
PZPR’s strategy both before and during the Round Table negotiations. The PZPR
hierarchy who envisaged Jaruzelski, or some other party nominee, filling the
post, regarded the presidential office as a guarantee of continuity.43 The report of
a PZPR interdepartmental team, which analysed the institutional changes
envisaged in the context of the Round Table, provides a fascinating insight
into the strategic goals of the party elite. Entitled ‘Concept of Changes’, the
document, which was prepared in September 1988, begins with the following
statement: ‘The “round table” should constitute a bridge for establishing a
Council of National Agreement, which would unite all social forces committed to
cooperation on the basis of the constitutional order of the PRL (Polish People’s
Republic).’44
The reference to the ‘constitutional order of the PRL’45 is informative. In a later
part of this document the writer notes that ‘Extremist organizations . . . pro-
nouncing themselves against the constitutional order in force (anti-socialist
groups, PPS [Polish Socialist Party] not accepting the leading role of the PZPR
etc.) should be excluded.’46
Clearly, none of the institutional changes envisaged in the context of this doc-
ument at least anticipated any tampering with the PZPR’s institutional hegemony.
In other words, the leading role of the party would not be challenged. In a later
section entitled ‘Outline Concept of Changes in Institutions of State Authorities’,
the writer explains the purpose and function of the establishment of a second
House of Parliament and the office of the president of the PRL. The document
notes that the establishment of the office of the president and formation of 
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a second house was driven by the necessity to do away with the institution of the
Council of State:
It is a majority opinion that the second House should not be autonomous
(presidents of the regional national councils etc.) but should create opportu-
nities for people of independent views, widely respected by society (people
from cultural and scientific circles) and for people associated with the
opposition’s activities or activities of lay groups associated with religious
organizations or associations, to get involved in political activities. This
House, by tradition, can be called the Senate.
Selection of the II House should not be done through general election
since it would give it too strong a position vis-à-vis the I House, but for
example one-third would be nominated by the President of the PRL and two-
thirds would be designated by prominent public organizations named and
authorized to do so by the Sejm. II House should have classic rights such as
the right to participate in legislative work, the right to defer the coming into
force of certain laws and resolutions passed by the Parliament or decisions
made by the President. In short, it should have advisory and representative
functions, and, to a limited extent, decision making ones without, however,
any legislative initiative.
In such a concept, the block of ruling parties does not have to have a
qualified majority. More places (e.g. 50 per cent) could be allocated to the
centre and opposition because it would not threaten the interests of parties in
the government coalition. In such a construction, the Senate and not the Sejm
would be the main place for the opposition. However, in order to hold the
power and to ensure operational efficiency, PZPR, ZSL and SD47 need a
majority in the Sejm.
The President of the PRL would be the highest institution of state authority
with legislative and executive powers.
The President would be elected in a secret vote of the National Assembly
(I and II House of the Parliament plus the president of WRN and people
prominent in the state, e.g. President of the Supreme Court, President of the
Academy of Science, President of the Constitutional Tribunal etc.). The term
of office would be seven years with the possibility of election for two terms.
There was no tradition of general presidential elections in Poland. The last
president of the Polish Republic was also elected by the National Assembly.
The President should always come from members of the PZPR. In this
situation, the office of vice-president should not be established, and it should
be accepted that, in the absence of the President, the role of the head
of the state should be temporarily taken over by the president of the Sejm. A
different election system can be provided for, e.g. through locally selected
electors.
Given such profound changes in the structure of the main institution of
state, enabling the opposition to participate in them, presidential power must
be strong. Constitutionally the President should be equipped among others
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with the following powers:
1 he is a head of the Armed Forces of the PRL,
2 he appoints and dismisses the Government with consent of the Sejm,
3 he has right to dissolve the Sejm and call new elections,
4 he is entitled to issue independent legal acts,
5 he has right, if he wishes to do so, to chair meetings of Council of
Ministers (Cabinet).48
It is clear from a perusal of this document that the Senate was designed as a means
of co-opting non-party people into the institutions of government. It is also clear,
however, that the selection of such people was to be strictly controlled by the party,
which would control both the Sejm (which would authorize the nominating orga-
nizations) and the president (who would nominate a one-third of senators). Even
then, its powers were to be purely advisory and representative. A key phrase in this
document is the reference to the fact that in order to ‘hold the power and to ensure
operational efficiency’,49 the PZPR and its coalition partners ‘need a majority in
the Sejm’.50 Furthermore, the document notes that because of the ‘profound
changes in the structure of the main institutions of state . . . presidential power must
be strong’.51 Crucially, the president must always be a party member.
While the document quoted earlier may serve to create the impression that the
PZPR had a precise view of the role of the president, constitutional lawyer,
Professor Stanis„aw Gebethner has argued that at the outset of the Round Table
discussions there was no clearly specified conception of the sphere of presidential
powers or of the president’s position in a new constitutional order.52 The outline
of the presidential role worked out at the PZPR KC in September 1988 was, in
general terms, a copy of the 1935 constitutional position. So while PZPR nego-
tiators may have had an idea about how the presidency would act as an important
institutional power base for the party, the big problem was that there had been no
resolution of how the existing Council of State would operate if the office of the
president were established.
Professor Stanis„aw Gebethner represented the coalition side at the subtable on
Political Reforms: ‘It would appear that nobody, apart from specialists in consti-
tutional law, had realized that the mechanical replacement of the Council of State
by the presidency was simply impossible.’53
These are by no means the nit-picking points of a constitutional lawyer.
The PZPR’s lack of specificity in relation to its proposal for the establishment
of the new presidency provided bargaining opportunities for the opposition. At the
second meeting of the Round Table subcommittee on Political Reforms held on
18 February (two weeks after the commencement of the Round Table), constitu-
tional expert Piotr Winczorek of the Democratic Party, representing the government
coalition, presented the proposal to establish the office of president of the PRL:
1 The president would be the authority and the arbiter in social conflicts.
2 The president would be accountable before the State’s Tribunal.
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3 In the area of international affairs:
a) represents the country to the outside world;
b) ratifies and dissolves international agreements;
c) appoints and recalls authorized representatives of Poland to other
countries;
d) accepts letters of credence and letters of recall from the representatives
of other countries.
4 In relation to internal affairs:
a) appoints to civilian and military posts, referred to in existing
legislation;
b) awards decorations and medals of honour;
c) uses the right of clemency.
5 In relation to the Sejm:
a) orders elections to Sejm to be held;
b) summons its sessions;
c) dissolves the Sejm before its term of office in situations described by
the legislation.
6 The president carries out the function of the Chief Commander of the
military forces and the Chairman of the National Defence Committee.
7 In situations of great urgency, introduces a state of emergency in a part
or in the entire territory of the state.
8 The president shall have the right to legislative initiative, which at present
belongs to the Cabinet, and also the right to put forward to the
Constitutional Tribunal a legal question in relation to the conformity of
legislation with the Constitution.
9 Presents to the Sejm the initiative of holding national referenda.
10 Has the right to present to the Sejm the candidate for the Chairman of the
Cabinet and to appoint ministers proposed by the Prime Minister.
11 The method of electing the President:
a) The President shall be elected by the Sejm or by the Sejm and
representatives of local administration organs;
b) The President shall be elected by way of general elections. (The
Government leaves this matter open to discussion).
12 The designation of a candidate for the office of President shall be done
by the Sejm or alternatively by the elected National Agreement Council
(Rada Porozumienia Narodowego).
13 The term of office shall be between 4 and 7 years with the possibility of
one re-election.
14 The adoption of constitutional legislation on the office of the President
should be carried out during the present term of the Sejm.54
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It is clear from a comparison with the September 1988 interdepartmental team
document that the PZPR’s conception of the presidency had changed somewhat. It is
difficult to determine whether or not this change can be explained by the simple fact
that the matter was being handled at the Round Table by an expert from its nominally
independent coalition partner or whether it was simply the case that the PZPR’s real
interest had to be disguised under the glaring lights of the Round Table. Either way,
there are significant differences between the bluntly stated conception of the advan-
tages of a strong presidency in the PZPR’s internal document and the initial draft
opened by Professor Winczorek at the Round Table. In particular, it is notable that in
the Winczorek document, the issue of how the president should be elected is left
open for discussion while the PZPR memo stipulates a mechanism that would have
allowed the party to retain effective control of the office. The Solidarnof^-opposition
side was unimpressed with the Winczorek proposal when it was presented at the
Round Table subcommittee table on Political Reforms on 18 February:
Following the presentation by the opposition of a significant number of
objections and reservations in relation to this concept, which could be
reduced to concerns and even fear of the strengthening of the state’s execu-
tive power, Bronis„aw Geremek made a statement, in which he concluded
that ‘we think that at present there are no grounds for making even an initial
political decision in relation to this point of the agenda.’ Therefore, the
government’s proposal was not even discussed.55
Another factor that influenced the presidential issue was internal differences
within the PZPR over whether the office of first secretary and president of PRL
should be held by the same incumbent. There was a clash between those who
wanted Jaruzelski to remain as party leader as a guarantee of continuity with ‘the
constellation of political forces’56 and those who wanted Jaruzelski to resign the
party leadership. This confusion and lack of clarity became publicly manifest
when the PZPR press spokesman Jerzy Urban denounced the presidential
proposal as an SD (Democratic Party) initiative. While Urban may have thought
he could get away with this statement given the fact that it was an SD member,
Piotr Winczorek, who had introduced the proposal at the Round Table, the incident
further highlights the PZPR’s hesitation and lack of resolution on this key issue.
The constitutional lawyer, Professor Piotr Winczorek, was a member of
the Democratic Party and negotiated on behalf of the government-coalition side
at the Political Reforms table at the Round Table. Professor Piotr Winczorek
remembers the meeting of the coalition side’s negotiating team which took place
prior to the Round Table subtable on Political Reforms on 18 February. He makes
the point that while the PZPR had a preference for a strong president they did not
articulate this overtly:
I remember a funny moment. We were talking about presidential powers.
It had not been said publicly, but everybody knew that Mr Jaruzelski would
be the president . . . . So the powers were very important. This day the
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governmental party was sitting on the second floor while the Solidarnof-
side waited for us on the first floor. We were late and there was no idea about
what powers could be given to the future president. There was no paper avail-
able and we had taken napkins – so the proposals were being written on nap-
kins. As we went down to meet them some experts were rewriting their
proposals on the napkins. It’s an indication of how little preparation there
was. Such an important thing could be decided in such a way.
I was just one of the experts, but if the leaders decided to restore the pres-
idential office they should have had an idea about what this president should
be. But nothing! They didn’t know. They wanted a member of the Democratic
Party to present this idea because we had always been in favour of this idea.
They wanted to profit from this. It was me who presented the idea but only
the general idea. The idea was that the Council of State would be removed
and be replaced by the president with this same power. The first election was
to be made by the National Assembly and the second by general election. The
problem was what presidential decisions should be countersigned by the
Prime Minister? It is a crucial decision because the president was not respon-
sible to the Sejm. The problem was that the politicians had no idea and it was
left to be decided at a later date. It was not resolved until the passing of the
so-called Small Constitution (1992).57
In his assessment of the PZPR’s aims and understanding of the impact of the
introduction of the office of president, Stanis„aw Gebethner agrees with the
characterization of the party’s proposals as incoherent and haphazard as outlined
by Professor Winczorek:
The problems of introducing the office of president into the constitutional
order were clearly dealt with as a functional response to circumstances. No
deeper discussions concerning the conceptions of socio-political change
were held; in general it was not realized that changes such as the estab-
lishment of the office of President would inevitably have such far-reaching
consequences for the functioning of the whole political system and
constitutional order.58
The Senate
It was noted earlier that a very limited role is envisaged for the proposed new
Senate in the PZPR interdepartmental team report ‘Concept of Changes in the
Political System of the Polish People’s Republic’.59 So the question arises as to
how a chamber that was conceived as a tool to co-opt the opposition and whose
membership the party would effectively control was transformed into the vehicle
that precipitated the untimely collapse of the PZPR’s power.
Stanis„aw Gebethner produced a research report during the course of the
Round Table which had been commissioned by the Council of State working
party on constitutional change. This report indicated that the idea of establishing
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a Senate was anachronistic.60 Significantly, Gebethner says that the chair of the
Council of State, the PZPR deputy prime minister, Kazimierz Barcikowski,
shared this opinion:
What is most striking and significant is the fact that this occurred two days
before the meeting in Magdalenka at which the government-coalition side
submitted the proposal for establishing a Senate based on the election of two
Senators for every province.61
Gebethner does not regard this apparent change in the PZPR’s conception of the
Senate as a sign of division within the leadership but as confirmation of
the absence of any cohesive and fully worked out conception of the reform of the
political system. MP Professor Jerzy Wiatr recalls:
That part of the story I remember very well – because I was involved in this.
I was not at Magdelenka when Kwafniewski62 made this proposal and it was
accepted. That was a Saturday night. Sunday morning Reykowski called me –
we had a conversation on the phone. He was jubilant and told me about this.
I told him it was going to be a disaster. We will lose the election for the
Senate and that would be a disaster because we will show to everybody how
weak our side is.63
Janusz Reykowski throws interesting light on how Aleksander Kwafniewski’s
suggestion that the Senate be elected in a totally free general election came to be
known beyond the private arena of the Magdalenka palace:
Jerzy Urban [PZPR spokesman] revealed to the press that the completely free
Senate had been proposed . . . . It had been discussed in a very small group and
the group was split on the issue. Kwafniewski had said that Urban had not been
given permission to mention it publicly. Jaruzelski had not said anything defi-
nite, but said that the final decision would be made at the Politburo meeting on
Tuesday and this debate had been on Saturday. So it was to be a secret until
Tuesday. But on Sunday, Urban leaked it to the international media . . . . So he
leaked it and the major media in the west announced that there would be a free
election in Poland for the Senate. So on Tuesday when the Politburo got
together it was already an international fact. Everybody knows that there is
going to be a free election in Poland and so the Politburo has its hands tied . . . .
I don’t know whether he did it by himself or whether Jaruzelski gave him the
go ahead. Jaruzelski was always playing very secretly.64
Professor Jerzy Wiatr remembers that the Kwafniewski proposal emerged in the
context of bargaining over the contractual Sejm and presidency:
The Senate came in the middle of the Round Table as a way to pay Solidarnof-
for its acceptance of this contractual division of seats in the Sejm. And also – and
this was not fully clear – for the agreement not to contest the presidential
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election! When it all started the original idea was that Solidarnof- would be
co-opted into the existing system in such a way that Solidarnof- candidates
would be given a certain share of seats in the Sejm without changing the system
of election. The system of election as used before practically guaranteed the
election of candidates put on the top of the list. It was the List system com-
bined with majority vote – an unusual system. You had a list of candidates
longer than the number of seats. You technically had the right to delete any
candidate. If you did not delete anybody your vote was cast for the top
candidates in the number of seats in the constituency. Practically speaking
this meant that people put on the safe places were elected. So the original
idea was that we would simply divide the cake giving Solidarnof- a certain
number of seats on this list – had Solidarnof- accepted this, the election
would not have been a test of strength between the party and Solidarnof-. But
Solidarnof- rejected this altogether and it started to propose various concepts.
One, I remember was proposed by Janina Zakrzewska [opposition electoral
adviser] that the Sejm would be divided into two parts. Fifty per cent would
be elected from the national list that Solidarnof- would not contest. In other
words the party and its allies gets 50 per cent free. The remaining 50 per cent
is contested in competitive one-seat constituencies. On face value it looked
like guaranteeing the party a majority because it was unthinkable at this stage
that the party would lose all 230 seats in this contest. It was rejected for obvious
reasons because it would expose the weakness of the party altogether. There
was a stalemate with various ideas and then there was this idea of the divi-
sion of seats but where each would be contested – but various political forces
would have the monopoly for nominating candidates. The idea was separate
lists of candidates for each seat. This way the party candidate would not
compete with the Solidarnof- candidate. But party candidates would com-
pete between themselves for each of the party seats. That was not good
enough for Solidarnof-, and then you got Kwafniewski with his proposal of
the fully free Senate. And that was enough, as I understand, to make
Solidarnof- happy with the outcome.65
Stanis„aw Gebethner says that the participants in the Round Table Group on
Questions of Political Reform on the government-coalition side were told of
Kwafniewski’s suggestion at Magdalenka on the following day (2 March). He
points out that at this stage, the conception of the future constitutional position
of the Senate was ‘more than a little hazy’.66 Gebethner argues that the party
reformers wanted to use the Senate to co-opt the ‘constructive opposition’ into
the political system, while the free election of the Senate would, in turn, help to
legitimate the election of the president. The unspoken assumption was that the
opposition would gain a majority in the Senate. The third premise was the hope
that the Senate would provide the possibility for a greater numerical representa-
tion of the opposition in parliament. The fourth idea, according to Gebethner,
was the desire to mobilize the PZPR provincial organizations into more energetic
activity in the hope that they would engage in a genuinely competitive electoral
struggle.
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A detailed analysis of the PZPR’s choice of voting systems and electoral
rules and of how these choices precipitated the collapse of the party’s power
following the June 1989 elections will be presented in Chapter 6. As a result I
will not deal in any depth at this point with the issue of the PZPR’s expectations in
relation to the outcome of the Senate election. However, it is clear from Stanis„aw
Ciosek’s remarks quoted later that, in his view at least, the newly created upper
chamber would not be a forum where the opposition would exercise power:
The effect of Senate result was a huge demonstration. But our assumption
was that the Senate was being given to Solidarnof-, and so I was not shocked
by the result! In my mind, it was not very important whether they
[Solidarnof-] got 51 per cent or 98 per cent of the Senate – I mean in the
sense of the mechanism of this whole agreement.67
The mechanisms put in place by the PZPR, including the contractual Sejm and
strong presidency, were intended as the linchpins of the party’s continued hold on
the reins of power.
While affirming his oft-stated view that party reformers, such as himself, saw
the Round Table process as a mechanism designed to create the conditions of
change in Poland, President Aleksander Kwafniewski is in no doubt that had the
PZPR anticipated the electoral defeat in the free election to the Senate no such
election would have taken place:68
I did not have any doubts that at the Round Table we initiated our path to
democracy. This was not a coincidence and it did not come out of a whim that
I proposed freely contested elections to the Senate during a discussion on our
strategy of talks with Solidarnof- at our closed Party-Government sessions.
My colleagues justified this idea with me being young. But I tried to explain
to them that one could not build a system, which was supposed to be
completely different from the previous one, and, at the same time, to make
only incremental changes, to defend the position of the Party and not to
allow, even partial, political verification.
At last, freely contested elections to the Senate were accepted. It must be
appreciated and at the same time one must acknowledge – none of us
expected that the elections would result in such a serious defeat of the Party.
If one had said then, that the Party would have one senator out of 100, and
on the top of this Henryk Stok„osa would be the one, and that the result would
be 99 to 1 to the benefit of Solidarnof-, I am quite sure – we wouldn’t have
had freely contested elections. Fortunately, our belief in a miracle was
stronger than common sense or a political calculation.
Conclusion
This chapter sets out to examine the relative merits of the Przeworski and
Colomer hypotheses in the context of the Round Table bargaining over the
relegalization of Solidarnof-, the PZPR’s preference for a strong presidency and
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the decision to establish a freely elected Senate. We now return to the observable
implications that flow from these hypotheses in order to assess what the evidence
says about these conflicting expectations.
The relegalization of Solidarnof-
It appears clear from an analysis of the data that there were different conceptions
within the PZPR hierarchy of the impact of relegalizing Solidarnof-. Reykowski
emphasizes that, on the one hand, the move was seen as a trade-off for Solidarnof-’s
agreement to participate in the semi-free election, while for other PZPR negotiators,
including Kwafniewski and Ciosek, relegalization was part of a broader process of
system transformation. So straight away we can see that there is evidence to support
both Przeworski and Colomer on the question of whether PZPR actors are short-
sighted or non-myopic in motivation. Reykowski concedes that there were many
situations where people did not ‘think clearly’69 about the potential impact on one-
party rule if Solidarnof- were relegalized. So, if this analysis is true, then it cannot
be claimed that actors were evaluating the relative strength of the players or updat-
ing information about how relegalization might affect the party’s power.
Reykowski points out that there were those within the party who did regard the
opening up of talks and the agreement to relegalize as having the potential to
bring about the collapse of the party. However, he argues that the ‘dominant
thinking’70 within the party did not anticipate the end of communist power as a
result of the move. If Reykowski is right, it follows that Przeworski is also right.
Wiatr saw relegalization as part of an offer to share power with Solidarnof-, but
it was the ‘weakest elaborated part of the (PZPR’s) strategy’71 and he says that the
party was ‘fundamentally’ unprepared for the new situation. Again, Wiatr’s evi-
dence tends to support the short-term and mistakes hypothesis of Przeworski, as
does that of former prime minister Rakowski who argues that he did not expect
Solidarnof-’s relegalization to have any impact beyond its functioning as a ‘trade
union. Nothing more.’72 As we have seen, Stanis„aw Ciosek disagrees. He asserts
‘everyone in my opinion was realizing that the relegalizing of Solidarnof-was the
effective end of the leading role and sole ruling of the party’.73
The closest we are likely to come to an understanding of the lack of coherence
surrounding the decision to relegalize the union is evident in the remarks of
Politburo member, Marian Orzechowski, when he announced that the ‘PZPR will
not surrender its leading role, but does not wish to and can not implement this
role as it has in the past’.74 This lack of a specific conception of how the party
would retain and implement its leading role while, at the same time, conceding
the relegalization of Solidarnof- appears to confirm the fact that the PZPR was
not acting in a coherent manner in relation to this particular institutional choice.
There is no indication of coherent pooling or updating of information concerning
the impact of relegalization and, yet, the move was conceded at a very early stage
of the Round Table talks. While it is arguable that the bulk of the evidence
indicates that party negotiators saw the move as part of a strategy that would help
secure the PZPR’s hold on power and that as a result it is plausible to claim that
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the PZPR’s behaviour conforms to Przeworski’s expectations, there is clearly
conflicting evidence on this issue. Given this fundamental disagreement about the
meaning and impact of the decision to relegalize Solidarnof-, it is not possible to
conclusively confirm one or other hypotheses.
The presidency
It has been argued earlier that the PZPR envisaged the new office of president as
being the guarantee of the party’s continuity and political control following the
Round Table process. An examination of the party’s September 1988 ‘Concept of
Changes’ document clearly shows that the PZPR did not anticipate any diminution
in its political hegemony arising out of the proposed institutional changes.75
According to the document, ‘The President of the PRL would be the highest insti-
tution of state authority with legislative and executive powers’76 and, crucially, the
president would always be a party member. In this case, the evidence supports
Przeworski’s hypothesis. The creation of the office of president was part of a strat-
egy designed to retain political control in what would be a ‘broadened dictator-
ship’. However, when PZPR negotiators presented the proposal at the Round
Table, they did so on the basis of a document produced by Democratic Party
member Piotr Winczorek and not on the basis of the earlier document.
As we have seen, there are major differences between the conceptions of the
strong presidency outlined in the PZPR’s September 1988 document and the
Winczorek proposal. One crucial difference between the two proposals is the fact
that Winczorek leaves open the issue of how the president should be elected,
while the PZPR’s September document stipulates a mechanism that would have
allowed the party to retain effective control of the office. Gebethner argues that
the problem of introducing the office of the president into the constitutional order
was dealt with as a functional response to circumstances. Party negotiators did
not fully appraise themselves of the socio-political change that would result from
the move, nor was it realized that the introduction of the new office would have
far-reaching consequences for the functioning of the whole political and consti-
tutional order.77 This tends to support Przeworski’s expectation that regime actors
will make mistakes.
Clearly, informational deficits and flawed evaluations led party negotiators to
negotiate on the basis of the wrong document. As part of a plan to legitimize the
election of the president, the PZPR conceded free elections to the Senate without
fully assessing the potential impact of this move. Given this failure to evaluate
potential effects, to react and counter-react to moves or to update information, it
seems clear that Przeworski’s hypothesis is confirmed in the case of the PZPR’s
bargaining over the presidency.
The Senate
It has been shown that the PZPR’s concession of a freely elected Senate is inex-
tricably linked with its bargaining over the semi-free parliamentary elections and
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its desire to introduce a strong presidency. Interviews with PZPR negotiators and
an examination of the September 1988 ‘Concept of Changes’ document shows
that at the outset of the process only a very limited role was envisaged for the
Senate and that it was regarded as little more than a talking shop for the opposi-
tion prior to Aleksander Kwafniewski’s bombshell at Magdalenka. The evidence
indicates that the PZPR negotiators lacked a cohesive or fully worked out
conception of how the various institutional pieces they were conceding would fit
into the institutional jigsaw. As Gebethner points out, even after Kwafniewski’s
proposal was made public, the PZPR’s ideas concerning the future constitutional
role of the Senate were ‘more than a little hazy’.78
Clearly, if the Senate was conceded as part of the plan to get Solidarnof-’s
agreement to the contractual elections and in response to the PZPR’s desire for a
strong presidency, then, at least in intent, the Senate can be regarded as supporting
Przeworski’s ‘broadened dictatorship’ argument. However, the PZPR could
clearly not have expected to control the Senate, if, as we anticipate following
Przeworski that liberalizers only create institutions they can hope to do well
from. Ciosek’s analysis tends to support Przeworski. He made the point that the
concession of the Senate was not a mistake because the PZPR viewed it as a
talking shop for the opposition. This flawed evaluation of the potential impact of
the Senate is clear proof that there was little evidence of players reacting and
counter-reacting in this particular case. While PZPR actors may or may not have
conceded the Senate on the basis of an evaluation of the relative strength of the
two sides, there is no convincing evidence of far-sighted motivation in relation to
this institutional choice. As in the case of the negotiations over the office of pres-
ident, we see a difference between the PZPR’s initial conception of an institution
and the reality that emerges as a result of the Round Table dynamic.
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Olson has asserted that the electoral system that resulted from the Round Table
process was not designed as a competition for power as neither the ruling party
nor Solidarnof- were willing to act as competitive political parties at that stage in
the transition.1 But if Olson is correct, then what was the PZPR’s aim in its nego-
tiations over the complex institutional arrangements put in place for the elections
to the Upper and Lower Houses to be held in June 1989? If the communist party
did not regard the electoral system as designed for political competition, then
what was the point of the elaborate ‘compartmentalized’ set of electoral institutions
negotiated at the Round Table? If these institutions were not designed to secure
the continuance of PZPR power in freely contested or contractual elections, then
what was their purpose and how did the PZPR perceive this purpose? It is to this
issue that we now turn our attention.
We will evaluate the PZPR’s choice of electoral system and voting formulae in
light of the Przeworski and Colomer hypotheses. In the context of the Przeworski
hypothesis, we do not expect the PZPR to pay much attention to electoral formulae
because in so far as its goal is a broadened dictatorship this end will be achieved by
other institutional strategies it will seek to put in place. As we have already seen, the
PZPR considered the establishment of a strong presidency to be its safeguard in the
context of a reformulation of the rules of the game. We do expect that the PZPR will
focus its attention on the preservation of the balance of power within parliament as
well as its ability to dominate the legislative process. We expect the party to try and
institutionalize its legislative dominance and control. However, it also follows,
given Przeworski’s analysis, that the PZPR will make flawed evaluations in the
context of the dynamic of the bargaining at the Round Table. In the context of
Colomer’s hypothesis of far-sightedness, we expect the PZPR to regard the choice
of electoral system as an important choice en route to an intermediate regime. We
expect PZPR negotiators to evaluate the relative merits of voting formulae and to
update their information about the differential impact of voting systems.
PZPR social support
This section uses Politburo documents, Magdalenka transcripts and author inter-
views with negotiators from both the PZPR and Solidarnof- concerning party
perceptions of its social support prior to the Round Table.
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It has been argued that the biggest mistake made by the PZPR at the Round Table
was its bargaining over the electoral law.2 In simple terms, the question is why PZPR
negotiators agreed to the adoption of the least advantageous electoral system from
its point of view. While some PZPR negotiators now claim that they did not expect
to win the contractual elections agreed at the Round Table,3 many key figures within
the party, not to mention its lower echelons, were shocked by the party’s electoral
collapse on 4 June. So, given the fact that many senior PZPR negotiators did not
contemplate the notion of an electoral defeat,4 the question is on what basis was this
positive assessment of the party’s future electoral performance formulated?
A CBOS poll conducted between 21 and 24 January 1989 asked respondents:
‘Does the PZPR activity serve society well and is it in agreement with society’s
interests?’5 A ‘Yes’ answer was given by 3.9 per cent, and a further 22.3 per cent
answered ‘rather yes’. A ‘rather no’ answer was given by 29 per cent and a further
24.8 per cent said ‘No’, while 19.9 per cent had no opinion. Combining the ‘yes’
and ‘rather yes’ figures give a total of 26.2 per cent. This figure is boosted further
when adjusted for the ‘no opinion’ category to over 32 per cent.6 It is interesting
to note that by 10 April 1989, just after the Round Table had concluded, only
15 per cent of those who were prepared to declare themselves in a CBOS poll said
that they would vote for the government coalition.7
Interviews with key players such as General W. Jaruzelski and Mieczys„aw
Rakowski highlight the fact that a form of doublethink appears to have influenced
the cognitive processes of many party negotiators. This doublethink appears to
have had a fatal impact on the PZPR’s evaluation of the information at its
disposal. Marek Kami‘ski has shown that the communist party estimated their
level of political support from unadjusted ‘confidence polls’.8 He has argued that
such polls were doomed to paint an overly optimistic picture of social support for
the PZPR. The CBOS ‘confidence polls’ of the 1980s, though carefully
conducted, were flawed in many respects.
There were three fundamental problems with the surveys that led the PZPR to
rely on a skewed picture of likely electoral support. First, 30 per cent of respondents
on average refused to complete the surveys in the late 1980s.9 The major cause of
the increase of refusals can be attributed to a reluctance of many Solidarnof-
supporters to interact with communist institutions. A second systematic factor was
the fear among the respondents who agreed to answer the questions. In simple
terms, people did not believe that the polls were secret and, therefore, did not always
express their true preferences. Piotr Kwiatowski has shown that polls undertaken in
universities consistently produced results that were not as favourable to the com-
munists as were those undertaken by CBOS researchers.10 Given the fact that many
high-ranking academics11 were also senior party members, the question is why such
information was not evaluated within the party. Another key factor was the party’s
control of the mass media. This asymmetric access to the mass media cannot be
overestimated as factor in the assessment of confidence polls:
Combined, these three systematic factors produced a picture of public opinion
that was systematically and seriously distorted. Revealed ratings slowly
shifted against the communists in 1987. The first serious jump in the ratings
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occurred in December 1988 and the second one in April–May 1989. This
‘revealed’ a decrease in support that probably was not only due to the drop of
real support, attributable to an economic decline, but also to the weakening
influence of the three biasing factors described above. When this influence
disappeared completely, which occurred in the final eight weeks of the
campaign, the ratings changed dramatically.12
The analysis of interviews conducted with both General W. Jaruzelski and
Mieczys„aw Rakowski shows clear evidence of some form of cognitive disso-
nance in their evaluation of the opinion poll information they had at their disposal
both during and immediately after the Round Table.
During the course of a number of interviews Mieczys„aw Rakowski has never
changed his explanation of his and the party’s failure to foresee the 4 June
election result:13
In May after the end of the Round Table the opinion polls showed that four-
teen per cent of the electorate would vote for us and the Peasants,14 while
forty per cent said they’d vote for Solidarnof-. The rest had no opinion. Till
now I don’t know why we thought that the rest would vote for us. We were
prisoners of our past, when the elections weren’t free. It just didn’t register
that the ‘don’t knows’ wouldn’t vote for us.15
General Jaruzelski was at an even greater loss than Rakowski to explain the
PZPR’s failure to appreciate its true levels of electoral support:
We were used to winning the election no matter what! We did have strong
propaganda – the Rakowski government was getting good results. So we
thought that there was no big danger . . . . We were used to winning no matter
what!16
Lech Kaczy‘ski was adviser to Lech Wa„ˇsa and Solidarnof- negotiator at the
Round Table subtable on trade union pluralism. He argues that the PZPR did not
foresee defeat in the elections for a variety of reasons:
Officially, they didn’t anticipate because their culture didn’t include the
possibility. They were distributing false information within the party. I know
what it was like in Gda‘sk. They were sending questionnaires (about local
support) to party leaders in institutions and these people were filling in the
answers ‘from the ceiling’ as we say here. And this was the basis for some
calculations. These people had a false perception – even within the party – of
what was going on.17
The notion of the ‘party’s’ perception of the process it was engaged in and its level
of social support is problematic on a number of levels. As one of the key players
on the Solidarnof- side, Lech Kaczy‘ski had many opportunities to observe the
conflicting impulses and motivations within the PZPR. He argues that it is facile
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to talk about the concept of the ‘party’ when talking about PZPR Round Table
strategies and goals:
Definitely – you cannot say ‘party’ because people thought about it differ-
ently. Some took part because they had to – because they had lost the battle
to stop the Round Table. Maybe this group hoped that things would return
to normal in Russia and that they would be able to control the opposition in
Poland. The second group really did believe in a new reformed system. They
thought that people who were legitimated by Solidarnof- would be able to
get the reforms though and then there would be free election in four years.
Then the third group thought that the system was finished and wanted
to find a boat to sail into the new system. Jaruzelski thought he could keep
the role of guarantor. I thought it was like that. This second group controlled
the political and army apparatus. That was the guarantee of Jaruzelski’s
power. This all became clear at the Tenth Plenum. Our main opponent was
in this first group. The betrayers, I call them. The second group was the old
communists and then there were the young ones like [Aleksander]
Kwafniewski [president of Poland] and [Józef] Oleksy [now a prominent
member of the post-communist SLD] who wanted to get rid of the old
communists and they did it in one year. Whether these young communists
had the conception of transforming the PZPR into the SdRP, I don’t know.
It is hard to examine it.18
Clearly, this diversity of interest and goals within the PZPR had a profound effect
on the negotiating process. But it was also the cause, or maybe the effect, of the
differing perceptions of the party’s social support. The Politburo member,
Stanis„aw Ciosek, has always claimed that he was under no illusions about the
party’s social support at the time of the Round Table.19 The PZPR ideologue,
Professor Jerzy Wiatr, and his son, S„awomir Wiatr (founder member of the post-
communist SdRP), have also asserted that they understood what the results would
be in a freely contested election.20 However, as we shall see, the predominant
conception of the party’s support did not reflect that held by Ciosek and
Wiatr, senior and junior. Lech Kaczy‘ski was a key participant in the ‘secret’
Magdalenka meetings and remembers well the diversity of opinion within
PZPR ranks:
In Magdalenka, he [Stanis„aw Ciosek] kept saying that they would lose [the
election]. He said that they couldn’t agree to fully free elections to the Senate
because they would lose. I remember it. However, a young Central
Committee secretary, an optimist [Capt. Jerzy Kretkowski] kept worrying
about the opposition in his reports. He was worried that they [Solidarnof-]
would lose too much. The central polling agency was also optimistic for
the party. I asked [Józef ] Oleksy after the election at the meeting of the
commission if they had put Kretkowski in jail. He said they hadn’t but that
they should have.21
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Professor Janusz Reykowski maintains that the PZPR’s assessment of the support
ratio between itself and Solidarnof- played an important part in the decision to
negotiate with the opposition:
This was an important factor. From the data I had . . . a number of sociological
studies from the Institute of Sociology and Philosophy . . . it was clear that
towards the end of the eighties it was assessed that 25–30 per cent of the
population supported the . . . regime. It was thought to be relatively strong
support. Clear support for Solidarnof- was similar – also between 25–30 per
cent. There was a large group in the middle who did not declare themselves!
Another aspect was that there was a decline in the support for Solidarnof-
leadership towards the end of the eighties. Towards the end of 1988 support
for the main Solidarnof- leadership was quite meagre. As a matter of fact it
was one of the arguments for negotiation because some people in the party
leadership were afraid that if Wa„ˇsa and his leadership lost his authority,
there would be a new generation of leadership with much less political
experience and much less political responsibility.
There were two things that happened in the autumn of 1988. One was an
interview with Wa„ˇsa in Polityka. The other was more obvious – a debate
between Wa„ˇsa and Miodowicz.22 This debate presented Wa„ˇsa, not only to
the public, but also to the leadership in a very different light. In general, the
Solidarnof- leadership was regarded as quite seasoned politicians in
comparison to these young strike leaders in 1988 who were very radical,
simple-minded and dangerous. So this decline in support for the Solidarnof-
leadership was not a decline in oppositional atmosphere, it was a decline in
the authority of the Solidarnof- opposition. So it was also one argument for
speeding up of negotiations with the Solidarnof- leadership as a real partner
in comparison to others. It also had an impact on strategies during election to
the Senate. It was expected that the party could get around 30 per cent
but there were also some indications that various personalities had higher
support than the party itself. So the whole campaign was set to personalities
and not to parties. And as you remember from the data it was approximately
true. It was between 25–30 per cent of the electoral votes that was collected
by the regime and some persons got higher numbers but less than Solidarnof-.
It turned out that latent support for Solidarnof- was quite strong!23
Claiming to have always anticipated the possibility of the PZPR losing the
election, Stanis„aw Ciosek says that the party had ‘precise research’24 before and
during the Round Table process. He says that as he understood it in early 1989, a
‘50:50 outcome’25 was being predicted by the polls:
We saw that there was no clear winner. So we knew there was a risk. But at
some stage the polls were showing a bad outcome, but the process had started
and we could not withdraw. I was at a meeting when the church side warned
us that we would lose – so the church had better information than the secret
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police! But the good will to change was so big that we took the risk. We were
the slaves of the dynamic of change and once it had started – it was hard to
stop. To withdraw – it would mean to lose face, honour, and it would be cow-
ardly not to stand in the election. I did not believe it was possible to withdraw.
Of course, we believed it was a good agreement and that we had our own
guarantees that we would not be out manoeuvred.26
Professor Andrzej Werblan warned the party hierarchy of the potential electoral
disaster if it proceeded with its plan to employ a majoritarian electoral system in
the proposed free Senate election.27 While not actively involved in the Round Table
process, Professor Werblan was a former Politburo member and was in contact
with many of the key participants. He argues that senior members of the PZPR
‘overestimated their own chances’28 in their evaluation of the electoral outcome:
They never thought that they would have a third of the votes. They counted on
having 50–60 per cent. The majoritarian system would have been good in this
context. It was not a question of being uninformed or of there being a lack of
knowledge – this was a question of the estimation of the state of public opinion.
Every government makes these kinds of mistakes. The opinion polls were not
objective and they were not conducted properly. They were corrected – the
results were corrected. Jaruzelski was surrounded by people who were not giv-
ing him credible information. This was a dictatorship . . . . [Jaruzelski] estimated
the situation as being better than it actually was. People in power have the
tendency to wishful thinking. One of Mr Jaruzelski’s closest associates, Józef
Czyrek, in charge of foreign affairs – said at a number of meetings that the party
would have to be careful not to do too well so as not to marginalize Solidarnof-.
It was funny, but true. I think he really thought this way. That’s why the election
was a kind of a shock . . . . It resulted from the information that they were getting
from the apparatchiks. They believed in strange things. They believed that if
they put popular people on the (election) list – neutral people – that these people
will [sic] gain support. They put the director of one of the Zoo’s on the list, for
instance, and people from the radio, and they thought it would help. The elec-
tions had the character of a plebiscite. People either voted for the government
side or Solidarnof- – the faces didn’t matter. If a donkey had been photographed
with Wa„ˇsa – he would have been elected. The top level of the PZPR did not
take this into account before the election. They were expecting that the opposi-
tion would have one-third of the votes. They thought about a division of power
and that there would be a long period of coexistence and power sharing.29
The electoral system and voting formulae
This section uses Politburo documents, Magdalenka transcripts and interviews
with PZPR and Solidarnof- negotiators concerning party perceptions of the
choice of electoral system and voting formulae.
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Kami‘ski’s investigation of the PZPR’s choice of electoral system supports the
analysis on which this discussion is based. Kami‘ski’s counterfactual discussion
of the 1989 election results has shown that apart from the fact that the PZPR’s
consent to the elections was founded on an overly optimistic estimate of its pop-
ular support, that an alternative electoral law, the STV, would have been mutually
acceptable to both Solidarnof- and the party.30 STV would have produced a much
better electoral outcome for the communists. The crucial point is that had the
result been less dramatic and the party’s actual seat share been more commensu-
rate with their vote, then the contractual power-sharing arrangement agreed at the
Round Table may well have remained in place. In a nutshell, it is argued that the
Solidarnof- coalition government may not have been formed and the communist
party might not have been dissolved.
The communist side proposed single-member district majority run-off as their
preferred electoral law at the Round Table. This gave them worse outcomes than
STV or PR Party List systems would have produced. Both STV and PR would
have been acceptable to Solidarnof-. Kami‘ski attributes this mistake to the
complexity of the decision-making environment, the lack of technical knowledge
about electoral rules and their properties and, finally, the fact that, under
communist estimates about the distribution of voter preferences, alternative laws
produced similar outcomes.31
The point is that there was nothing inevitable about Solidarnof-’s victory. In
terms of popular support, the results were far less impressive than might be
understood on a cursory examination of seat share. Solidarnof- took around 70
per cent of the votes cast in the Sejm and Senate elections while the PZPR got
about 25 per cent. The majority run-off system converted Solidarnof-’s support
into 100 per cent of the freely elected Sejm seats and also gave the union 99 per
cent of the Senate seats. Kami‘ski has shown that with districts of a typical mag-
nitude of three to four seats, and with an allocation formula friendly to small par-
ties, practically any PR scheme would have resulted in a division of seats roughly
proportional to popular votes, regardless of the further details of the electoral law.
The essential point is that had PR been used, the outcome of the elections would
have been very different.
Kami‘ski makes the point that an indication of how little awareness there was,
within the PZPR, of the impact of electoral systems can be seen in the fact that
STV was not even proposed at the Round Table negotiations. It is worth noting
that there is no mention of voting rules in an otherwise detailed Politburo memo
concerning the ‘non-confrontational but competitive election’32 sent to PZPR
regional secretaries on 15 February 1989.33 It appears that the various methods of
vote aggregation was not a matter that overly troubled PZPR leaders used, as
General Jaruzelski puts it, to ‘winning the election no matter what’.34
Former Interior Minister C. Kiszczak could barely control his anger when
asked about the choice of voting rules! ‘We could have had any election rule. Not
this stupid majority one! Any other election rule would have guaranteed victory
for the party. The electoral rules were a huge mistake!’35
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General Jaruzelski was even more candid than Kiszczak!
The electoral regulations – when the party were in power for 40 years – not
democratically of course – it is not easy to see the small print of the rules. What
version to choose – not easy to decide which version to choose – it is not easy
to make such a conscious decision. We were used to winning the election no
matter what! We did have strong propaganda – the Rakowski government was
getting good results. So we thought that there was no big danger. It was naïve
that we chose the majority system – where the stronger comes through – and
not the proportional one. If the rules were changed in the Senate, for example,
instead of 99 for Solidarnof-, it would be closer to 70. So this was a psycho-
logical knockout. But it would be different if it was 70 and not 99 to 1.36
Before moving on to a detailed analysis of the individual components of the electoral
system and voting formula, it is interesting to note General Jaruzelski’s recollection
of his mindset just after the Round Table in April 1989. This recollection emphasizes
the fact that Jaruzelski regarded the non-electoral institutional mechanisms negoti-
ated at the Round Table as guarantor of both his and the party’s power:
The [electoral] regulations that were adopted were negotiated in a really
tough and tedious process. And both sides were realistic. The Soviets were still
around – the bloc was there. [This was] one of the strongest limitations when
I was making decisions. I was keeping it in mind that I must not hamper
Gorbachev. I knew he was in a tough situation . . . . On the 27 April 1989, I was
in Moscow for two days talking about cooperation between Polish and Soviet
youth – that’s why Kwafniewski was there. He was Minister in charge of Youth
affairs . . . . We were also having solid talks with Gorbachev. We were explaining
to Gorbachev that what we were doing in Poland was not going to lead to the
fall of socialism. We. . . talked about the guarantees including the 65 per cent
and me being the president – for Gorbachev, these assurances were important
because he was under pressure from the conservative forces in Russia. Poland
was always central to the reforms in the bloc and Gorbachev admitted that. He
was looking at Poland as an example. If the putsch against Gorbachev had hap-
pened in 1989 and not 1991, it could have been much worse. We did not want
to give the impression that we were giving away power. Even after losing the
election – we were always reassuring the Russians. My role as the president and
the master of the military was important in terms of reassuring the Russians that
everything was okay . . . . This was used against the Russian marshals who were
against Gorbachev . . . that in Poland, it is possible to carry out reforms so that,
on one hand there is opposition, but still the good people are in control.37
Election to the new Senate using the majoritarian system
Olson has observed that the essence of the Polish compartmentalized election
system was seven separate segments of electoral competition where each
96 Strategies and outcomes: part 2
Hayden-06.qxd  18/11/05  6:23 PM  Page 96 $ 
+ + 
$ 
compartment consists of a defined set of participants with a defined type 
of competition with its own rules.38 In the election, the Senate district system
and vote-counting methods swamped the PZPR and all but one of the non-
Solidarnof- independent candidates. As has been discussed earlier, a proportional
representation election method would have aggregated votes from around the
country to give the PZPR at least some small share of Senate seats. Both
Kami‘ski and Olson have observed that using a proportional system would have
required a formal acceptance by the PZPR that rival organized political parties
existed, thus compromising the leading role of the communist party. Kami‘ski
and Olson emphasize the PZPR’s unwillingness to acknowledge Solidarnof- as a
political party as being the main reason for their failure to even consider the use
of a proportional system. However, interviews with PZPR negotiators highlight
the fact that they were more interested in the ratio of seats in the contractual Sejm
and the institution of the presidency as a guarantee of the party’s post-Round
Table power.
The decision about the free election to the Senate was made during a critical
debate within the narrow leadership – 10–12 people. The argument was used
that the party is a bureaucratic structure that executes power and such a party
cannot survive in a democratic environment. So if it is to survive, it must
learn new rules of democratic policy and this new agreement, that is being
discussed, gives it [PZPR] a chance of reconstruction. It was expected that it
was politically secure because 65 per cent [of seats in the Sejm were reserved
for the PZPR] of votes are predetermined and . . . in this basic political secu-
rity or safety it is possible to initiate a political game where the party may try
to attain a new competence. But it was being formulated in conditional terms.
They were not saying – the party will learn a political game, but it has a
chance to learn the political game . . . . It was seen that there are some chances
to improve the situation by this political game.39
Stanis„aw Ciosek argues that foreknowledge about the actual election result
would not have changed any of the specifics of the electoral package agreed at
the Round Table.
It would not change too much even with this information . . . . I was the author
of this conception the 35–65 per cent arrangement for the Sejm. So, in the
Sejm, we needed two-thirds of a majority to deal with the presidential veto
and the Senate . . . . But two-thirds is not 65 per cent but 67 per cent, so we
were minus 2 per cent. Thirty-five per cent is not one-third, so the real fight
[at the Round Table] was about this 2 per cent. The backbone of the offer to
Solidarnof- was that they could win this 2 per cent. We were saying that a lot
of Solidarnof- members were, in fact, in the party. But on the other hand, I
was saying to the party that they could have more than the 65 per cent
because they take a few per cent from Solidarnof- during the election
because there are party members in Solidarnof- . . . . So the sides were
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deliberating and they took – deliberately – the risk of fighting over this
2 per cent. It was not too much. The Senate – which was 100 per cent free,
was not considered important. It was a sort of demonstration, but not practi-
cally important. Because in this conception, the majority in the Senate was
held by Solidarnof-, and so the Senate can veto, but the President is able to
veto also. The most important element of the bargain was the Sejm and who
controls this 67 per cent of votes . . . . Both sides chose to gamble. I was writ-
ing the same thing to both sides and I was the author of this idea . . . . This sys-
tem was guaranteeing stability, so I was not so worried about winning. I was
always sure that we would always be able to organize a majority for particu-
lar events or topics such as the bill of laws . . . so this conception was very
sensible at that time. It was sincere.40
Information concerning private talks between Solidarnof- and PZPR negotiators
at Magdalenka provided by General Czes„aw Kiszczak at the Politburo meeting
of the PZPR held on 14 March 1989:
The fifth issue that was discussed in a stormy and, at times, dramatic manner,
was the package of political reforms concerning the office of the President
and the Senate.
Solidarnof- and the opposition have analysed especially closely proposals,
which were presented by us, focusing their attention on presidential powers,
which could be used in situations of extreme political conflict. The issue here
is the possibility of dissolving Parliament. They also tried to widen signifi-
cantly the competency of the Senate, aiming at the concept of the Senate as
an alternative to the Sejm. This was based on a belief that the opposition has
a chance to monopolize the composition of the Senate.
It seems that with the progress of the debate on this subject, the position
of the other side became more rational and realistic. In the end, at the last
working meeting in Magdalenka, there was only one disputable question left
regarding the Senate – the retention by the Senate of the right to veto, used
to block any legislation; this would require two-thirds vote majority in the
Sejm to force it through. Our proposal is the majority of three-fifths.
It should be explained that three-fifths means 60 per cent of votes in the
Sejm – the exact number guaranteed by the political contract for the coalition
of the three parties. However, two-thirds votes represents 67 per cent, i.e.
2 per cent more than the guaranteed in the contract 65 per cent of seats for
the entire PRON coalition.
The dispute, therefore, is for the 2 per cent of votes in the Sejm, but, in
fact, it is a principal question for us, as it requires the avoidance of the dan-
ger of a parliamentary crisis, which could paralyse the functioning of the
authorities and the state. These 2 per cent could mean the possibility of a kind
of ‘liberum veto’ for the opposition.
We think that there has been enough of learning on one’s own mistakes and
experimenting on a living organism. We are saying openly to Solidarnof- and
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the opposition that – on the basis of the Polish historical experience and the
experience of many other countries – we stand for strong power, because
weak power was always the source of disasters and misfortune.41
It seems clear from the accounts of Ciosek, Reykowski and Kiszczak’s report to
the Politburo that the party’s share of seats in the contractual Sejm was the central
focus of PZPR bargaining. Arguably, this focus affected PZPR negotiators’
perceptions of the significance of other segments of the electoral bargaining.
It has been already noted that Professor Jerzy Wiatr was horrified when he
became aware of the Magdalenka deal that provided for a free election to the
Senate. Aleksander Kwafniewski had introduced the idea of the free Senate
without prior consultation with other negotiators. Wiatr heard of the proposal in
a telephone call from Professor Janusz Reykowski who was delighted with the
development. Having told Reykowski that the free election would be a ‘disaster’
for the party, Wiatr suggested a voting rule that would have given the PZPR some
chance of getting its candidates elected in a free election:
I proposed a small modification to the system of election. Each voter would
have only one vote – not two or three – and then the candidates will be
declared elected by the order of votes received. The implication of this is that
in a typical voivodship were two Senators were elected – the first – the fron-
trunner would have been a Solidarnof- candidate. But unless Solidarnof-
was . . . powerful the second place would go to a candidate of the party or its
allies. Andrzej Werblan made a similar proposal, but going further. He pro-
posed formally that the Senate should be elected by a proportional system
and argued quite correctly that that would give the government side about
30 per cent of the seats in the Senate, which is exactly what would have hap-
pened. Both these proposals were rejected. And I know from Reykowski that
the most important factor in rejecting these proposals was Jaruzelski himself.
Now they hoped – Jaruzelski’s people – hoped that Solidarnof-’s weakness
in rural Poland would compensate in the election for the Senate for its
strength in the urban conglomeration. They thought that the backward
provinces would give the seats to the party and also they did not anticipate
that the Catholic Church would engage itself in the election. But it did, and
that was a critical factor. These weak provinces, from Solidarnof-’s point of
view, were also the most Catholic. So Solidarnof- was weak but the Church
was strong so the outcome was that these provinces became even worse from
the party point of view than provinces like Warsaw and Katowice.42
Professor Stanis„aw Gebethner was a participant in two Round Table working
parties appointed to prepare changes in the electoral law and to amend the consti-
tution. He provides a fascinating account of the PZPR hierarchy’s failure to inform
itself about the differential impact of voting rules.43 According to Gebethner, the
proposal for establishing the freely elected Senate was almost universally criticized
at a meeting of negotiators for the government-coalition side. Gebethner argues
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that everybody pointed to the real risk of a PZPR defeat in a Senate election
carried out in two-seat constituencies on the majority vote principle:44
I elaborated a short report, but very detailed, and proposed a proportional
representation system with 13 big constituencies and elections on 3 lists –
Party, PRON and the opposition. They would be allocated proportionally in
three elections according to d’Hondt. I presented this paper to Professor
Reykowski45 and there was no response. I then had a conversation with
Mr Czyrek46 about my proposal and he said that it is interesting academically
and an interesting project. But it is the opinion of the voivodship secretaries
that they will win in the majoritarian system and we will have to act on the
basis of the political instinct of the secretaries. Józef Czyrek was a Politburo
member and party secretary and formally charged with these negotiations. I
reported this conversation to my friends and they were laughing. When the
elections brought such total defeat in the Senate election, Professor
Reykowski sent for this report because he was blamed for the result as well
as the electoral system. But he said that they [the party] had Gebethner’s
project and the party rejected it.47
Professor Gebethner has no doubt that his electoral advice was available to the
highest levels of the PZPR. He argues that the level of knowledge within the party
of the differential impact of voting formula was extremely low, but that this
lacuna was exacerbated by a huge degree of ‘self-confidence’. So, here, we see
two different mistakes. The PZPR made a mistake in relation to the selection of
electoral rule and voting formula, a mistake that was made worse by the party’s
failure to base their evaluation on a correct assessment of support for the party.
Gebethner was not alone in fearing the impact of a freely and proportionally
elected Senate. Professor Janusz Reykowski remembers being approached by a
former member of the Politburo, Professor Andrzej Werblan, who had produced
a document predicting electoral defeat if the majority run-off system was used in
the Senate election:
When the free election to the Senate was announced I got a visit from
Professor Werblan who brought me a special document that predicted the
complete collapse of the party at the election. But the decision-making
groups who were debating the issue finally decided that this outcome was not
very likely. This was probably 15 March 1989. It was thought that this
prediction of Werblan’s was not very likely. Not everybody disagreed with
Werblan but the majority of decision-makers, the few people who made the
decisions, felt it was too Cassandric to believe it. Werblan’s idea was to
negotiate another electoral law instead of the majority system and to use a
proportional law. Of course the composition of the Senate would change if
there was a proportional system but it was rejected. They thought that there
was no need to change it. So in March the majority [in this decision-making
group within the party] did not expect defeat. But some expected it!48
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Professor Werblan took the precaution of sending his document to Prime Minister
Mieczys„aw Rakowski on 17 March.49 Rakowski subsequently published the
letter in an edited volume of his own correspondence.50
Professor Andrzej Werblan stated that
There was no discussion within the party. The matter came up all of a sud-
den during the talks at Magdalenka . . . . Primarily it was planned to make
only the Sejm a contractual arrangement, and later, because Solidarnof-
wanted some element of free election, Kwafniewski got the idea of free elec-
tions to the Senate. The idea was the same as the United States – two Senators
from each voivodship. I think it was the idea of aparatchiks who thought that
in the small, rural voivodships it would be easier to get the seats. I wasn’t in
power at the time, but I was observing what was going on. When I heard
about the concept of the Senate elections on TV, I rang Rakowski and told
him that God was punishing him and that he had had his brain removed. I told
him that, with this system, he wouldn’t have a single mandate in the Senate.
It would be more reasonable to have the pre-war proportional electoral
system to the Senate. Solidarnof- would have 70 places and the party would
have had 30. There would have been a proportion between the Sejm and the
Senate. The Sejm was contractual, and so the opposition would have one-
third there. In the Senate, it would have been the opposite. The headquarters
of the party was so sure that it would not lose the election to the Senate that
they felt they would have 64 of the 100 seats. That’s why they stayed with this
majoritarian system.
After the telephone call, I wrote a letter to him in which I mentioned the
old pre-war electoral system . . . . Rakowski gave the letter to Jaruzelski and
Barcikowski. Later Rakowski published the letter in a book called ‘Letters to
me’. . . . I didn’t even have to think of anything new. In Poland, the elections
were made three times before the war using the proportional system . . . .
There were large districts – five, six, seven mandates. The voting was on
numbered lists, not on names. So number 3 was the Polish Socialists, etc. We
used d’Hondt. It was purely proportional system . . . . The party did not take
my propositions into consideration. They thought that the majoritarian
system would give them a better chance. They overestimated their own
chances.51
Again, we see the point being made that the PZPR made two separate mistakes.
They chose the wrong voting rule and they expected more support than they had.
Werblan is emphatic, as are Gebethner and Wiatr that the PZPR hierarchy was made
aware of the potentially disastrous consequences of a free election to the Senate
conducted under a majoritarian system. He rejects any suggestion that the PZPR
lacked the knowledge to evaluate the differential impact of voting formulae:
They did have expertise. I told them. It wasn’t a lack of knowledge that
played the decisive role. It was wishful thinking. They were sure of a better
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result – they were very confident. The result wasn’t that bad taken into
consideration the free elections to the Senate. In these elections the coalition
got about 25–30 per cent of votes depending on the district. But after 45 years
of dictatorship – at least 10 as a totalitarian regime and 10 after martial law –
if the party gets 25 per cent of votes – it is quite an achievement. If you take
into account that 36 per cent of people did not take part, then I claim that the
government side did not have such bad results – it wasn’t a catastrophe. Four
years later – they won the elections.52
The collapse of the national list
While the PZPR’s collapse in the Senate election had a huge demonstration effect,
the collapse of its national or country list was also a devastating blow given the
fact that the party’s elite was simply crossed off this list by the electorate. The
question is why the PZPR retained this negative form of voting; was there any
awareness of the potential dangers of crossing off when voters had non-party
candidates to choose from?
Olson provides this account of how the system actually worked when a person
went to vote:
The usual communist system election rule was retained whereby each candi-
date must obtain an absolute majority of all votes cast . . . . Voters had no easy
task to express their intentions at the polling place, a marked departure from
previous practice. Voters were presented with one large white ballot, one pink
ballot, and several small white ballots. The large white ballot, uniform
throughout the entire country, contained the 35 names on the national list.
The pink ballot listed the names of the candidates for the two or three Senate
seats within each province. The voter was also presented with as many small
white ballots as the district had seats (two to five per district).
The names on each ballot were listed in alphabetical order, without any
designation. Not only were the parties unlisted on the Senate ballot, even
the Sejm district ballot design helps account for the PZPR’s emphasis in the
names of candidates. The same design, however, also accounts for the
Solidarnof- strategy of emphasizing a negative vote against all but its own
few designated candidates . . . . The vote was cast by crossing out the names
of the candidates for whom the voter did not wish to vote, leaving unmarked
the names of the candidates whom the voter wished to support. The
Solidarnof- appeal was simple: cross out all names but our few candidates in
all compartments.53
Professor Stanis„aw Gebethner points out that the PZPR should have learned
from the experience of the elections in the Soviet Union, prior to the Round Table,
where official candidates had been crossed off. Gebethner campaigned against
negative voting all through the 1980s and produced a paper arguing against the
use of the system in Poland. Gebethner recalls discussing the issue with a party
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secretary who rejected his arguments:
This idea of crossing out was an aggressive way of voting. It was better to
vote positively, but it was impossible to convince them, but I told them. I
remember a conversation with Mr Szmajdzi‘ski, who was secretary of the
parliamentary club. He rejected my view. I said, ‘Look at the results in the
Soviet Union.’ There had been the results of the first semi-free elections in
the Soviet Union and the official candidates had been crossed out by the
same method. During the TV time for Solidarnof-, people were told to cross
out the names of the party names on the national list. The national list col-
lapsed because they constructed the list in the way they did and Solidarnof-
refused to cooperate with it.54
Zoltan Barany and Louisa Vinton note that the large number of candidates
registered meant that voting was inevitably a taxing procedure. In Warsaw, for exam-
ple, voters had to cross out 29 of 32 candidates on the Senate ballot to cast a valid
vote.55 Again, the question arises as to why PZPR negotiators did not anticipate the
possibility that the people would simply cross off the names of party candidates.
Professor Andrzej Werblan said that
They expected more loyalty from Solidarnof-! They didn’t expect that
Solidarnof- would agitate against the country list. They didn’t expect
Solidarnof- to instruct people to cross off the whole list. Solidarnof- used
their TV time to show people how to cross off. I don’t think it was with
Wa„ˇsa’s permission. He wanted to stop it, but the majority of the leaders
supported it. The government did not expect it! But I also think that
Solidarnof- did not expect that it would cause the collapse of the list. Their
aim was to reduce the votes because they knew that the collapse of the list
meant breaking the agreement. That’s why, after this, they were rather embar-
rassed and were looking for a way out. But the way out was unconstitutional.
They changed the electoral rule midstream before the second round.56
Werblan was equally scathing about the party’s failure to look at alternative meth-
ods of voting for the national list:
No – only the Senate system was discussed. The press was not free enough
to have such a discussion in public. The government didn’t feel the need to
discuss it. I started the Senate discussion privately because I knew Reykowski
and Rakowski. If I hadn’t known them, then there would have been no
discussion. You have to understand this mechanism of a closed society . . . .
Such a possibility [losing the election] could not be openly discussed. Big
circles of the apparat were against cooperation or compromise with
Solidarnof-. In these circles, it was argued that power was being given away.
It was not because they anticipated what happened, but because they thought
that even sharing power means losing. They cannot imagine anything other
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than monopolistic power, and for this reason, anyone who starts a conversation
about the method of compromise or which method would retain long or
short-term power would be seen as a supporter of the hardline.57
Werblan argues that because of the opposition to the changes being envisaged by
the reformist elite this core group58 had to move
in some kind of conspiracy. It was impossible to have an open discussion – it
had to be in a tight group . . . . In this narrow group, they were thinking about
my arguments, but they were not convinced and there was no wider discussion.
Even people from the Politburo were not involved. They were considered
hardliners.59
The use of the crossing-off formula devastated the PZPR’s nationalist list and
precipitated a crisis for both the PZPR and the opposition. There was no run-off
arrangement for the 35-person national list, so the party was faced with the reality
that its key people had failed to enter the Sejm.60
MP Professor Jerzy Wiatr:
I don’t think that all the consequences of this electoral system were realized!
For instance, there is an obvious sign that people did not realize how vulner-
able the national list for the Sejm was . . . . Because otherwise people like
Rakowski should have run from the districts. Had Rakowski run . . . from a
district where the seat was reserved for the candidates, he would have been
elected. And the same about all the other people on the national list! Instead
they believed that the national list was a safe vehicle – which it was not . . . .
I think that in the case of the national list – they underestimated the strength
of the negative vote. This list was defeated by a purely negative vote . . . . They
underestimated the strength of the negative vote and thought that mostly
when people are confronted with a kind of vote, which is not a choice but a
confirmation that many who are passive would say yes . . . . In fact, they were
partly true because the proportion of those who voted for the national list was
higher than the percentage of those who, in contested elections, voted for the
party candidates for the Senate. But it was not high enough to have the
national list elected. This is a proof that these people did not fully understand
all the implications of the electoral system.61
As Michael Laver points out this is yet another kind of electoral error or misuse
of the chosen system.62
Candidate selection procedures
The PZPR selected nearly 700 candidates for its 156 seats in the contractual Sejm,
while Solidarnof- sponsored only 161 candidates for the 161 seats it was contesting.
Likewise for the Senate, 186 candidates were PZPR affiliated, while Solidarnof-
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nominated 100 candidates for the 100 seats. The Solidarnof- tactic of endorsing
only one candidate for each of its eligible seats proved as effective against
independent challengers in the Sejm as against PZPR candidates to the Senate.
Again the question arises as to why the PZPR ran so many candidates. Andrzej
Werblan provides a harsh assessment of his former colleagues: ‘Because of
stupidity! These people had no experience of the mechanism of free elections.’63
As Millard notes in a majoritarian second-ballot system, a high number of
candidates reduces the chance of electing a candidate on the first ballot.64 In
many Sejm constituencies, as many as seven or eight PZPR candidates competed,
while in the Senate contest, the party ‘allowed its own vote to be split, one case
seventeen ways’.65
PZPR’s expectation of rural support
PZPR negotiators believed that they could win the Senate election in at least 30
rural provinces.
Professor Stanis„aw Gebethner thought that
This calculation was based on the general assumption that provinces with a
majority rural population were pro-government. At any rate such a conclu-
sion was drawn from the higher rates in voting turnout previously noted in
these regions. Hence the PZPR fell into its own trap. For many years a single
individual was allowed to vote for a whole family in the countryside, in order
to increase the numbers of voters in the electoral statistics. Officials were
often encouraged directly in such practices. As a consequence it was believed
that the countryside continued to support the existing system and that it
would elect coalition, and not opposition candidates. This belief was
strengthened further by a mistaken interpretation of one of Lech Wa„ˇsa’s
responses that Solidarnof- was supported in 19 urbanized and industrialized
provinces. The conclusion drawn from this was that the PZPR, or the coali-
tion as a whole, had the support of the majority of the electorate in the
remaining 30 or so provinces.66
Professor Andrzej Werblan said that
They did think they would do well in the rural areas. I don’t know why. Two
things misled the party! First, the secretaries of the voivodships who guaran-
teed them victory and said it was in their pockets, and secondly, the church.
The church was misleading. The PZPR did not expect the church to openly
support Solidarnof-.67 This had a big impact on village society. People there
were ready to listen to the priests.68
Heyns and Bia„ecki analysed the election returns as published in Gazeta
Wyborcza.69 The major conclusion from the aggregate election data was that the
strongest relative support for Solidarnof- was concentrated in poor, rural areas
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and not in the traditional strongholds of the urban working class. We will return
to the issue of the PZPR’s expectation of support in rural constituencies in
Chapter 7.
The PZPR bargaining
The PZPR bargaining over the contractual election to the Sejm leaves the party
without an overall majority except with the support of its coalition partners.
The PZPR’s failure to retain an overall majority without the support of its coali-
tion partners is one of the strangest of all Round Table outcomes. Each of the four
political forces within the government coalition was allocated a share of seats
within the 65 per cent of reserved seats. Zubek describes the decision as the
PZPR’s ‘Trojan horse’. He argues that the Polish transition might well have had a
somewhat different character if, at the time, the party had made the decision to rid
itself of the coalition. However, the decision to persist with this arrangement
proved to be a ‘pathetically misguided attempt designed to strengthen those
parties by allotting them a solid share of the pre-divided Sejm seats’.70
Gebethner notes that the PZPR displayed ‘arrogance’ in relation to their coalition
partners.71 However, once the election was over and the bargaining over the new
government began, the ZSL (Peasant Party) and the SD abandoned their coalition
arrangement, joining forces with Solidarnof- in August and thus removing the
party’s apparently secure majority. As Millard points out, PZPR leaders assumed
the stability of the government coalition.72 Millard quotes Jacek Kuro‘, the
veteran dissident, who noted in March 1989 that a guaranteed majority for the
coalition ‘does not mean a majority for the Communist Party, since the other
coalition partners are beginning to come to life’.73
Conclusion
This chapter sets out to examine PZPR’s choice of electoral system and voting
formulae in the context of the Przeworski and Colomer hypotheses. We noted that
it followed from Przeworski’s hypothesis of short-sightedness that PZPR negotia-
tors would not pay much attention to electoral formulae given their preoccupation
with other institutional safeguards designed to facilitate their desired goal of a
broadened dictatorship. We also expected that PZPR negotiators would focus on
strategies that would ensure the preservation of their legislative veto. However, we
also expected to see strategic mistakes as a result of the PZPR’s failure to evaluate
or update its knowledge of the differential impact of electoral formulae. In the
context of Colomer’s hypothesis of far-sightedness, we expected the opposite kind
of behaviour from PZPR actors. We expected them to value the choice of elec-
toral system as a step on the road to an intermediate regime. It follows that if this
hypothesis is to be confirmed, the PZPR should have chosen an electoral system
and voting formula that maximized the party’s seat share. Furthermore, negotiators
should have updated their information on the differential impact of voting
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formulae during the course of the negotiations. With these expectations in mind,
we examined a number of institutional choices or scenarios to assess whether they
conformed to the predictions of either hypothesis.
Three categories of error
The PZPR’s erroneous estimation of its support is, arguably, the root cause of the
party’s collapse at the 4 June election. Of the three categories of mistakes made
in relation to the election, the flawed evaluation of the party’s actual support was
the most fundamentally damaging. Had party negotiators really believed that they
were in danger of electoral annihilation, it seems unimaginable that they would
not have taken a keener interest in the differential impact of alternative voting
rules. Had party negotiators appreciated their true support levels, they might not
have made a mistake in choosing the voting rules. It follows that, if the party was
operating on the basis of an accurate estimation of social support, its decision-
makers might not have made strategic mistakes such as splitting the vote by
running too many candidates.
Confidence polls
It seems clear that this error of estimation was rooted in the fact that the party
was, as General Jaruzelski pointed out, ‘used to winning – no matter what’.74 The
material examined in this chapter reveals that many of the party’s senior players
did not behave rationally when considering the level of support for the PZPR.
Kami‘ski’s analysis of the adjusted confidence polls taken throughout the 1980s
clearly indicates that it was not rational for the PZPR to rely on these polls for an
accurate estimate of support.75 He identified three fundamental problems that led
the PZPR to rely on a skewed and favourable estimate of their social support. The
analysis of interviews with Jaruzelski and Rakowski, in particular, shows that a
form of doublethink appears to have prevented these senior figures from
understanding the evidence at their disposal and led them to expect higher levels
of social support than even the adjusted polls indicated. As Lech Kaczy‘ski
remarked, the PZPR did not anticipate the likelihood of defeat ‘because their
culture didn’t include the possibility’.76 That said, it is clear from interviews with
Stanis„aw Ciosek, Jerzy Wiatr and S„awomir Wiatr, as well as interviews with
Solidarnof- negotiator Lech Kaczy‘ski, that not all the PZPR Round Table
players held this optimistic view of party support. However, at the end of the
day, the predominant view of likely support was, as Politburo member
Andrzej Werblan argues, based on the false information being supplied by the
apparatchiks.
In this instance, it seems clear that many key PZPR figures failed at the most
rudimentary level to ensure that they were estimating their support on the basis
of reliable information. It is also clear that there was a failure at the most senior
level of the PZPR to update or seek out accurate information that would have
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enabled a more reliable estimate of the likely impact of differential voting rules.
The PZPR’s behaviour in relation to the estimation of its support confirms
Przeworski’s analysis. PZPR decision-makers did not evaluate their next choice or
move on the basis of the relative strengths of the two sides because they did not
know these relative strengths.
Majoritarian voting rules
The evidence in relation to the PZPR’s choice of voting rules makes it absolutely
clear that party negotiators chose voting rules that resulted in a worse outcome
than would have resulted from almost any other voting system. While Kami‘ski
has argued that an indication of how little awareness there was within the PZPR
of the differential impact of electoral systems was the fact that STV was not even
proposed at the Round Table negotiations, this analysis has produced evidence
which proves that senior negotiators were made aware of the damaging impact of
using a majoritarian system in the Senate election.
Politburo member Andrzej Werblan advised Round Table co-chair Janusz
Reykowski that a proportional system should be adopted for the Senate, and later
wrote to Prime Minister M. Rakowski outlining the plan. Jerzy Wiatr has
confirmed that he advised Janusz Reykowski of the disastrous consequences of
choosing a majoritarian system. He also says that he understands that it was
General Jaruzelski who rejected both sets of proposals. Stanis„aw Gebethner
also confirms the fact that the notion of electing the Senate on the majority
principle was ‘almost universally criticized’77 at a meeting of the government
coalition group at the Round Table. He also produced a report outlining the merits
of a proportional system. Gebethner’s advice also was ignored. Gebethner
says that a senior Politburo member, Józef Czyrek, told him ‘it was the opinion
of the voivodship secretaries that they will win in the majoritarian system and we
will have to act on the basis of the political instinct of the secretaries’.78
On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that senior PZPR players not only failed
to update their knowledge of the differential impact of voting systems, but also
ignored the advice of three experts, two of whom were from within the party’s
own ranks. It, therefore, follows that the PZPR’s behaviour in relation to the
choice of voting rules supports Przeworski’s hypothesis.
Crossing-off and the collapse of the national list
The evidence here is clear: had the PZPR been updating its information, it should
have responded to the experience in the Soviet Union where voters had crossed
off official candidates in the first semi-free election there. Again, there was
information advising against the use of this negative form of voting available to
the party. Stanis„aw Gebethner had written papers arguing against the use of the
system and describes himself as having campaigned against the crossing-off sys-
tem throughout the 1980s. Again, the PZPR’s behaviour confirms Przeworski’s
expectation that ‘misperceptions lead liberalization to transition’.79
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The PZPR’s decision to run 700 candidates for its 156 seats in the contractual
Sejm and another 186 for the Senate election falls into the category of an error of
strategy. In a majoritarian second-ballot system, a high number of candidates
reduces the chances of electing a candidate on the first ballot. In this case, the
PZPR once again failed to understand the implications of allowing multiple
candidates to stand, given the use of the majoritarian voting rule. Again, the
PZPR’s behaviour confirms Przeworski’s hypothesis.
PZPR reliance on its satellite coalition partners
The PZPR made a strategic error when it assumed the stability of the government
coalition and failed to anticipate that its satellite partners might cease to support
the party at a future date. This assumption, which was central to the PZPR’s
bargaining over the contractual Sejm, seriously undermines the notion of party
negotiators as far-sighted actors. The failure to protect the PZPR’s dominance in
the negotiations for the contractual Sejm struck at the heart of the party’s most
important goal, that is, its legislative veto. Here we see that the party’s aim in
negotiating the contractual Sejm was subverted by hubris. It wrongly assumed
that the support of its satellite coalition partners was unconditional. Again,
evidence of flawed evaluation and a failure to find out the most basic intentions
of its coalition partners supports Przeworski’s analysis.
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If PZPR actors were the strategic far-sighted players posited by Colomer, we
would expect them to have engaged in a vigorous election campaign designed to
ensure the maximum seat share it could reap under the terms of the electoral deal
agreed at the Round Table. Specifically, we would expect the PZPR to use its
superior financial and organizational resources to get its election campaign off to
an early start with selection conventions and registration of candidates completed
ahead of the opposition; we would expect that PZPR strategists would have used
the party’s control of the media to promote its candidates and to dominate the
campaign agenda; if PZPR strategists were alerted to tactical mistakes made at
the Round Table, we would expect to see them attempting to rectify those
mistakes where possible. In other words, we would expect them to react and
counter-react to the moves in the game.
If, however, we look to what flows from Przeworski’s analysis we do not expect
to see PZPR actors engaging in an active campaign. The party’s main strategic
focus was on securing its legislative veto in the contractual Sejm and the estab-
lishment of a strong presidency, both of which were expected to ensure the
PZPR’s continued control in, what was envisaged as, a broadened dictatorship. In
reality, the campaign turned out to be of crucial importance to the PZPR precisely
because of its failure to ensure the effectiveness of its legislative, inbuilt, major-
ity in the contractual Sejm. However, given Przeworski’s hypothesis and the
expectations that flow from it, we do not expect that PZPR decision-makers
would have re-evaluated the electoral agreements and strategies that emerged at
the Round Table in the hope of being able to maximize the party’s performance.
The PZPR’S campaign
In a commentary written just a few months after the election, Paul Lewis notes
that the PZPR did not appear to have embraced the election campaign with any
degree of enthusiasm.1 Following the election some commentators said that the
PZPR had given up the ghost even before the campaign had started and that much
of the coalition’s election literature remained in party offices because no one had
bothered to distribute it. Lewis points out that the campaign was later criticized
by reformists within the party’s leadership for being slow and old fashioned, and
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many members were said to be bitter about the way the whole election had been
conceived, planned and executed.2 Lewis does not find this behaviour surprising:
The post-war Polish party had never been concerned with establishing polit-
ical dominance by relying purely on its own resources and had had little need
to perpetuate its position through elections. The primary interests of its staff,
activists and supporters had certainly not lain in this area, and it was hardly
surprising that the new atmosphere of political competition did not uncover
much enthusiasm or aptitude for it . . . . Given the agreement on the distribu-
tion of seats, it was probably not immediately evident to the ruling party that
it needed to contest the elections in quite the same way as the recently legalized
opposition.3
While Lewis may be correct in arguing that the PZPR was not naturally equipped
to fight election campaigns and that many of the party’s hierarchy may have
assumed that there was no danger given the distribution of seats, what concerns
us here is the admission that reformist elements within the party were unhappy
about the way the campaign was run. It is clear from interviews with senior PZPR
activists that this concern was voiced,4 so the question is why this concern did not
generate positive action. David M. Olson argues that the PZPR did not seem to
know how to campaign.5 As we have seen in earlier chapters, some senior party
members were sceptical about PZPR election prospects, but Olson points out that
confidence played a role in the party’s catastrophic election campaign. He argues
that the PZPR thought it would win about one-third of the Senate seats and that
non-Solidarnof- candidates would win about a third of the independent seats in
the Sejm.
Olson’s view that the PZPR thought itself well protected by the ratios among
the electoral compartments is supported by the views expressed by senior PZPR
Round Table negotiators interviewed in the course of research for this book.6
Olson talks of an assumption among party leaders that they did not need to cam-
paign. When it became apparent that there was a real danger that party candidates
were going to lose, Olson claims that both opposition and party elites interpreted
the PZPR’s inaction as stemming from a perceived lack of options and a sense of
desperation, rather than from any deliberate strategy. According to Olson ‘the
party presented a severe case of trained incapacity’.7 PZPR party spokesman Jan
Bisztyga remarked at the height of the campaign that the ‘party is not accustomed
to election battles like this’.8
The PZPR’s inbuilt campaign trap
Voytek Zubek points out that the PZPR’s own ideological platform contributed to
the creation of a campaign trap that ensnared the party in a debate over the least
ideologically advantageous issues from its perspective.9 The problem arose as a
direct consequence of the changes to the party leadership and hierarchy, which
was a sine qua non for the initiation of the Round Table process. The struggle
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between the reformers and the old guard had been accompanied by ideological
reassessments and condemnation of past mistakes.
However, as Zubek points out, while the ideological debate proved to be a most
effective means of defeating the conservative wing, it also added fuel to a debate
over the negative role of the PZPR in Poland. Party reformers perceived them-
selves as being radically different from the conservative wing and expected to be
seen as a completely different breed from their party opponents.10 However, up
until the end of the campaign, most of the Solidarnof- leadership refused to
acknowledge the distinction between the PZPR’s contemporary reformist leader-
ship and its past. By refusing to acknowledge differences between the reformers
and the conservatives, and by acting as if very little had changed in the party,
Solidarnof-manoeuvred the PZPR into a most uncomfortable campaign position.
On the one hand, party reformers spoke of the battles they had fought to bring
about the Round Table, while Solidarnof- both spoke and acted as if the reformist
leadership and its policies were just the most recent wave of crafty gimmicks
unleashed by the hard-pressed vanguard party. Solidarnof- operated a simple
campaign strategy. It characterized the party as the embodiment of all that was
evil in Poland, which had the effect of trapping both reformers and conservatives
alike in a hopelessly damaging debate over the definition of the degree of the
PZPR’s historical guilt.
The PZPR’s reforms
The casual approach to the campaign reflected a deep underlying mis-
conception of the relationship between rulers and ruled. Senior party and
government officials believed that the party would reap credit for its inaugu-
ration of the reform process.11
Frances Millard points out that PZPR strategists wrongly assumed that they
would be rewarded for their role in initiating the Round Table process.12 This view
was corroborated many times in the course of interviews with senior PZPR
Round Table negotiators, General Czes„aw Kiszczak among them:
I consider myself the father of the Round Table – I take responsibility for the
pluses and the minuses. The Round Table was the most important event to
help Poland change politically without killing people. The shops are full now
and people have full freedom. It was a detonator for the rest of the bloc, and
it brought about the end of the Imperium. The Round Table should have been
given a Nobel Prize. The creators of the Round Table from the government
side are hated. In that regard, the first place of honour goes to Kiszczak, and
the second place goes to Jaruzelski. Solidarnof- and the Church have
hijacked the Round Table.13
It is not difficult to understand how this expectation of public gratitude led
the party into a series of interconnected traps. Starting from the position that
the reformers expected to be thanked for having won out in the battle against the
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conservative wing of the party, they then went a step further and wanted recognition
for having allowed Solidarnof- to join, albeit in a limited fashion, the political
process. Basing their campaign on these two fundamentally flawed assumptions,
party strategists then proceeded to tell the exhausted Polish electorate that they
would have to be ready for the austerity necessary to get the Round Table bargain
off the ground. As George Sanford argues, there was considerable confusion dur-
ing the government-coalition’s badly organized electoral campaign. It emphasized
the socially unwelcome message that the public had to shoulder the burden of the
massive cost of implementing the Round Table Agreement, estimated at 5 billion
zlotys (US$ 1.5 billion).14
As the campaign wore on, party strategists became frustrated by their inability
to engage the Solidarnof-’s leadership in a focused, detailed debate concerning
economic reform. Given the fact that the imperative of economic reform was the
driving force behind the initiation of the Round Table talks in the first place,15 it is
not surprising that reform scenarios were key components of the PZPR’s electoral
platform since the party leadership had come to consist almost exclusively of
reformers, notwithstanding the only very recent conversion of some to their
reformist views. As Zubek quite rightly argues, the party hoped that, if
Solidarnof- were to engage in a debate on the actual detail of the reform mea-
sures, then the superiority of the party’s experience would impress many voters.16
However, what the party failed to anticipate was the Solidarnof- leadership’s
tactic of ignoring the PZPR challenge and its ability to adhere to its own cam-
paign message. Another example of the party’s inability to set the campaign
agenda was its failed attempt to play the foreign policy card against Solidarnof-,
who might have been perceived, by the public, to lack experience in this arena.
Solidarnof- anticipated this problem and simply refused to engage in a debate
about Poland’s foreign policy commitments and relationships in the post-Round
Table context.
The television debate between Miodowicz and Wa„ęsa
While the election campaign proper did not commence until after the completion
of the Round Table in April 1989, it is arguable that the real campaign began in
November 1988 in the context of the television debate between the leader of the
party’s trade union, Alfred Miodowicz, and Solidarnof- leader Lech Wa„ˇsa.
A number of facts surrounding how this debate occurred, expectations of its effect
on the PZPR’s public support as well as the details of the actual sanctioning of the
encounter, provide support for the view that the party operated on the basis of
false assumptions and misperceived strategies. The debate itself took place on 30
November and was watched by some 20 million viewers.17 Amazingly, those
involved in the affair from the PZPR’s side expected that it would lead to an
increase in support for the party. This assumption could not have been further
from reality. As Marek Kami‘ski argues, whereas some rise in support of the
communists was expected, the 30 November televised debate resulted in significant
falls in CBOS confidence indicators.
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Kami‘ski points out that the debate was intended to cautiously sound public
reaction to the first television appearance of Wa„ˇsa and help communist rulers
gauge the strength of its opposition.18 In fact, subsequent polls showed that 63.8
per cent of respondents thought that Wa„ˇsa had won the debate, while only 1.3
per cent believed that Miodowicz had won.19 Apart from the ‘surprise’ of Wa„ˇsa’s
approval ratings, the debate also produced another unexpected result. A substan-
tial attitude change towards the relegalization of Solidarnof- was also detected.
But in August, the difference in respondents supporting and opposing relegaliza-
tion was over 12 per cent, the figure jumped to over 32.4 per cent following the
encounter between the two trade union leaders.20
While it is hard enough to believe that those PZPR members involved in
arranging the debate between Wa„ˇsa and Miodowicz expected an increase in
party support to result, it is even more surprising to learn that the encounter went
ahead without the prior knowledge or approval of General Jaruzelski and the KC
PZPR. Evidence to support this claim is to be found in the minutes of a stormy
meeting of the Secretariat of the KC PZPR and its trade union ally, the OPZZ, in
early February 1989:
Com. Jaruzelski summarizing the debate expressed his hope that this meeting
between the Secretariat of the CC (KC) and the AATU [OPZZ or PZPR affil-
iated trade union] leadership will clear the atmosphere and will make people
aware of common dangers . . . .
Some issues emerged in the course of this debate that are worrying. AATU
comrades’ consciousness is burdened with a view that ‘the party betrayed
us.’We never used any argument against unions. The party went through deep
self-criticism. The unions were not criticized apart from polemics between
coms. Rakowski and Miodowicz. The party leadership is politically and
morally entitled to criticism. AATU comrades say that ‘the party betrayed’,
but this charge can be turned round [interview with Com. Miodowicz in
‘Perspektywy’]. We weren’t informed about your contacts with ‘S’
[Solidarnof-]. We didn’t surprise anybody with the ‘round table’. We took
this decision faced with increasing danger of strikes, possibility of Wa„ˇsa
getting ahead of us, and the need to play for time.
It was neither surprise nor betrayal. It was us who were taken by surprise by
com. Miodowicz’s initiative to have debate with Wa„ˇsa on television. This pub-
lic debate raised Wa„ˇsa’s status. Further developments stemmed from there. Up
to that point we defended a formula that there would be no ‘Solidarnof-’, that
conditions/grounds for it must evolve in future. Was that class attitude?21
By the autumn of 1988, the interests of the reformist wing of the PZPR and the
party’s trade union ally, the OPZZ, were clearly diverging. However, given the
sensitivity and complexity of what Jaruzelski and his coterie were attempting, it
is surprising, given the party’s control of the media, that Miodowicz was able
to take a decision to take part in a public television debate with Lech Wa„ˇsa
without the matter being considered by either Jaruzelski or the Politburo.
However, that is exactly what appears to have happened.
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Pe„czy‘ski and Kowalski argue that the electoral campaign showed not only a
fundamental lack of symmetry between the government side and the Solidarnof-
opposition, but also a basic difference in approach.22 Even though the govern-
mental coalition had overwhelming advantage in access to mass media and means
of expenditure, it did not capitalize on this asset:
Solidarnof- was allowed to start a mass circulation daily paper and some
weeklies and had the support of some independent (mostly Catholic)
weeklies. It had only 7 minutes a day on television (to the government coali-
tion’s 23 minutes) and very limited share of radio time. But it received
tremendous support from Polish language foreign radio stations, especially
Radio Free Europe, which was frankly partisan in its comments. It made up
its lack of other opportunities by the massive and imaginative use of posters,
stickers and leaflets which dominated Polish streets during the campaign.
They were financed by individual contributions to the election fund but
also by foreign aid, much criticized by the Communist press (like outside
broadcasting) as ‘foreign interference’ although it was not against the law.
The Solidarnof^-organized election meetings were far more numerous and
better attended; the government coalition candidates were scarcely visible in
public.23
This sense of the PZPR’s almost frozen inertia at a time when decisive action was
required is visible in exchanges between a disgruntled team of OPZZ leaders at a
meeting with the Secretariat of the KC PZPR in February 1989. The exchanges
highlight how unprepared many elements of the party were for the impact of
Solidarnof-’s new-gained access to the media. Widespread concern and disap-
proval of that media access was expressed at this meeting, while many leading
figures voiced worries about the effect of the end of censorship.
It is clear, in the context of accusations, that the PZPR strategists behind the
Round Table project were selective with information about the extent of its con-
tacts with Solidarnof-, that even the reformist dominated leadership was divided
on how the new relationship with Solidarnof- should be managed. The meeting
took place on 9 February, a day after a meeting of the Round Table’s subtable on
the economy. The OPZZ delegation, which was led by Alfred Miodowicz, was
clearly angered by the television coverage of the subtable, in particular, by the
manner in which the OPZZ statements were edited. The minutes note that the
vice-president of the OPZZ, Com. Wac„aw Martyniuk, was present at the Round
Table subtable on 8 February:
Having been present at yesterday’s meeting of the economy group [I] had the
impression that it was a great seminar for economy professors. [The]
Opposition partners were perfectly prepared. After six statements and a
declaration read by Bugaj [Solidarnof- representative] our side was only
clarifying, we were not aggressive . . . . The director completely ignored our
unions . . . . The television transmits the full text of Bugaj’s declaration and
only one-third of mine. This is a manipulation of our unions.24
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A Politburo spokesman, Com. Franciszek Ciemny, offered the view that the PZPR
side was ineffective at the Round Table meeting on the economy:
Our side lacked firing power. There was none of it in Professor Kaczmarek’s
statement. We should have determined people in all the groups, fighters,
ready to defend socialism. The opposition acts with arrogance, does not
abstain from sharp criticism, caddish behaviour, scoffing. We keep quiet, we
don’t retort. Why are our representatives so poorly prepared; only the AATU
[official trade union] people defend the agreed position.25
Prime Minister Mieczys„aw Rakowski was not concerned by Solidarnof-’s strong
and televised performance at the economic table meeting. Rakowski threw cold
water over concerns that the PZPR negotiators lacked vibrancy and dismissed
Solidarnof- negotiator Ryszard Bugaj’s analysis of the economic crisis in Poland
as nothing new. He also implies that Deputy Prime Minister Seku„a’s non-
attendance at the meeting was tactical. Clearly, Rakowski is confident that the
PZPR had the situation under control:
The comrades are excited by yesterday’s meeting of the economy group. Too
early. It’s only the beginning. The declaration read by Bugaj indicates that
‘the emperor is naked’. Everybody was talking about it as far as the begin-
ning of the eighties. Deputy Prime Minister Seku„a purposely did not appear
yesterday. In spite of shortcomings of our economic programme nobody will
get anything more by some magic trick. If we want to fit the opposition into
shared responsibility we have to give up something, preserving however
unity in our camp. We have no illusions as to ideological nature of the
opposition including the constructive side.26
Registration and candidate selection
Given the internal battles within the PZPR between reformers and hardliners, it
is perhaps not surprising in retrospect that the party’s main focus after the Round
Table should be on selling the agreement to its own members. Lewis observes that
the communists took less note of the election campaign and were more concerned
with the National Conference of PZPR delegates which met early in May.27 Even
so, it is somewhat surprising that the PZPR manifesto was not published until 29
May, less than a week before polling day. Pe„czy‘ski and Kowalski argue that the
Solidarnof- leadership was initially pessimistic about its campaign prospects,
given the party’s many advantages in terms of resources and organization.28
However, that perception began to change.
In terms of election preparedness, Solidarnof- began to show its organizational
efficiency. Almost a month before the party submitted its list of candidates for
registration to run in the election, Solidarnof- had its complete list of candidates
ready. As if hitting the ground limping and late, rather than early and running
was not bad enough, the PZPR used the suicidal tactic of fielding numerous
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candidates in the seats assigned to them. As Sanford notes, this tactic ‘divided up
what proved to be their low vote in the equivalent of primaries without doing
much to enhance their democratic credentials’.29 In terms of strategy and tactics,
Solidarnof- played a masterstroke by selecting 100 candidates for the 100-seat
Senate election and endorsing a limited and, in many cases, single candidate in
the seats it was allowed to contest in the Sejm election. Sanford’s résumé of the
list of registered candidates is illuminating and, once again, highlights the PZPR’s
gaffe prone approach to fighting election campaigns:
The final number of 558 registered candidates for the 100 Senate seats was
made up as follows: 186 PZPR (whittled down from an original total of about
500 nominations), 90 ZSL [Peasant Party], 69 SD [Democratic Party], 10 PAX
[Catholic Groups], 73 non-party, 100 Solidarnof- and 21 other opposition
groups (including 5 KPN, one Union of Real Politics and even one Orange
Alternative!). As far as the Sejm was concerned the PZPR had a participation
explosion which it could not handle; it started off with 1,200 individuals vying
for nomination for its 156 non-National List seats, the ZSL with 217 for its 67
seats, the SD with 78 for its 27 seats. The PZPR ended up with generally
between three and six candidates competing for each of their assigned Sejm
seats. These figures compared very badly with the almost total [Solidarnof-]
Civic Committee discipline in endorsing a limited, or even single number of
candidates per seat despite one or two local conflicts.30
Personality-first strategy
The political establishment has designed its election campaign to blur
distinctions between official candidates and those on the Solidarnof- ticket.
The Solidarnof- Citizens’ Committee is determined to keep these distinctions
clear, and to make the elections a contest between the tested Solidarnof-
team, with its evolutionary program to change the system, and the defenders
of the status quo masquerading as independents.31
Writing in May 1989, Radio Free Europe’s Louisa Vinton notes that, cognizant of
its own lack of popularity, the communist party establishment decided to run a
strangely apolitical campaign whose main aim was to increase the confusion of
voters in elections whose rules are already extremely complicated.32
‘Qualifications not Affiliations’ was the theme of the party conference while the
PZPR campaign slogan was ‘Choose according to ability not affiliation’.33 As the
journalist Krzysztof Wolicki remarked on a Solidarnof- Citizens’ Committee
radio programme, ‘Finding a candidate from the communist party who will admit
that he is a candidate from the communist party is an enormously difficult task’.34
Olson concurs with Vinton’s view.35 He argues that the PZPR had no leading
personality, unlike Solidarnof-, who branded their candidate list as Lech’s team.
All Solidarnof- candidates had their photograph taken with Lech Wa„ˇsa and
that was the only picture that appeared on hoardings throughout the campaign.
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The PZPR adopted the opposite tactic and did not endorse its own candidates in
the Sejm or the Senate elections. There were no advertisements in the party’s
name. Olson argues that according to participants on both sides, the party’s
abstention from the visible campaign seemed to stem from the fact that there was
a conscious decision to shift the emphasis away from both the party organization
and its symbols:
Its candidates stressed their personal accomplishments rather than their party
ties or the party’s record and platform . . . . One leading party figure said,
‘We did not use organizational symbols . . . . We wanted the talented people of
the party to win and not the party symbol or its organizational seal’.36
Solidarnof- shrewdly adopted the opposite tactic and argued that what mattered
was the organization that nominated people. Voters were invited to treat the
election as a plebiscite for Solidarnof- or for ‘really existing socialism’.37 In
order to highlight the rejection of the communist system and to prevent the elec-
torate being sidetracked by personalities running for the communist party, voters
were asked to strike out all but the Solidarnof- candidates on the ballot paper. As
we have seen earlier, the PZPR’s national list fell foul of this call with only 2 of
the 35 names nominated by the party gaining more than the required 50 per cent
of the popular vote on the first round.
Speaking with his political scientist’s hat on, Professor Jerzy Wiatr believes
that it is arguable that if the PZPR had run a more personalized campaign around
the personality and record of General Jaruzelski, the campaign result might well
have been affected:
Then there is another factor, which has never been tested – Jaruzelski’s
personal popularity! The election was never run as Jaruzelski’s team versus
Wa„ˇsa’s team. It was Wa„ˇsa’s team versus the conglomerate of the old
timers, with Jaruzelski keeping a kind of a distance and being earmarked for
the next president . . . . This is a factor that was never investigated . . . but con-
sidering the fact that Jaruzelski was far more popular than the party or any
of its leaders – the fact that he put himself out of the picture – helped
Solidarnof-. If it had been more Jaruzelski versus Wa„ˇsa and had the game
been played earlier . . . and if Wa„ˇsa had pictures showing him with the
various candidates . . . had Jaruzelski pictures with his people – the result
might have been better for Jaruzelski’s people!38
Crossing off PZPR candidates
The catastrophic impact of the retention of the crossing-off system of voting has
been discussed in Chapter 5. As was noted earlier, the PZPR’s 35-candidate national
or country list was almost totally wiped out as a result of the crossing-off formula.
We also saw how PZPR negotiators were advised against the retention of the sys-
tem both before and during the Round Table negotiations, but chose to ignore this
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advice. At the PZPR’s election convention on 4 and 5 May, two delegates voiced the
fear that was probably at the back of most delegate’s minds: that voters could cross
out all the PZPR candidates on the ballot. Vinton reminds her readers that the PZPR
insisted at the Round Table that candidates would be listed alphabetically on the
ballot and that no information about them except their name would appear.39
According to Vinton, the ‘authorities quite rightly fear that many voters will
automatically cross out candidates whom they identify with the communist party’:40
Although it may be tactically shrewd, the political establishment’s wager on
‘personalities’ in an election campaign designed to convince the public that
political affiliation is unimportant could backfire. The attempt to suggest that
the official coalition’s candidates share all of Solidarnof-’s good points and
that the party’s program could be mistaken for Solidarnof-’s constitutes a
remarkably compromising admission that the official coalition has nothing
of its own to offer. In this situation, voters could easily decide that they pre-
ferred the genuine article. In addition . . . should the official coalition’s media
campaign continue to conceal the political orientation of candidates appear-
ing on the ballots reserved for the establishment, voters might decide it was
impossible to distinguish among them and simply cross them all out.41
There can be no doubt that if Radio Free Europe’s Warsaw correspondent was
able to predict the possibility that PZPR candidates would be crossed off by vot-
ers, party hierarchy was also aware of this possibility. The party’s failure to
respond to fears about the possibility of its candidates being crossed off is yet
another example of it not attempting to rectify mistakes or suboptimal choices
made at the Round Table. Writing on the eve of the election, Louisa Vinton noted
that the most obvious and important feature of the campaign had been the
political collapse of the Communist party with some of its leaders facing the real
possibility of a humiliating public rejection:42
The key problem here is that the names of these establishment leaders were
put on the so-called national list: the people on this list are running unop-
posed for seats in the Sejm. The list was designed to ensure that the leaders
of the party and its political allies retained their seats in the country’s main
legislative body; the lack of opposition appeared to guarantee that outcome.
As a result of a possible oversight, however, the certainty that the party leaders
will be elected has been undermined by a general provision that all
candidates must win at least 50 per cent of the votes cast in the first round in
order to win seats in parliament. This requirement applies to the candidates
on the national list but, because they face no opposition at all, they cannot
run in the second round. This opportunity has been spotted by both the oppo-
sition and the public, and it is quite likely that some prominent political per-
sonalities may struggle to be elected. This situation may reflect carelessness
or overconfidence on the part of the establishment’s campaign organizers. It
also suggests, however, disarray within the establishment, a factor that could
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have major political consequences if the party leaders were defeated in the
election. This disarray has been noticeable for some time and has been
openly admitted by various activists and officials. The campaign has brought
it into the open. Many observers think that the political eclipse of the current
establishment, particularly the party, is inevitable.43
‘Intricate election mechanisms, simple choices’44
Ultimately, the PZPR’s strategy of confusing the electorate was a self-defeating
mechanism. As Louisa Vinton noted on 2 June, two days before the election: ‘The
mechanics of the elections to the Sejm and the Senate are very complicated. This
design was intentional and reflects the authorities’ general effort to confuse voters
as to who represents them.’45
Confusing and complicated as the multiple ballots were, Solidarnof- was able
to ride roughshod over the party’s tactic with a very simple instruction to voters
to cross off all names except those of the Solidarnof- candidates. This was made
simple by Solidarnof-’s other strategic decision to limit the number of candidates
running in each electoral compartment. In contrast, PZPR supporters would have
had the much more difficult task of identifying their candidates, given the deci-
sion not to include party credentials on the ballot. Furthermore, the ‘explosion’ of
PZPR candidates from which voters were forced to choose, exacerbated the prob-
lem. Solidarnof-’s Citizens’ Committees all over Poland sent supporters out to
train Poles how to mark the ballots and, on election day, its supporters sat outside
polling stations under eye-catching Solidarnof- banners advising voters to cross
off all but the Solidarnof- names.46 Solidarnof-’s new election gazette, Gazeta
Wyborcza, devoted a daily column to explaining electoral procedures, while local
Citizens’ Committees published ‘crib sheets’, small leaflets with all the names of
the Citizens’ Committees’ candidates, for a particular region so that voters could
carry them with them into the voting booth. One inventive Citizens’ Committee
in Pozna‘ told would-be voters that its crib sheets would be valid as a raffle ticket,
if turned in at election booths on polling day.47
It is hard to conceive of the PZPR doing itself any more electoral harm than it
managed during the election campaign between April and June 1989. Despite hav-
ing control of the media and huge organizational resources, the PZPR fell at every
campaign hurdle. Solidarnof- got its campaign off to a much earlier start having
registered its candidates a full month ahead of the party. The PZPR defeated the
possibility of retaining its core vote by its personality-first policy. This tactic also
allowed Solidarnof- to pursue a very simple campaign agenda, that is, to invite the
electorate to regard the election as a simple plebiscite on the role of the commu-
nist party in Poland. By failing to limit the number of its candidates running in
each electoral compartment, it confused the electorate and provided Solidarnof-
with the opportunity to exhort voters to make the simple choice of voting for the
Solidarnof- candidate – singular not plural. By deliberately making voting a com-
plicated procedure, it also created the opportunity for Solidarnof- to legitimately
call for its supporters to cross off the party’s candidates.
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Apart from all of these errors, the party set out under the false assumption that
it would reap the benefit of having initiated the process of reform. This assump-
tion was compounded by the fact that the reformist wing, which had pushed for
the Round Table, assumed that it would receive differential treatment and respect
from the public, who would recognize that the party reformers were not the same
as hardliners. This assumption allowed Solidarnof- to set the campaign agenda
and thwarted the reformists who hoped to show that they were a different and
more deserving breed than their hardline colleagues. Finally, it is clear that the
party simply ignored the warnings, from both within its ranks and from other
sources that its national list could potentially collapse as a result of voters
crossing off its candidates. In a word, the PZPR failed to update its information
or rectify strategic mistakes made at the Round Table.
The PZPR and the Catholic Church
‘They drank a sea of vodka with Ciosek and the others’.48
Stanis„aw Ciosek explained that
We started to talk to the church about the need for social dialogue almost
immediately after martial law [December 1981]. One important thought. For
obvious reasons – the structure of the party – hierarchical and stable – it was
easier for the party to talk to a similar structure in terms of hierarchy . . . . It
was easier to believe what the church was doing because of certain similari-
ties and credibility. Those two structures were able to understand each other
quite well. It was easier for the party than talking to this new wild
Solidarnof- movement! The Solidarnof- movement was unpredictable – the
party was talking to the church very regularly in the 1980s. The church was
the advocate of Solidarnof- but we felt that it understood the party. The role
of the church was gigantic. The Round Table agreement would be impossible
to achieve without the church mediation. And that’s very specific to Poland.49
In retrospect, it might appear counter-intuitive to argue that the PZPR made the fatal
error of expecting its apparent enemy, the Catholic Church, to remain neutral during
the election campaign. However, the fact that this was the case is not so difficult to
comprehend if one looks at the issue from the perspective of those party negotiators
who had the closest contact with the Church throughout the 1980s. In the context of
tracking the gap over a range of issues between the PZPR’s expectations of strategies
or relationships and actual outcomes, perhaps its most fatal error was its failure to
fully understand the nature of its relationship with the Catholic hierarchy.
As is clear from Stanis„aw Ciosek’s remarks quoted earlier, the PZPR thought
of the Catholic Church as an organization very similar to the party. Implicit in
Ciosek’s remarks is the view that the church was not ‘wild’ like Solidarnof-. It
perceived the church as reliable and predictable; it understood the party and they
could speak the common language of power. In a word, Ciosek thought he could
do business with the church, and as is clear from Bishop Orszulik’s memoirs
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which are cited later, the church thought it could do business with the party.
Ultimately, however, while the bishops might have ‘drunk a sea of vodka with
Ciosek’, the Polish hierarchy never lost sight of what side it was on.
Bishop Alojzy Orszulik was one of the key figures in the contacts between the
Catholic Church and the PZPR:
The Church initiated the talks . . . . What induced the Church to adopt this posi-
tion? The late archbishop D‰browski once said: ‘At a time when the society
was disposed of its subjectivity and voice, out of necessity, the Church had to
take its place and, at the same time, paved the way for a socio-political
dialogue.’ The Church looked for peaceful solutions – reached through
dialogue. It saw its role in reconciling two opponents: on the one side
those ruling, on the other an embittered society. The Church initiatives did not
mean that it was willing to compromise with the authorities to the
disadvantage of the society, as some dissidents claimed. The Church defended
the opposition; this is why it was accused by the communists of anti-State
activities.
Despite the communists’ critical attitude towards the Church, they welcomed
the idea of talks on the social accord. Why?
First, the desperation of the society was such that there was a risk of
extreme upheaval. The authorities realized that they would not be able to
suppress riots, even with the use of force.
Second, they could not find a partner for talks among opposition circles.
According to the communists, the Lech Wa„ˇsa-led hierarchy of Solidarnof-
was too radical because its main aim was to deprive the communists of
power. There was no common ground for bargaining. On the other hand, they
realized that the social order could not be restored unless there was cooperation
with Solidarnof-.
Thus, the Church initiative enhanced prospects of getting out of a deadlock.
The communist authorities hoped that the Church would have beneficial
influence on Wa„ˇsa and his advisers.50
After martial law, the party was in desperate need of an interlocutor. The church
was the obvious and, from the PZPR’s perspective, the safest and only choice.
Arguably, the church was at its strongest during this time. The party was danger-
ously at odds with the very workers it claimed to embody. In showing financial
generosity and tolerance to the church, the party sought to ease the steam from
the pressure cooker and, by doing so, retain a line of communication with society.
Church historian Peter Raina argues
There is no denying the fact that for the authorities the Church became the
only partner for dialogue. Moreover, through Church mediation, the authori-
ties sought contacts with the society, which was indispensable for solving
contentious issues. This was confirmed by secret talks between the authorities
and the Church.51
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This Orszulik/Raina account of the Secretary of the Episcopate – Archbishop
D‰browski’s discussions with internal affairs minister, General Czes„aw Kiszczak
clearly indicates that the PZPR expected that the church authorities would
reciprocate its ‘kindness’:52
We are concerned about the deterioration of Church–State relations. The
form and contents of the 204th Press Conference of the Episcopate upset us.
Bishops want to exacerbate the situation. This gives both your enemies and
our enemies’ grounds for attack. The Episcopate’s memorial from this con-
ference is ruthless and unpleasant. In the communiqué of the Press Office as
well as that of the Primate, there shouldn’t be any such notions. They are
dangerous endeavours – one more step and we will face a confrontation . . . .
Is any confrontation necessary? Who needs it? At present, the Church
enjoys privileges. For example: seminaries are full; the financial situation of
priests is very good – they pay symbolic taxes; the building of sacral premises
is proceeding; and the churches are full of worshippers who are not disturbed.
We do not object to continuation of church-going practices because we real-
ize the positive role of the Church. Now, when losses are not to be recovered
due to a severe winter, priests empoison people’s mind against the authorities.
After all, the authorities do everything for the people to live better lives.
Nobody starves, nobody feels cold, and people have clothes to put on. For the
good of the people, the Church should support the authorities.
Does the Church help us? Yes, in churches ‘Our Lord, Free Motherland,
gives us back’ is sung, as during tsar’s or Hitler’s times. A conclusion is
simple – one does not work for the oppressor but boycotts it. Wa„ˇsa identifies
himself with the underground. The Church sides with Wa„ˇsa – consequently,
it supports the underground too. . . .
We need each other – we depend on each other. We won’t escape from that.
We must search for an agreement and not look for the confrontation.53
This perception that the PZPR and the Catholic hierarchy were mutually dependent
is a constantly reiterated motif in the exchanges between party negotiators and
church representatives throughout the 1980s.54 It is also clear that Stanis„aw
Ciosek, who conducted most of the negotiations with the hierarchy, believed him-
self to be doing a deal with the Church. The church’s role throughout the 1980s,
especially during the Round Table, is a complex one, and while the church was
indeed wielding enormous power, it could not be seen to be visibly attempting to
control Solidarnof- or the opposition. Leaving aside whatever aspirations the
Catholic hierarchy might have harboured, Solidarnof- was no monolith; it was
made up of a wide range of disparate influences. Solidarnof- was a broad church
ranging from atheistic Marxists to Catholic fundamentalists with would-be
Thatcherites in the wings. The Catholic hierarchy was too shrewd to allow itself
to overtly assume the role of speaking for the opposition.
In September 1988, during the intense series of meetings prior to the start of
the Round Table, Bishop Orszulik, once again, reminded Ciosek that, if there was
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to be an agreement, it must be concluded with the workers and not with the
hierarchy:
On 13 September 1988, Stanis„aw Ciosek met Father Orszulik for a longer
conversation. Ciosek was talking about discontent among the party members
owing to Kiszczak’s meeting with Wa„ˇsa and objections towards Jaruzelski’s
‘inconsistency and weakness’. Ciosek counted on the Church to exert a calm-
ing pressure on Wa„ˇsa’s postulates. Father Orszulik did not see it happening.
He expressed his opinion that the sooner Solidarnof- became legalized the
better for the welfare of the country. Moreover, he said that the issue of trade
union pluralism should be discussed directly with competent people [i.e. the
union].55
Later in the same note from Orszulik’s diary, the bishop draws attention to
Ciosek’s belief that he was doing a deal with the church:
‘The authorities hope to reach an agreement with the Church’, Ciosek added.
I said that I had stated many times that with regard to workers the author-
ities should reach an agreement with the workers rather than the Church
hierarchy.56
Despite being regularly reminded that the church’s role was that of go-between
rather than dealmaker, the PZPR, and Stanis„aw Ciosek, in particular, continued
to believe that they were doing a deal with the hierarchy. This perception of doing
a deal and the long period of close contact led many senior party figures to
believe that the church would not intervene to directly support Solidarnof- in the
course of the election campaign. Politburo member Andrzej Werblan explains that
the PZPR expected that the church would remain neutral during the election
campaign because of its self-perceived generous treatment of the church in the
early 1980s:
WERBLAN: [The party expected that the church would remain neutral in the
campaign] . . . because of the fact that the relationship between the church and
the party – during martial law – had been perfect. The government made a lot
of conciliatory moves towards the church.
HAYDEN: And they expected payback?
WERBLAN: Of course! The party had supported the building of churches. There
were more churches built during martial law than during the previous
400 years . . . . The government thought that the church would not want to
enable or facilitate dramatic political change, but this was a mistake. But the
priests felt it was possible to go further. So the question is: did direct rela-
tionships between the party and the bishops affect things? Of course it did.
Today, bishops don’t want to say that this is true but they drank a sea of vodka
with Ciosek and the others.57
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Professor Janusz Reykowski was the PZPR’s co-chair of the subtable on Political
Reform at the Round Table:
One thing that was under evaluated – it was believed that Solidarnof- did not
have an appropriate logistic for organizing its campaign. The argument against
this was that the church would help Solidarnof-, and it will make up for the
lack of a political structure. Some very influential members of the leadership
claimed that it would not happen – that the church would be neutral except a
few priests. The church, as an institution, would remain neutral. I think it was
in the last years of the 1980s when the relationship between the church and
party officials was very good and cordial – the church does not like to hear it
now. It is politically incorrect to say it now. But at that time, the party leader-
ship tended to believe that they had real friends in the church [laughing]. I
remember very positive statements from General Jaruzelski about Cardinal
Glemp and his attitudes. And as we know, it was the very opposite. The church
gave a structure for Solidarnof- . . . I didn’t think anything – I had no experi-
ence. I didn’t know church people. So I simply accepted what I was told.
These people have so much contact with the church for so long. So probably
they know what they say. In my initial document [anticipating the campaign]
was the expectation that the church would be a sort of infrastructure for
Solidarnof-, but they said no – so I thought maybe they know!58
This belief that the church would remain neutral during the campaign led to an
overestimation of the electoral outcome in rural constituencies where the PZPR
wrongly assumed that Solidarnof- would do poorly. Party strategists were calculat-
ing on the basis that Solidarnof- was a largely urban phenomenon with no organi-
zation or appeal in rural constituencies. Whatever the right or wrongs of this
calculation, the PZPR’s failure to factor in the powerful role that would be played by
rural priests meant that it completely miscalculated its support in rural areas. Jerzy
Wiatr argued, as recorded earlier, that senior PZPR strategists hoped that Solidarnof-’s
weakness in rural Poland would compensate in the election for the Senate for its
strength in the urban conglomeration.59 Wiatr argued that it was thought that the
backward provinces would give the seats to the party. However, while these
provinces were weak from Solidarnof-’s point of view, they were also the most
Catholic. So, while Solidarnof- was weak, the Church was strong, and the party’s
failure to anticipate the role the church would play in supporting the union meant that
the outcome in these provinces was even worse from the party’s point of view than
provinces like Warsaw and Katowice (where the party expected to do badly).
While calculating the differential impact of the Catholic Church on urban and
rural voting patterns in the June 1989 election is something of a gargantuan task,
analysis of the actual results shows that the strongest relative support for Solidarnof-
was concentrated in poor, rural areas and not in the traditional strongholds of the
urban working class.60 Heyns and Bia„ecki’s study of the Polish election results was
based on election returns published in the summer of 1989 in Gazeta Wyborcza and
in Tygodnik Solidarnof-, as well as statistical data available from the voivodships
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and survey results from the 1987 Social Structure and Mobility Project sponsored
by the Polish Academy of Sciences. Heyns and Bia„ecki acknowledge that aggre-
gate data provide a meagre basis for testing the effects of specific social character-
istics on voting behaviour. While individual-level voting data was not available, the
authors claim that the models that support their conclusions are quite robust irre-
spective of the measures used.61 In 23 of the 49 voivodships, the estimated number
of votes for Solidarnof- cast by independent farmers exceeded the number cast by
workers, despite the fact that workers outnumber peasants in Poland as a whole.62
According to Heyns and Bia„ecki, even with other individual characteristics
controlled, there are strong residual differences between the workers and the
peasants. Polish peasants in 1987 were more hostile to the system of government
and more supportive of change than were workers who claimed to have been
members of Solidarnof- in 1981.63 In describing support for Solidarnof-, Heyns
and Bia„ecki argue that the single variable most significantly and consistently
related to aggregate voting behaviour is location in one of the rural south-eastern
voivodships.64 Polish sociologists have provided a number of potential explana-
tions for the strength of Solidarnof-’s support in the south-eastern part of the
country. First, the region had experienced substantial emigration, but little immi-
gration since the Second World War. Second, collective farms were virtually non-
existent, and, third, the population was reputedly the most traditional and the most
committed to Catholicism in the country.65 In the context of the south-eastern part
of Poland, Heyns and Bia„ecki point out that
In the countryside, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the local
parish for communication and mobilization. Under the leadership of Bishop
Tokarczuk, who has the reputation of being very sympathetic to opposition
organizations, the church was crucial in facilitating the organization of civic
committees in this region.66
It seems clear that the PZPR made three fundamental errors in relation to their
estimation of support in rural constituencies. First, they wrongly assumed that
Solidarnof- would not penetrate the rural vote because they perceived the union
as an urban voice. Second, they ignored the fact that there is a long-standing
tradition of political opposition in the south-east of Poland. The PZPR’s own
political scientist, Jerzy Wiatr, had shown that these voivodships were more likely
to abstain from voting or strike out names of state candidates in the elections held
in the 1950s.67 Finally, the PZPR simply did not calculate on a rational basis when
it failed to consider the potential impact of the Catholic clergy actively supporting
Solidarnof- in the election campaign.
Conclusion: ‘the party is not accustomed to 
election battles like this’68
If ever there was a time when the PZPR could have displayed strategic, far-sighted
behaviour, it would have been during the electoral campaign. This was a period
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when party far-sighted strategists would have evaluated the outcome of the Round
Table dialogue and agreement in order to assess what needed to be done in the
context of the new arena of competition. As we have seen, warnings about the
upcoming electoral contest came from both within and outside the party.
However, as we have also seen in the foregoing pages, there is no evidence that
PZPR negotiators attempted to rectify any of the strategic errors made at the
Round Table. In fact, while warnings might have been voiced they were simply
ignored by the relevant actors. The campaign did not matter to strategists who
understood the new game in terms of the legislative veto they had secured with
the 65–35 division of seats in the contractual Sejm. The PZPR’s political hege-
mony was secured because of its inbuilt legislative dominance and its control of
the presidency.
It is arguable that the PZPR’s election campaign did not collapse, as such,
because it never really began. Party spokesman Jan Bisztyga’s comment that the
party was not accustomed to election battles seems like a case of stating the blind-
ingly obvious. In so far as there was a PZPR campaign, it was based on two
fundamentally flawed assumptions. PZPR reformers wrongly assumed that there
would be a payback for their defeat of the hardliners within the party.
Furthermore, they expected to be able to use this victory as a persuasive cam-
paign argument. It was also assumed that, as well as rewarding party reformers
for initiating the reform process, the Polish public would be happy to make the
necessary sacrifices in order to facilitate the implementation of the economic
reform package agreed at the Round Table. Clearly, these actors had become so
engrossed in their own internal political struggles that they were not responsive
to the atmosphere and feelings within society. In simple terms, the PZPR
expected a return, but did not base this expectation on a rational or informed
analysis of the public mood.
The evidence in relation to the conduct of the campaign is clear: the PZPR did
not put its logistical and financial superiority to good use. Solidarnof- beat the
party hands down with a fraction of the funds and resources. The analysis of
the discussions at the KC PZPR meetings at the start of the Round Table indicates
that the party was clearly not prepared for the impact Solidarity would make when
it was given access to the media. The fact that the OPZZ’s Alfred Miodowicz
arranged to engage with Lech Wa„ˇsa in a televised debate without the prior
knowledge of General Jaruzelski is astonishing and, once again, confirms the fact
that PZPR players were not coherently evaluating the impact of moves. They were
not reacting and counter-reacting but were being dragged along by the tide of
change they had unleashed.
The personality-first strategy left the PZPR dangerously exposed to
Solidarnof-’s instruction to voters to cross off all but the union’s candidates.
Designed as a way of convincing the electorate that organization or party mem-
bership did not matter, the strategy allowed Solidarnof- to argue the opposite. The
union told the electorate that there was only one campaign issue – the historical
record of the PZPR. Again, it is clear that the party embarked on an ill-informed
strategy based on the false assumption that society would distinguish between
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Polish communism and Polish communists. In conclusion, it seems clear that the
PZPR’s election campaign is best understood as a series of strategic mistakes
that resulted from poor information, short-sighted interests and an inability to
play the game on a new pitch. It follows that the PZPR’s conduct of the electoral
campaign supports Przeworski’s analysis.
Strategic friendships
The relationship between the PZPR and the Catholic Church deserves far greater
treatment than it has received here. The brevity is justified, however, as the only
issue we are concerned with here is whether or not the PZPR was strategic in its
expectations of that relationship. It has been clearly demonstrated that the expec-
tation of some PZPR actors that the church would remain neutral during the elec-
tion campaign was neither rational nor supported by the behaviour of the church.
Clearly, the opinion of the party’s chief church contact, Stanis„aw Ciosek, is cru-
cial here. Arguably, he became too close to his church contacts, most especially
Father Alojzy Orszulik. This closeness was not confined to Ciosek alone; General
Jaruzelski was known to be an admirer of the Polish Primate Cardinal Glemp.
Janusz Reykowski testifies to this in the interviews analysed here.
The rejection of Reykowski’s assessment that the church would support
Solidarity in the election campaign is further confirmation of the repeated failure
of senior PZPR negotiators to listen to their own advisers. It is also evidence of
some sort of wishful thinking that seemed to dog the PZPR’s ability to make ratio-
nal evaluations about expected behaviour even when they were dealing with an
avowed enemy. This expectation that the church would support the party in the
election campaign was as unfounded as Rakowski’s expectation that the ‘don’t
knows’ would vote for the PZPR or as inexplicable as its assessment of its social
support prior to the Round Table. The view that the church would remain neutral
in the campaign, combined with the PZPR’s wrong assessment of its chances in
rural areas, proved devastating for the party. Heyns and Bia„ecki’s analysis of the
pattern of support for Solidarnof- clearly demonstrates the degree to which the
party’s assessments and expectations were wrong.69 It is also clear that there was
information available to the party, such as Wiatr’s work on patterns of abstention
and crossing off, which shows that the party, once again, acted on the basis of
misinformation. It, therefore, follows that the PZPR’s conduct of its relationship
with the Catholic hierarchy is further evidence of a repeated pattern of flawed
evaluations, failure or indeed refusal to update information which places the
PZPR’s relationship with the Catholic Church into a category of behaviour best
understood or explained by Przeworski’s hypothesis.
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This analysis set out to discover why the Polish communist party lost power in
Poland over the summer of 1989. Given the fact that neither the PZPR nor
Solidarnof- anticipated the fall of communism at the outset of the Round Table
process, the question addressed was what factors best explain the collapse of the
party’s hegemony so shortly after its negotiators had concluded a deal they hoped
would enable the government to carry out its economic reform programme. The
question is an important one because, prior to the collection of data, it was
intuitively apparent that PZPR negotiators appeared to have adopted positions and
strategies during the Round Table process that led to suboptimal institutional
outcomes for the party. So if it is assumed that the PZPR were rational actors and
did not deliberately decide to hand power over to the Solidarnof^-led opposition,
what explains the behaviour and strategic choices that brought about the collapse
of the party’s power? The question is, therefore, significant from two perspectives.
First, political scientists failed to predict the possibility of the collapse of
communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the later 1980s. It is
consequently important to attempt to construct an analysis with the potential to
highlight the factors that might have given an intimation of the impending collapse.
The issue is also important because, superficially at least, it seems to cast doubt
on the validity of the assumption that PZPR negotiators were rational actors.
While it is not necessary to repeat the discussion in Chapter 2, this volume is
a direct response to the debate between Przeworski and Colomer who take opposing
views on the issue of whether well-informed regime actors will promote
processes that lead to democratization. Two key issues arise out of the Colomer
and Przeworski debate. The first is the question of whether actors will operate on
the basis of a ‘farsighted criterion of choice’1 during periods of regime crisis
given the long-term consequences for the rules of the game, while the second
issue is whether transition results from the mistakes of regime liberalizers as
Przeworski hypothesizes.2 These two issues were directly addressed in the course
of this volume. Colomer’s argument in relation to far-sighted time horizons is a
central plank of his analysis of the process of democratic transition in Eastern
Europe. It is also an important part of his rejection of Przeworski’s contention that
‘broadened dictatorship’ is the only outcome where actors are rational and well
informed at moments of regime crisis. It was noted earlier that, while it is hard
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not to agree wholeheartedly with Colomer’s attack on structuralist scholarship,
which failed to predict the collapse of communism, his rejection of Przeworski’s
contention that democratic transition could only be the outcome of ‘misinformed
or miscalculated strategies’ is more problematic.
It is important to bear in mind that Colomer makes no claims about the behav-
iour of regime actors once the decision to negotiate or not negotiate with the
opposition has been made.3 Furthermore, Colomer would argue that the focus of
both his and Przeworski’s analysis is on the period when this initial decision is
made and that the subsequent rounds of bargaining are not relevant to this
argument. In this analysis, it has been argued that this leaves the problem of how
to characterize the subsequent behaviour of regime actors who have made the
initial decision and entered into negotiation with the opposition. In particular, in
the case of the PZPR, how do we characterize the behaviour of actors who had,
arguably, taken the ‘far-sighted’ decision to negotiate with the opposition?
Bearing in mind Colomer’s reservations about the application of his hypothesis to
the negotiations that follow on from the initial regime decision, this analysis set
out to provide a process-driven account of a range of bargaining scenarios at the
Polish Round Table in order to track the gap between the communist party’s
expectations and the actual institutional outcome. In doing so, it was intended to
evaluate the relative merits of the conflicting hypotheses of Przeworski and
Colomer.
At the heart of the matter is the question of whether or not the transactions
between the PZPR and Solidarnof- produced their anticipated outcomes or
whether the collapse of communism was an unintended consequence and precip-
itated by the strategic misperception of PZPR Round Table negotiators. In particular,
we have paid close attention to the issue of whether PZPR actors behaved
rationally in the sense that their decision-making was underpinned by available
information and reasonable expectation as Colomer posits. It should be emphasized
that available information is not perfect information and that perfect information
is not a necessary condition for a rational decision. It, therefore, follows that the
central focus of this analysis has been how PZPR actors treated the available
information at their disposal during the bargaining process. With this in mind, and
in order to provide a rigorous analysis of the PZPR’s Round Table bargaining, the
party’s institutional choices were analysed in the context of the expectations or
observable implications that flow from the respective hypotheses of Przeworski
and Colomer. In doing so, it was possible to differentiate between the intentions
of PZPR negotiators and their institutional follow-through or outcome.
Following Bates et al., it was argued that to construct a coherent and valid
rational choice account, scholars must ‘soak and poke’ and acquire the same
depth of understanding as that achieved by those who offer ‘thick’ descriptions.4
In exploring a concrete historical case, such as the Round Table process and the
collapse of communism in Poland, it was noted that we are examining the choices
of individuals embedded in specific settings. In examining such choices, it is
necessary to unpack and trace the sequence of actions, decisions and responses
that generated events and outcomes.5 In employing the analytic narrative
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approach, we seek to account for outcomes by identifying the mechanisms that
generate them. In doing so, this analytic narrative method employs rational choice
theory and ‘thin’ reasoning to produce tightly constrained accounts based on
rigorous deductive reasoning grounded on close attention to empirical detail.
Finally, it was argued that analytic narratives are ‘disciplined by both logic and
the empirical record’.6
Controlled and incremental political change
Before embarking on an analysis of each of the Round Table bargaining scenarios,
it was argued that it was necessary to establish that PZPR players had not simply
decided to hand power to Solidarnof-. While the notion appears intuitively
unlikely, formally establishing the intention of party actors was an important initial
step for a number of reasons. First, if it had been established that the PZPR had
decided to relinquish power then clearly the notion of strategic misperception
would be nullified. Second, the entire logic of the research project depends on
being able to establish the intention of the key party players. Clearly, establishing
the nature of the intention of PZPR Round Table negotiators makes a contribution
to the literature on this topic. Finally, in analysing the data it has been possible to
expose the wide range of conceptions of that intention within the party elite who
promoted the Round Table process. Laying bare the range of PZPR conceptions of
the purpose of the Round Table makes a contribution to political science. It does
so because it has provided us with the opportunity to evaluate whether or not the
real life behaviour of political actors conforms to the expectations posited by ratio-
nal choice theory. This analysis also makes a contribution because it has attempted
to discover which of the two conflicting versions of rationality posited by Colomer
and Przeworski provides the greatest leverage in explaining the actual outcome.
While this form of analysis is always open to charges that the findings are
trivial, or not significant, because they are intuitively obvious, establishing the
intention of PZPR Round Table actors is the first and most fundamental brick in
the logical structure of this research project. It would not have been logically
possible to analyse the PZPR’s bargaining strategies if its primary intention had
not been established first.
Interviews with key players such as General Jaruzelski, General Kiszczak,
Mieczys„aw Rakowski, Stanis„aw Ciosek, Janusz Reykowski and Jerzy Wiatr
have confirmed the fact that fear of economic collapse was the key motivating
factor in the party’s decision to initiate talks with the opposition.7 Solidarnof-’s
weakness, internal power battles and its poor showing in the spring and summer
strikes across Poland in 1988 convinced many senior PZPR players, including
Stanis„aw Ciosek, that this was the party’s opportunity to drive a hard bargain for
the union’s support for the government’s economic reform package. The fact that
General Jaruzelski intended to control the process of reform is confirmed in the
Prague document.8 In this document, Jaruzelski talks of the need to ‘neutralize’
Solidarnof- while Poland ‘passes through a difficult period of 1–2 years’.9
Clearly, Jaruzelski did not intend to relinquish power. In this case, it has been
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clearly shown that the ancien regime did not simply decide to give up. While the
analysis of interviews with key party players highlights a variety of ideas about
how the process of change would be handled, these interviews confirm the fact
that it was not intended to hand power over to Solidanof-. General Kiszczak
speaks of wanting to ‘loosen the straightjacket’ but is emphatic that ‘we didn’t
aim to give power to the opposition’.10 Stanis„aw Ciosek, who characterized
himself as being involved in a ‘deliberate attempt to change the system’11 in
Poland, emphasizes the limits of the PZPR’s plans at the start of the Round Table:
‘It was a democratization process – a fuzzy democracy’.12
In the context of the conflicting hypotheses of Przeworski and Colomer, the
evidence is somewhat equivocal. The assessment of General Jaruzelski, General
Kiszczak, Prime Minister Rakowski and Janusz Reykowski tends to support
Przeworski’s view that regime liberalizers will only seek broadened dictatorship.13
The Prague document could not be more explicit on the short-term interest that
was to be served by the initiation of talks between the PZPR and Solidarnof-.14
Analysis of other documents including the PZPR’s Interdepartmental Team report
clearly shows that, in September 1988, party strategists were thinking in terms of
the creation of institutions, which would assist in the retention of the party’s political
hegemony in any new institutional arrangement. Specifically, it has been shown
that the presidential office was to act as the party’s guarantee of continued power.
The Orszulik memoirs also confirm the fact that, as late as November 1988, the
party hierarchy did not envisage the idea of free elections. Bishop Orszulik refers
to Stanis„aw Ciosek’s anger at hearing Solidarnof- spokesman Janusz
Onyszkiewicz’s demand for free elections. Clearly, in the months prior to the start
of the Round Table, PZPR strategists thought they were initiating a process of
incremental and controllable change. However, other PZPR actors, including
Stanis„aw Ciosek, father and son, Jerzy and S„awomir Wiatr, provide a perspective
that supports Colomer’s hypothesis of far-sightedness. Jerzy Wiatr talks about
the aim having been the creation of a ‘form of contractual democracy’.15 The
more long-term goal was the democratization of the system. This supports
Colomer’s contention that liberalizers will seek to create an intermediate regime
as they extricate from authoritarianism. The actions and behaviour of the younger
members of the PZPR, including Aleksander Kwafniewski and S„awomir Wiatr,
conform to Colomer’s expectations. These players were non-myopic and believed
that they would achieve ‘important positions in the new system’.16
The relegalization of Solidarnof-
The PZPR sought the creation of institutions it could realistically hope to control.
Next we turn to the question of the institutional choices agreed to by PZPR nego-
tiators at the Round Table. In Chapter 5, we examined the PZPR’s perception of
the potential outcome of its agreement to the relegalization of Solidarnof-. The
data clearly shows that there were widely varying perceptions concerning the
purpose and potential impact of relegalizing Solidarnof-. In some sections of
the party hierarchy, the move was seen as a trade-off for Solidarnof-’s agreement
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to participate in the semi-free election, while other sections, including the group
around Kwafniewski and Ciosek, saw relegalization as part of a broader and
far-sighted process of systemic change. While some party players, including
Stanis„aw Ciosek, did regard the commencement of talks with Solidarnof- as the
beginning of the end of one-party rule, and the decision to relegalize the union as
a move that could bring about the collapse of the party, the evidence clearly
confirms that this was not the dominant thinking within the PZPR hierarchy.
Reykowski emphasized in his interview with the author that the prevailing
wisdom did not anticipate that the relegalization of the union would precipitate
the collapse of communism.
Relegalization was a means to an end: the end being the incorporation of
Solidarnof- into the government coalition for the purpose of implementing
economic reform. As Prime Minister Rakowski observed, relegalization would
have no impact beyond the union being able to function as a ‘trade union. Nothing
more!’17 As has been shown, there is no indication of organized pooling or
updating of information concerning the impact of relegalization and there was no
agreed perception of the meaning and impact of the decision to relegalize
Solidarnof-. Thus, there is evidence of both non-myopic and short-term motivation
thereby lending support for the hypotheses of both Colomer and Przeworski.
The new office of president
As we have already seen, the PZPR’s intention in relation to the introduction of
the office of president was entirely rational and office seeking. The PZPR’s
September 1988 ‘Concept of Changes’ document clearly shows that the PZPR did
not expect any diminution in its political hegemony arising out of the proposed
institutional changes.18 In fact, the aim was to retain control in the new order by
controlling the mechanism through which the president would be elected and by
endowing the office with extensive executive powers. It was envisaged that the
president would be the ‘highest institution of state authority with legislative and
executive powers’19 and, crucially, the president would always be a party member.
So the evidence here supports Przeworski’s broadened dictatorship hypothesis.
Furthermore, PZPR negotiators did not negotiate on the basis of the September
1988 conception of the office, but on the basis of a proposal produced by
Democratic Party member Piotr Winczorek.
There are many differences between the party’s initial formulation and the
Winczorek document. The most important of these differences is the fact that the
Winczorek proposal was silent on the crucial issue of the election of the president,
while the PZPR’s September document stipulates a mechanism that would have
allowed the party to retain effective control of the office. So, here again, we
have evidence of a mistake that had the potential to negate the PZPR’s main
purpose in pursuing its presidential strategy. We have seen from the evidence, and
that of Gebethner in particular, that PZPR negotiators did not fully apprise
themselves of the consequences of introducing the office.20 Winczorek points out
that PZPR negotiators hoped to legitimize the idea of the new office by presenting
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the proposal to the Round Table as a Democratic Party idea. However, in accepting
the Winczorek document as a basis for the bargaining over the office, PZPR
negotiators left a number of hostages to fortune.
The evidence of Gebethner is clear on the fact that PZPR negotiators did not
update information in the course of the bargaining over this institution. Having
started with a perfectly rational conception of how the presidential office might
benefit the party, PZPR negotiators failed to keep the proposal on track or ensure
that the consequences of concessions made to gain support for the office did not
result in unforeseen outcomes. As we have seen, Kwafniewski’s proposal, that a
new and freely elected Senate should be introduced, was regarded as a means of
legitimizing the presidency; however, the potential impact of this move was not
assessed. Misperceived strategic choices led to outcomes that had not been antic-
ipated by PZPR negotiators in their bargaining over the office of the president and
hence this bargaining confirms Przeworski’s hypothesis.
The new Senate
The PZPR’s concession of a freely elected Senate was one of its greatest strategic
errors at the Round Table. As we have seen, negotiators such as Stanis„aw Ciosek,
still maintain that the concession of the free Senate was not important because it
was not envisaged that the chamber would have any power; in crude terms, it was
to be a talking shop for the opposition. However, Solidarnof-’s crushing victory
in the election, taking all but one of the hundred Senate seats, served as a massive
symbolic rejection of the party. As we have seen, the Senate concession was inex-
tricably linked with the party’s bargaining over the contractual parliamentary elec-
tions and its desire to introduce a strong presidency. It is clear from the analysis of
both the interviews and the September 1988 document that the Senate was not
perceived as having substantial power in the initial formulation. However,
because party negotiators were responding to a dynamic offer and counter-offer
at the Round Table, and because they lacked a cohesive or fully worked out
conception of how the various institutional pieces they were conceding would fit
into the institutional jigsaw, they failed to anticipate the potential consequences
of the decision to concede a freely elected Senate. Gebethner highlights this lack
of regard for the consequences of institutional choices when he points out that
even after Kwafniewski’s proposal was made public, the PZPR’s ideas concerning
the future constitutional role of the Senate were ‘more than a little hazy’.21
As in the case of the negotiations over the office of president, we saw a difference
between the PZPR’s initial conception of the institution and the reality that
emerges as a result of the Round Table dynamic. We saw that, at least in intent,
the concession of the Senate supports Przeworski’s broadened dictatorship
hypothesis, given the fact that the idea was part of a strategy designed to get
Solidarnof-’s agreement to the contractual election and the presidency. However,
the PZPR could not have rationally expected to control this freely elected institution.
Stanis„aw Ciosek’s contention that the concession of the Senate was not a mistake
because it was not deemed to be an arena of importance clearly supports
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Przeworski’s analysis. This flawed evaluation of the potential impact of a freely
elected Senate is clear evidence that the PZPR was not engaged in reacting and
counter-reacting in a far-sighted manner in its negotiations over the presidency
and Senate. So while the evidence supports the contention that party strategists
were rational in their deliberations over the Senate prior to the start of the Round
Table, they subsequently failed to fully assess or evaluate information that might
have led negotiators to seek a different bargain in this case. Specifically, these
actors did not negotiate on the basis of the available information and thus we
must, therefore, conclude that PZPR negotiators were not far-sighted and strategic
in their decision-making over the concession of the Senate.
The electoral system and voting rules
If PZPR negotiators were far-sighted, as Colomer posits, we would expect them
to choose an electoral system and voting formula that maximized the party’s seat
share. We would expect them to regard the choice of an electoral system as an
important step on the road to an intermediate regime. We would also expect
negotiators to have updated their information on the differential impact of voting
formulae during the course of the Round Table negotiations. In this regard, we
have identified three categories of error in the way PZPR strategists responded to
the issue of voting rules for the contractual election.
The first mistake is an error of estimation. Before party strategists could
evaluate the differential impact of voting rules, it would be necessary to have reli-
able information about social support for the PZPR. The analysis is clear on this
point. Many of the party’s senior players did not behave rationally when considering
the level of support for the PZPR. Kami‘ski’s analysis of the adjusted confidence
polls taken throughout the 1980s clearly indicates that it was not rational for the
PZPR to rely on these polls for an accurate estimate of support.22 Three funda-
mental problems with the conduct of opinion polling in the relevant period led the
PZPR to rely on a skewed and over-favourable estimate of their social support. It
appears incontrovertible that a form of cognitive dissonance affected senior PZPR
players such as Jaruzelski and Rakowski. This led them to expect higher levels of
social support than even the adjusted polls indicated.
However, it is clear from interviews with Stanis„aw Ciosek, Jerzy Wiatr and
S„awomir Wiatr as well as interviews with the Solidarnof- negotiator, Lech
Kaczy‘ski, that not all of the PZPR Round Table players held this optimistic view
of party support. That said, the evidence that emerges from the interview material
and the work of other scholars supports the contention that the predominant
estimate of the party’s support was informed by the false information being
supplied by the apparatchiks. It, therefore, follows that many key PZPR figures
failed to ensure that they were estimating their support on the basis of reliable
information. It is also clear that there was a failure at the most senior level of
the PZPR to update or seek out accurate information that would have enabled a
more reliable estimate of the likely impact of differential voting rules. This first
category of error clearly confirms Przeworski’s expectations.
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The second category of error relates to the choice of voting rules. Kami‘ski has
shown that the PZPR chose voting rules that resulted in a worse outcome than
would have resulted from almost any other voting system.23 However, in this volume,
evidence has been presented that demonstrates that not only did negotiators make
a bad choice but they also ignored advice that would have prevented the party’s
electoral defeat had the advice been taken. It has been shown that senior
negotiators were made aware of the damaging impact of using a majoritarian
system in the Senate election.
Three well-known academics, two of whom were members or former members
of the Politburo, advised against the majoritarian system of voting. Andrzej
Werblan advised Round Table co-chair Janusz Reykowski that a proportional
system should be adopted for the Senate election and later wrote to Prime
Minister M. Rakowski outlining his analysis. Jerzy Wiatr has confirmed that he
advised Janusz Reykowski of the disastrous consequences of choosing a majori-
tarian system. Wiatr also claims that the decision to reject both sets of proposals
came from General Jaruzelski. Gebethner cites two instances where advice was
ignored. He points out that the idea of electing the Senate on a majority basis was
‘almost universally criticized’24 at a meeting of the government coalition group at
the Round Table. Gebethner also produced a report in support of the use of a
proportional system. PZPR strategists also ignored this report.
It, therefore, follows, in the context of this stunning failure to take on board the
advice of a number of sympathetic ‘experts’, that the PZPR’s behaviour in
relation to the choice of voting rules supports Przeworski’s hypothesis.
The decision to retain the crossing-off method of voting proved disastrous for
the PZPR. Had PZPR strategists been updating their knowledge and information,
they should have responded to the experience in the Soviet Union, where voters
had crossed off official candidates in the first semi-free election held there.
Again, there was information advising against the use of this negative form of
voting available to the party. We have seen that Stanis„aw Gebethner had written
papers arguing against the use of the system and that this advice was ignored.
Two other serious mistakes, which fall into the category of strategic error, com-
plete this litany of misperceived electoral strategies. The PZPR’s decision to run
700 candidates for its 156 seats in the contractual Sejm and another 186 for the
Senate election is almost inexplicable. But again we see that the PZPR failed
to understand the rules of the game they were playing. In this case they failed to
understand the implications of allowing multiple candidates to stand, given the
use of the majoritarian voting rule where in the second-ballot system a high number
of candidates reduces the chances of electing a candidate on the first ballot.
At the end of the day, it is perhaps the assumption of the continued support of
its coalition allies that highlights the enormity of the irrationality that drove the
party’s bargaining in this area. In failing to secure its own overall majority in the
Sejm without the support of its coalition allies, PZPR strategists contemptuously
failed to anticipate even the possibility of their allies changing sides. This
assumption, which was central to the PZPR’s bargaining over the contractual
Sejm, seriously undermines the notion of party negotiators as far-sighted. As we
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have seen, the PZPR’s failure to protect its own parliamentary majority struck at
the heart of its most important goal, the retention of its legislative veto in the
Sejm. The assumption that its satellite coalition partners would continue to
support the PZPR no matter what the circumstances smacks of enormous hubris.
The fact that PZPR negotiators did not even bother to ascertain the likelihood of
the continued support of its partners emphasizes that, once again, we see party
negotiators failing to seek basic information or making flawed evaluations that
lead to strategic mistakes. In particular, we have demonstrated that PZPR negotiators
disregarded information that was available to them and that as a consequence they
acted on the basis of unreasonable expectations, which contravenes the rationality
requirement as understood by Colomer and other scholars.
The PZPR’s relationship with the Catholic hierarchy
Moving on to the conduct of the party’s election campaign and its negotiators’
relationship with the Catholic hierarchy, we see the same pattern of false assump-
tions, as well as a failure to rectify earlier strategic errors. In our earlier discussion
of the campaign, we saw that it was based on two fundamentally flawed assumptions.
First, key Round Table negotiators who were predominantly drawn from the
reform wing of the PZPR expected that the Polish public would differen-
tiate between their role and that of the hardliners who had opposed reform. These
reformers expected electoral support on the basis that they had defeated the
hardline element within the party and initiated the process of contacts that resulted
in the Round Table agreement. The reformers further assumed that this victory
would be a persuasive campaign argument.
Because these players had been involved in, what was for them, an all-consuming
battle, they failed to appreciate that the issue was not afforded the same degree of
significance by the Polish public. The assumption that party reformers would be
rewarded for initiating the reform process led to the false view that the Polish
public would be prepared to embrace austerity in order to ensure the economic
reform package agreed at the Round Table. Again, we see expectations and strate-
gies that were not based on a rational appraisal of the data available to the PZPR.
We saw earlier that key players, such as Rakowski, acknowledged the poor
showing in the polls in the month prior to the election, but for some inexplicable
reason, expected the ‘don’t know’ category to vote for the party. This cognitive
dissonance clearly affected many elements of the reform wing of the party,
and while we have seen that players, such as Stanis„aw Ciosek and the group
around Aleksander Kwafniewski, held more realistic estimates of likely support
it remains the case that the campaign was fundamentally flawed by the expecta-
tion of support that was not based on a rational or informed analysis of the
public mood.
Given the party’s superior financial and logistical resources it was to be
expected that the PZPR campaign would be more effective than Solidarnof-’s.
However, the reverse was the case. The PZPR did not put its logistical and financial
superiority to good use. Solidarnof- consistently out-performed the PZPR with
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considerably less resources. It is clear from the analysis of the discussions at the
KC PZPR meetings that many party players were horrified and unprepared for
Solidarnof-’s effective use of its television time. The decision to give the union
access to television and the media was discussed in the context of the establishment
of the Round Table, but the tenor of the discussion at the KC highlights the fact
that the impact Solidarnof- made during the transmitted elements of the Round
Table was not anticipated. However, even more surprising is the fact that the
OPZZ’s Alfred Miodowicz arranged to engage with Lech Wa„ˇsa in a televised
debate without the prior knowledge of General Jaruzelski. As we have seen, this
debate was won hands down by Lech Wa„ˇsa, who effectively used the debate to
launch his campaign platform with the establishment of the Citizens’
Committees. This debate played a crucial part in the further destabilizing of the
PZPR. The fact that it was arranged without the knowledge of General Jaruzelski
is astonishing and, once again, confirms the fact that PZPR players were not
behaving either coherently or rationally.
The PZPR’s personality-first strategy should be understood in the context of
the assumption that reformers expected payback for their defeat of the hardliners.
These reformers assumed that if they disassociated themselves from the PZPR’s
historical legacy, voters would assess the personal, as opposed to the party, profile
of each candidate. Again, this was a false assumption and left the PZPR danger-
ously exposed to Solidarnof-’s instruction to voters to cross off all but the union’s
candidates. While the strategy was designed as a way of convincing the electorate
that party membership was unimportant, it allowed Solidarnof- to argue that
association with the party was the only issue. Solidarnof- turned the election into
a plebiscite on the party’s record. So, once again, we see that the reformers
embarked on an ill-informed strategy based on the false assumption that society
would distinguish between Polish communism and Polish communists. The
party’s conduct of the campaign confirms Przeworski’s analysis.
It has already been noted that the relationship between the PZPR and the
Catholic Church deserves far greater treatment than it has received here.
However, we are only concerned here with whether or not PZPR actors were
rational in their expectations of that relationship. The central issue was the
PZPR’s expectation that the church would remain neutral during the election
campaign. It has been demonstrated that this expectation was neither rational nor
supported by the behaviour of the church. Stanis„aw Ciosek was the party’s main
contact with the church. The tenor of Ciosek’s remarks, as outlined in the
memoirs of Bishop Alojzy Orszulik, clearly shows that this was a personally
warm relationship. This closeness was not confined to Ciosek. General Jaruzelski
was known to be an admirer of Polish Primate Glemp and as was argued earlier,
Janusz Reykowski testifies to this in the interviews analysed here. Clearly Ciosek,
and perhaps even Jaruzelski, confused the personal regard they entertained for
individual members of the Polish hierarchy with their rational assessment of the
church’s behaviour during the campaign.
Janusz Reykowski’s assessment that the church was likely to be of considerable
use to the Solidarity campaign was rejected and is further confirmation of the
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repeated failure of senior PZPR negotiators to listen to its own advisers. This
mistaken assumption that the church would remain neutral, combined with the
PZPR’s flawed assessment of the support it would receive in rural areas, proved
devastating for the party. So while there might have been some basis for the
party’s assumption that Solidarnof- might not perform as well in the country as
they would in urban areas, there was no basis for their view of the church’s role.
The church proved to be an active and persuasive pro-Solidarnof- campaigner
and nowhere was this support more effective than in rural areas. Heyns and
Bia„ecki’s analysis of the pattern of support for Solidarnof- clearly demonstrates
the degree to which the party’s assessments and expectations were wrong.25
Again, we see that the party failed to update its information. PZPR member Jerzy
Wiatr’s work on patterns of abstention and crossing-off in Poland should have
alerted party strategists to the fact that they were in danger in some rural regions.
In describing support for Solidarnof-, Heyns and Bia„ecki argue that the single
variable most significantly and consistently related to aggregate voting behaviour
is location in one of the rural south-eastern voivodships.26 Furthermore, they have
shown that, in this region, the population was reputedly the most traditional and
the most committed to Catholicism in the country.
This example of the devastating impact of the PZPR’s failure to anticipate the
impact of the Catholic Church’s pro-Solidarnof- campaigning is just one demon-
strable example of how this falsely perceived relationship misled PZPR strate-
gists. As has been stated earlier, the Catholic Church played a huge role in the
emergence, sustenance and eventual victory of Solidarnof-; that PZPR actors
could get that role so badly wrong is conclusive evidence in support of Przeworski’s
hypothesis. It has already been noted that Colomer regards his hypothesis as
providing the most explanatory leverage when it is applied to the initial decision
to negotiate or not to negotiate. In this volume, we have examined Colomer’s
behavioural expectations in the context of the subsequent bargaining of regime
actors. However, given the importance of the role and influence of the Catholic
Church in the PZPR’s initial decision to negotiate with Solidarnof-, the fact that
key party actors clearly misunderstood the nature of their relationship with
the church tends to weaken our earlier conclusion that this decision can be
characterized as far-sighted and thus conforming to Colomer’s expectations.27
Implications for the study of regime change 
and democratic transition
As has already been noted, this analysis is a response to Przeworski’s request that
his analytical framework and hypotheses be tested empirically.28 In this case we
have examined a case of regime change in what became a dual transition to
democracy and a market economy. However, the analytical framework and
hypotheses utilized here could be used, albeit in differing form, in cases where both
or just one kind of transition is being examined. The key heuristic device employed
here is the ability to track a complex process or set of events in the context of what
is expected given one hypothesis or another. In simple terms, we can match the
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events of the real world with the expectations that flow from the hypotheses. In
doing so, we are enabled to reach conclusions and characterizations which are
soundly based in scientific method and thus are reliable and not ad hoc.
Given the emphasis in this type of analysis on the gap between the expectations
of actors and the actual institutional outcome, it provides a most useful basis on
which to commence the examination of the potential trajectory of a process of
transition. Because this type of approach allows us to understand what regime
actors hoped to achieve when they initiated the dialogue with the opposition, it
follows that we can learn much in the course of our research about the preferred
institutional outcomes of these actors. Given the path-dependent nature of transition
and the view that the mode of transition has a major impact of the success of the
democratization process, it follows that an understanding of the institutional
preferences of the elites who negotiate the initial regime change is crucial if we
are to predict the trajectory of transitional countries.29 Josep Colomer’s analysis
of the Spanish transition is one example of the successful use of formal modelling.30
In the case of the present analysis, informal tools were used and proved as
successful in tracking the gap between expectation and outcome and exposing the
underlying dynamic of the Polish process of regime change. It seems clear that
this approach and method could be used to examine other cases of regime change
or transition. In particular, it seems clear that the approach would be useful to
researchers examining cases of negotiated transition such as occurred in Hungary
or, indeed, Bulgaria where communist party elites attempted preventative reform
so as to control the process of change.
Theoretical implications of the foregoing analysis
The foregoing analysis of the PZPR’s strategic intentions and expectations gives
rise to a number of theoretical implications for the study of regime change and
democratic transition. First, at a very fundamental level, previous structural
explanations would have ignored the preferences of regime actors and, thus,
would have missed this rich vein of predictive analysis. Purely structural accounts
ignored the factors that precipitated changes in political and institutional equilibrium
and, thus, failed to identify the conditions that changed the relative costs of the
preferences of regime actors. Given the fact that none or very few of the structural
preconditions normally associated with democratic transition existed in 1989, it
is not surprising that political scientists, conditioned in this view, failed to identify
the possibility of regime change. On the basis of the findings of this analysis, it
is clear that structural accounts alone do not provide the explanatory power
required to offer a coherent account of why some regimes fall and others survive.
Elite theory, which focused on elite settlements and elite convergence, has
proved a more useful tool in the analysis of transition, as has the idea of analysing
new institutions as bargains among self-interested politicians. However, perhaps
the most important insight highlighted in this analysis has been the confirmation
of the view that scholars must not assume the motivation and goals of elites.
If actor-based approaches are to provide explanatory leverage, they must be
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underpinned by theoretical assumptions and testable hypotheses. It was assumed
that PZPR reformers were behaving as political entrepreneurs anticipating the
twin reward of retaining power by shaping the way the new rules of the political
game were formulated, as well as the possibility of economic benefits that would
derive from the introduction of economic reform. This process-driven examination,
based on a clearly defined set of observable implications which flowed from the
conflicting hypotheses of Przeworski’s and Colomer’s seminal work, allowed for
a tractable and explicit analysis of the intentions and strategic behaviour of PZPR
negotiators. This approach prevents the use of ad hoc explanations for particular
scenarios and outcomes. Crucially, it separates intention from actual behaviour
and, by applying a rigorous standard of rationality, makes it possible to identify
where the outcome was not the one intended by actors.
In this case, the application of a theory-driven analysis has shown conclusively
that party reformers were rational in intent when they initiated the talks process
with the Solidarnof^-led opposition. The evidence shows that negotiators did not
perceive themselves to be relinquishing power:
Communist leaders wanted to maintain their control of public life and the
stability of the system, particularly its Socialist character and its membership
in the Warsaw Pact, by increasing its inclusiveness and limited pluralism with
the voice of the moderate wing of the opposition in parliament.31
It is also clear that this rational intent predisposed party reformers to prefer a
‘broadened dictatorship’, as outlined by Przeworski,32 or an ‘intermediate
regime’, as specified by Colomer,33 but not an immediate transition to democracy.
While it is evident in many of the interviews in this volume that some PZPR
players foresaw that the chronology of events might be faster than the competi-
tive elections planned for 1993, the dominant view was that the deal represented
a breathing space in which the party could prepare itself for competitive politics
in the future.
Throughout this analysis we have seen evidence to support Colomer’s claim
that a far-sighted criterion of choice induces non-myopic equilibria.34 None of the
reformers around General Jaruzelski had any desire to repeat the experience of
martial law when Pole was forced to shoot Pole. Significantly, many party nego-
tiators referred to the perception that Lech Wa„ˇsa was losing control of the union
in the late 1980s and that more radical elements might soon take over. The union’s
weakness was the party’s opportunity to reach an agreement that would retain
maximum incumbent power. This is an important finding from the perspective of
Colomer’s hypothesis and is consistent with his own research focus on the initial
decision to negotiate or not to negotiate. Specifically, this research has confirmed
Colomer’s hypothesis in the context of the arena in which he has claimed it has
the most explanatory leverage. It follows that Colomer is right when he claims
that the bargaining that proceeds from the initial decision to negotiate is not an
appropriate milieu in which to expect non-myopic behaviour. However, it is
important to remember that a null hypothesis is as valid and important a finding
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as a positive result. In this case, it has allowed us to track the gap between the
formal prerequisites of rationality as understood in conflicting interpretations of
rational choice and the perceptions of human beings making decisions they
assume to be in their best interests.
While the analysis confirms the fact that PZPR negotiators were rational in
intent prior to the start of the Round Table, it has conclusively shown that they
made mistakes in the conduct of the bargaining over institutions. The consistent
failure to update information, and the quite remarkable ignoring of the expert
advice of Werblan, Gebethner and others, tends to confirm Przeworski’s conception
of how transition follows the mistakes made by regime liberalizers who seek
broadened dictatorship. This process-driven account relied on a thin conception
of rationality to track the gap between ideal, formally rational behaviour and the
historical reality of the PZPR’s behaviour during the course of its Round Table
negotiations. It has proved a useful heuristic device in the analysis of a complex
set of events where elite actors engaged in a round of bargaining that created its
own dynamic.
The combination of this ‘soak and poke’ approach and the application of the
observable implications that flow from the hypotheses of Przeworski and
Colomer has conclusively shown that over a range of bargains and scenarios the
PZPR’s strategies produced unanticipated outcomes. It is clear that many of these
outcomes could have been predicted had party negotiators relied on the available
information at their disposal. Making decisions on the basis of available infor-
mation is a minimal requirement of a rational actor; however, we might also
expect that rational actors would have updated their information and knowledge
over a range of institutional choices and listened to the advice of sympathetic
advisers. Not only is it the case that the PZPR’s misperceived strategies produced
an unexpected outcome, but it is also arguable that the failure to act on the avail-
able information is the key to any explanation of the collapse of communist power
in Poland in 1989. In conclusion, it is a plausible hypothesis that rationally inten-
tioned PZPR actors who updated their available information would not have
negotiated the suboptimal institutional bargains agreed at the Round Table.
Perfect information had the potential to change the course of the history of both
Poland and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.
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[Rectangular stamp: At the request of Com. K. Cypryniak. Sent to the secretaries
of Regional Committees, 15.02.1989; ref. no. KS/195/89]
This concise formula: non-confrontational, but competitive elections held on the
basis of agreed principles, demands an explanation and a more detailed definition.
I. The competitiveness would in this form mean, that:
1) In every constituency and for every seat there will be more than one
candidate with equal rights – this should be the competitiveness at a
personal level;
2) In every constituency (both two- and five-seat ones) one or two seats
would be sought after by candidates of various political persuasions,
from both the coalition in government, and from the opposition groups,
on the basis of various electoral programs and without excluding com-
petition between candidates from PZPR and ZSL, PZPR and SD, or SD
and ZSL – that would mean competitiveness at the program level.
II. Non-confrontational character should mean in this case that: the participants
in the elections, i.e. candidates and parties and their allied organizations and
opposition groups which put forward their candidates, undertake to refrain
during the entire election campaign from:
1) Any attacks on the principles of the political system, defined in the
Section I of the Polish Constitution (that is the leading role of the PZPR,
constitutional basis of the three-party coalition and the alliance with
USSR);
2) Attacks on the origin of the Polish People’s Republic, discussions con-
cerning the responsibility for the mistakes of the past (such as accusations
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of totalitarianism or statements about the country being taken over by
the communists, etc.), responsibility for the 1981 conflicts and the
martial law, or propagating a total negation of achievements of the past
40 years.
III. The formula of elections held on the basis of agreed principles would
mean that:
1) There would be an agreed declaration on the subject of an agreement of
the Poles as to overriding interests and objectives of the Nation, which
would have to be respected by all those participating in the elections
throughout the entire election process;
2) The right to putting candidates forward will have political parties,
agreed categories of organizations, including the recognized opposition
groups which have been described in the legislation (in the electoral law
or in a separate legislation); and also groups of citizens consisting of
four thousand to five thousand people. Five per cent of voters [added in
handwriting].
3) Generally established exit proportions will be observed as to the division
of seats, including the selection of seats for direct competition between
parties and groups.
The question of guarantees as to the observance of these conditions, which ensure
the non-confrontational character of elections to Sejm and also that they would be
held within the agreed principles, is outlined below.
Firstly, however, one must present the essence of a system, which would meet
such a formula of elections that are non-confrontational but competitive and
organized on the basis of earlier agreed principles.
This would look as follows:
Sejm [Parliament] has so far 460 members. In two- and five-seat constituencies
430 members would be elected. However, 30 members of Parliament shall be
selected from the general or ‘country’ list.
In each constituency there will be any number of candidates put forward for
each separate mandate. At least two candidates must run for each seat.
Sixty-nine free seats [added in handwriting] would have a free number of
candidates of various orientations and political parties registered. However, as for
the remaining seats, candidates would be registered only from that party or
that political orientation, which on the basis of an agreed understanding is the
‘disposer’ of such a place.
This means that 69 [numeral 138 is crossed out and numeral 69 written by
hand] members of Parliament, i.e. 15 per cent of candidates [30 per cent crossed
out and 15 per cent written by hand] of the Parliament will be selected on the
basis of ‘free competition’. As a result of this, the final political division of those
69 [written by hand] seats is absolutely and fully the result of free election by
citizens participating in elections.
144 Appendix 1
Hayden-App-1.qxd  22/11/05  10:13 PM  Page 144 $ 
+ + 
$ 
However, 78 per cent [63.5 per cent crossed out and 78.5 per cent written by hand]
seats, i.e. 361 votes [292 crossed out and 361 written by hand] shall be initially, on
the basis of the agreed by way of negotiations agreement, divided as follows:
PZPR 176 i.e. 38.3%
ZSL 76 i.e. 16.5%
SD 25 i.e. 5.4%
PAX, UChS
PZKS 15 i.e. 3.2%
Opposition 69 i.e. 15.0% [written by hand]
Thirty members of Parliament, i.e. 6.5 per cent of all elected, will be put forward
from the ‘country’ list. The political composition of candidates for MPs on the
‘country’ list will match the political composition of candidates for MPs who are
being elected in constituencies. Based on this principal, seats on the ‘country’ list










[numeral 9 for jointly: the independent and opposition – crossed out and written
by hand – 5 for independent and 4 for the opposition].
Assuming, that free seats in various constituencies (69) [written by hand] are
won by the non-party candidates (independent and opposition), the political com-
position in the Sejm will be as follows (total seats in various constituencies and
those on the ‘country’ list):
PZPR 187 seats 40.7%
ZSL 81 seats 17.6%
SD 27 seats 5.9%
Total 295 seats 64.2%
PAX 8 seats 1.7%
UchS 6 seats 1.3%
PZKS 4 seats 0.9%
Free seats 74 seats 16.0%
Opposition 73 seats 15.9%
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[31.9% for the joint independent-opposition group, crossed out and replaced with
a hand-written note: free seats 74 (16%), opposition 73 (15.9%)].
IV. Final comments and conclusions:
1) It is proposed that the election be held in two stages. The first stage on
11 June. The second stage on 25 June.
In the first stage, candidates from the ‘country’ list and from the ‘constituencies’
lists will participate in elections to select members of Parliament; they would
receive 50 per cent of all valid votes plus one vote.
In the second stage, two candidates, who received the largest number of votes
in the first stage, should contest each seat. The candidate with the largest number
of votes shall be elected.
The elimination from the electoral procedure of ‘convention’-type institutions,
whose objective was to eliminate the surplus of candidates, would be an enor-
mous step towards the inclusion of a wider society in the joint governance. It
would fundamentally change the existing character of elections. [It would] start
totally new motivations amongst the candidates and the electorate.
With the acceptance of this mechanism of putting forward, selecting and electing
candidates for parliamentary seats, one has to take into consideration, that the social
composition in the Sejm will be representative of selections made by the electorate.
2) Elections held in this manner will be fully competitive at a personal level,
and in relation to 15 per cent [30 per cent crossed out and 15 per cent
written in its place by hand] of seats, also confrontational on the level of
issues. Because of that, it would be possible, without a threat of loosing
power, to study the composition of forces amongst the electorate;
processes would also be created, which would encourage the emergence
of a new generation of activists within both our party and other forces.
3) Assuming, that the 69 free seats [138 crossed out and 69 written by
hand] will be won by non-party candidates, the following set-up of
power should emerge:
a) PZPR, having 40.7 per cent of seats, will not be able to pass any
resolution by itself. This would create a totally new basis for building
coalitions. However, It would be able to block any legislation that
requires two thirds of all votes, i.e. the Constitution;
b) PZPR, ZSL and SD, having 64.2 per cent of seats, will not be able to
pass any legislation, that requires two thirds of all votes (for exam-
ple, the Constitution). Therefore, in such situations they would have
to seek the support of at least PAX and UChS or other groups;
c) PZPR and ZSL, having 58.3 per cent of seats, could pass any legis-
lation which do not require qualified majority;
d) the creation of a block consisting of ZSL, SD, independent members
of Parliament and the opposition, gives a majority which is adequate
for the creation of a coalition government.
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4) The creation of the above set-up in the Sejm should serve as a guarantee
for all sides taking part in the agreement. This would be evidence that
the party takes elections seriously, having the awareness, that in an
extreme situation it could be eliminated from the government.
5) If the elections were to be held on the above dates (11 and 25 June of this
year), it would be necessary to introduce by 8 March amendments to the
legislation on electoral regulations and a draft constitutional legislation,
requiring a shorter working period of the Sejm.
Warsaw, 14.02.1989
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1. The idea of setting up the senate as an upper chamber with powers that are
not too far reaching, seems to be very wise for the transitional period to nor-
mal political democracy. Wise and at the same time courageous, is also the
idea of selecting the senate in contesting elections, i.e. with the participation
of rival (competing) sides.
2. Unfortunately, the idea of implementing the majority electoral ordinance in
the Senate is totally reckless (from the point of view of the need to ensure an
evolutionary and peaceful process in the transition to this democracy), and
even hypocritical (resembling a referendum and the second stage of the
reform). Something has failed here, either the imagination or knowledge,
or both.
3. The majority ordinances, typical for English-speaking countries, favour deci-
sively the party, which obtained the majority of votes. Having received 60%
of votes, [such a party] takes 80–90 per cent of seats, and in conditions of
low political stability, even more. This system aims to ensure that the win-
ning party has an appropriate and lasting advantage, and to eliminate smaller
parties, in fact, all of them, but two. The Conservative party in Great Britain,
having recently obtained 53 per cent of votes (I recall this from memory –
and so I might possibly be mistaken) received nearly 70 per cent of seats,
while the liberals – for a dozen or so percent of votes received only a couple
of seats. And all this despite the existence of super stable constituencies, i.e.
those, where the electorate for a hundred years gave the majority of their
votes to the candidate of a particular party. Today, in Poland, the majority-
based system (i.e. one-seat constituencies and the election by a majority of
votes) promises the opposition 100 per cent or nearly that number of seats
with 65–70 per cent of votes received.
4. Political consequences of such total defeat of the government camp could be
unpredictable. One has to take into account such a rise of a wave of triumphal
radicalism that could destroy any compromises and which nobody would be
able to contain. One cannot disregard the atmosphere of desperation and
hatred, which are triggered off by both the crisis lasting already 10 years,
and by the worsening economic situation.
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5. The idea of selecting quite an odd ordinance to the senate (implementing in
Poland the USA model and the treatment of administrative regions
(Polish:województwa) as states /!/) was promulgated, most likely, because of
the following aspirations: a/ the desire to give privileges to the agricultural
regions in the hope that they would vote for the coalition’s candidates; b/
counting on the fact, that in one-seat constituencies, in the process of voting
for ‘persons’, many coalition candidates would camouflage ‘their own’ or
‘crypto-own’. One cannot see any other reasons. These must be illusions. The
support for the coalition is, indeed, better in the rural areas than in large
cities, but this would not be enough to gain advantage over the opposition,
even more so, that in the final count the voting in the majority of villages
could be decided quite simply by the parish priest. The ‘b’ [option] is point-
less to discuss, because the camouflage would be immediately removed and
the appropriate candidate indicated, i.e. the political force would indicate its
own candidate. One cannot be under the illusion of experiences of elections
held until now, where we created the pretence of competition, however, the
voters immediately recognized this and ignored our endeavours.
6. The only safe and somehow the most democratic ordinance to the senate
seems to be, at present, the traditional Polish five-adjective ordinance (based
on the March Constitution), providing for the proportional elections. Then
one would have to form several seats’ constituencies and vote for lists. It
seems that the coalition would receive then not less than 30–35 per cent votes
and the same number of seats. This would not be a catastrophe, and the sen-
ate would be the reverse of the Sejm. Of course, if the atmosphere were to
worsen to the level seen in 1980–81, it would be worse, but always better than
in the majority elections. Furthermore, the proportional elections would not
eliminate smaller groups, truly independent or intermediary; it would be
worth while giving them access to the ballotage, when the dichotomous
set-up contains the danger of the confrontation of two fundamentalists.
7. Technically, the proportional elections would require the setting up of 15
six-seat districts, joining several administrative regions into one district
(regions), which would not rule out some kind of privileges for the agricul-
tural districts (although this does not seem to be especially important). One
could leave a small state list for the division of votes that were left unused in
districts; there are in existence known and well developed models with the
best tradition of parliamentary democracy. The list of candidates proposed in
districts would compete with each other – as it used to be before the war. One
could imagine that the coalition and some opposition groups would submit
lists in all districts, which does not exclude the ‘independent’ lists in single
districts. In such cases the campaigning is two-fold: for the candidates and
for the political group as a whole. Despite superficial feelings, this situation
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